Soon the French Air Force will shower its concept of brotherhood from its bombers

(To Denise Serangelo)
15/11/15

Before any analysis, and consideration must start from the assumption that it is a serious act of collective irresponsibility to generalize violence by attributing it to a specific ethnic or religious group. The names of the attackers have not been made known by the Paris authorities to the state of the art. A Syrian passport was found near the lifeless body of one of the terrorists. The authenticity of this document is still doubtful and remains one of the decisive points to investigate.

French investigative sources have stated on several occasions that the Bataclan concert hall bombers spoke fluent French, without Middle Eastern dialectal influences. This would suggest at least second-generation immigrants. A second individual, whose name according to rumors would be Ismael M. he had already been filed by the French intelligence services. A second passport, this time Egyptian and even in this case of doubtful authenticity, was found near the kamikaze who blew himself up in front of the Stade de France of Saint-Denis.

The accomplices of the attackers are searching all over France and there is talk of at least eight men to track down. The researches have expanded also and above all in the neighboring countries to France, Germany and Italy in primis. Both countries made themselves available to fully support the investigations of the French police. Whether the attacks were predictable or not, we do not know. Closing the borders by preventing any "suspect" (whose archetype is unknown) from crossing the border is not a great idea. French terrorism is above all within the country, a sort of revolt due to the lack of integration between the world that second-generation immigrants leave and the one in which they try to get themselves accepted. Islamic Jihad has found fertile ground in those more manipulable personalities, who have no place in French society and feel excluded from that of origin. All this is far from being a holy or religious war, if anything, it is a psychological war that is played on the cutting edge but above all it is a war that we cannot lose.

The places that have been chosen for the attacks have some peculiarities that should be emphasized. Unlike the 7 January 2015 attack on the editorial office of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, the places chosen this time are not the symbol of a West that derides and stains the name of the prophet Muhammad. They are places characterized by a normality that frightens even more than the bombs tied to life and the kalashnikovs aimed at the head, places that represent all of us in our daily life. The unpredictability of this choice by terrorists aims to amplify the sense of insecurity of ordinary citizens in their daily lives. Just everyday life is the goal of terrorism and the struggle against the West and it is here that they try to strike the soldiers of terror. The almost total impossibility of entering large-scale events such as international meetings or large sporting events has made incredibly vulnerable and attractive places less representative but more daily. However, more than a clarification is needed.

The suicide bombers could have waited a little over half an hour to have all the visitors of the stadium where the France-Germany match was playing, with a definitely greater number of victims. The closeness with which the attacks were presented to President Hollande is disconcerting, the attackers could have come directly to him, to the political symbol of France, to the man who represents the country and who should be the most protected of all. This geographical proximity and the choice of crowded and completely normal public places creates that sense of waiting for the next attack. All of us, when we go around Europe we will look with a little more suspicion at the first Middle Eastern who crosses the threshold of a shop, whether we want it or not.

The bombers, as we have already said, do not yet have a definite profile, but we can make some considerations on the conduct of the terrorist operation, drawing some conclusions from it. There were six terrorist operations conducted simultaneously between Friday and Saturday evening, events disconnected in logical terms but similar for used techniques and chosen places.

The first episode at the Stade de France around the 21.15 was presented to French citizens with two major explosions, total victims three, not yet clear if the victims are also counted. A choice that is certainly atypical to blow itself up in an almost deserted street, when it was enough to wait a few more minutes for maximum efficiency. We do not know how to give a rational explanation for this behavior, we could hypothesize an organizational issue of terrorists or an unforeseen randomness. The last explanation we gave for this anomalous behavior is that the inexperience of the attacker took the upper hand on his bloodlust. The anxious desire to show off bringing with them the highest number of infidels may have prompted this boy or young man to act earlier than expected. On the other hand, "performance anxiety" is an evil that also affects those who are subjected to stress deriving from terrorist operations, psychology does not give discounts to anyone.

Practically at the same time as the events of the Stadium, the first shots were fired, (later identified as a kalashnikov), at the 20 number of Rue Alibert at the restaurant Le Petite Cambodge. In such a small place it would have been more rewarding to use a suicidal action, less dispersive and intense. However, a total number of 14 victims were obtained by the attackers. The restaurant, although ethnic, does not have a known symbolic meaning.

The bloodiest attack is certainly the one that took place at the Bataclan theater, on Boulevard Voltaire, in a neighborhood between the 11, the 10 and the 3 arrondissement. The victims, almost all young fans of the metal band that was playing, were at first taken hostage and then shot down with a Kalashnikov blow. Also in this case we have rather anomalous times. The situation in which the seizure of those present had only led to the killing of the attackers had already occurred in the market Kosher in January, a very rewarding conclusion for us but in the view of the attacker does not have a great logical sense .

If the purpose is to harvest as many victims as possible, entering a theater and shooting would have had a different result, but it was not so. What we can hypothesize is the inexperience of the attacker, who, not having a strict paramilitary instruction, decided according to his personal logic how to act. The second hypothesis is also here, a crisis linked to the excitement of the moment, a false move by those who could not resist the death of their enemy.

A shootout at the Belle Equipe restaurant resulted in 18 deaths, around 21.38 on Friday 13 November. We know little or nothing about this event, but the number of victims leads us to think that it was conducted with exemplary effectiveness. Temporarily near this event there are several shootings in the streets, again with Kalashnikovs, which will cause the last victims, plus an explosion in an almost empty room near the stadium where there are no casualties.

The complexity of this attack is dictated by the simultaneity of terrorist events. The basic rationale is that police and armed forces could not rush to multiple locations at the same time, leaving certain points unavoidably uncovered. The explosions near the Stadium would have perhaps attracted the bulk of the forces, given the presence in the Hollande area promptly evacuated, and obviously the attack on the Bataclan theater given the presence of hostages. Six contemporary but disconnected attacks also have a practical reason; after the first attack, France would have activated extraordinary measures to protect its citizens, preventing the execution of other attacks. Despite the prompt and swift claim of the IS, the techniques used by the commando would make one think more than ferocious terrorists well armed and trained to terrorists with skills learned from the internet or through the breviaries forwarded by the Islamic State itself. A group of lone wolves, exalted by the gripping rhetoric of the Caliph who felt compelled to fight their Jihad, in a house they did not hear from them.

The Kalashnikov is one of the most smuggled weapons in the world and procuring a cargo, with the right knowledge, is not a complex task as can be imagined. The explosive belts were assembled and built in an elementary way with household products that we could find in all our homes. Adding nails to the explosive effect is a gimmick used very often during offensives against American troops in Iraq around the 2004 / 2005.

It can be hypothesized that, given the nature of the weapons and techniques used, the cell intervened in Paris does not have a real direct military training. Rather it is credible that these subjects trained themselves on the internet, through propaganda videos with which the IS trains its troops via the web. The errors like that of the Betaclan theater, the use of a lethal weapon like the kalashnikov used in an anomalous way reducing their effectiveness, the craft bombs would lead back to the profile of a motivated but improvised terrorist.

Despite the inconsistencies with the brutality and cold planning of the beheadings of the IS, a handful of elated has brought one of the greatest nations to history to its knees. France, knowing full well that this handful of kids has been cleverly influenced by the Islamic State and its fabulous rhetoric, has declared through the voice of President Holland that it will be considered the Friday 13 November attack as 'Act of War'.

If the Islamic State thinks that this is only the beginning of the storm, it is right, soon the French aviation will rain its concept of brotherhood from its bombers.