The debate that accompanied the celebrations of NATO's 75th anniversary, and above all the subsequent controversies, all centered on the (necessary and due) contributions to common defense as opposed to national spending limits, have made us lose sight of the essence of the problems, the future we would like.
We have forgotten how much it cost and who really paid for the current relative well-being of the West and in particular of Europe, that Europe which includes the defeated, the former "enemies".
The West is rooted in democracy, free elections, media freedom, the rule of law, judicial independence and accountability, and therefore in the "welfare state", albeit with different interpretations according to latitude and culture. ..
This is a perspective and a system that is opposed to authoritarianism.
If it were not attractive as a system, how could the pressures of migratory waves be explained? How could we explain, in particular, the origin and multiplication of protests for human and civil rights throughout the world?
Rights that are universal, they are not Western concoctions as opponents claim, it is a question of what must be defended, consistently and with confidence.
Defending what the West and Europe represent is connected to more than just what is happening negli United States, but above all to what is happening to United States.
Defending what the West and Europe represent also means identification and sharing of values, identification and coherence in alliances, complete identification and not one of convenience, opportunistic in alternating phases, or on segments of interest.
US leadership is being questioned by China, especially in the Middle East, especially when it is realized that Hamas' war against Israel is not limited to Gaza, it is a proxy war linked to an axis starting from Ukraine .
In this context, where is Europe, which has and is experiencing a war on its doorstep?
Is Europe ready for a new transatlantic era?
I am certainly not a fan and supporter of Biden (and less than Trump, and hence a profound dilemma...) but Joe Biden's exit from the presidential race, and the form in which it occurred (from a dome of interests) creates uncertainties about the future of ties between the United States and the EU.
Will there still be a full identification of roots, values and interests between the two sides of the Atlantic?
Biden was unsustainable as a presidential candidate in 2017, as the expression of an artifice of a "dome of power", expendable and sent into disarray in a contest with uncertain outcomes, he was then a symptom of weakness throughout his mandate, to finally become a source of embarrassment, political and credibility, reasons why - when he withdrew from the US presidential race - there was palpable relief, not only in the US but also in most European capitals.
However, we have forgotten that Biden is the last president of the United States of Atlanticist origin: his career, his experience in foreign policy and his age made him an Atlanticist who believed in the lasting ties between the United States and Europe.
A younger generation does not have that institutional memory or that connection with Europe, just think not only of the declarations of the new artificial icon, Harris, but - going a little further back, of the experiences and acquaintances of Trump himself and his followers. ..
Atlantic commitments – exemplified post-1945 in US-led multilateral institutions such as NATO, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations and all its subsidiary bodies – are in poor shape: the post-1945 and post-XNUMX eras. -The Cold War in which the West naively believed it could prevail in perpetuity turned out to be an illusion and, if it hasn't already ended, it is ending.
Europe's relief at Biden's abandonment from the race is misplaced: the outcome of the US elections remains uncertain in an unclear domestic and international landscape.
And once again, regardless of the outcome, Europeans are unprepared for the tectonic shifts that will take place in the United States.
This should be the opportunity for Europe, the same Europe that should have been ready to take charge of its own security and after 25 years of adjustment (a generation !!!) should know how to deal (au pair) with the Atlantic allies.
With declining support for Biden, starting within his own party and evidence of weaknesses and fractures within it, commentators and leaders across Europe are increasingly anxious about Donald Trump's potential return to the White House, but they should also be for Harris' eventual rise.
In both cases they should remember the characteristics of previous presidencies, with Obama oriented towards the "pivot to Asia", without discounts and without agreements with the EU, and with Trump who between 2017 and 2021 did not make discounts but did not close the EU (“only” he asked, first of all for clarity and then for certain commitments).
What Trump did, and what he is feared to do again:
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attacked Europe (in particular and with some reason Germany, due to Merkel's pro-Russian and pro-Chinese ambiguities);
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attacked NATO (for what? for efficiency? for a cost/benefit evaluation typical of an entrepreneur?);
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he harshly criticized the soft power of the EU and its values (much preferring leaders who defend conservative principles, who are against immigration, who defend national sovereignty: Hungarian Viktor Orbán was, and is, one of his big fans).
European leaders have thus received many warnings about the imbalance in transatlantic relations.
Trump was not the origin of the distancing (we need to reflect, and a lot, on Obama/Hillary Clinton...) but he only amplified what previous administrations had said to Europe:
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He must stop taking the American security umbrella for granted.
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It needs to spend more on defense and take its own security seriously.
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It must stop free-riding its transatlantic ally.
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It must match its economic strength with political ambition.
European leaders, perhaps in the false perception of a peace achieved and of a possible balance played on two or three fronts, have not assessed either the long-term strategic situation or the need for alignments, starting from clear definitions: only French President Emmanuel Macron (also in this case my dilemma of sympathy and affinity ...) understood those messages; over and over again, at the risk of remaining isolated and being even more unpopular and arrogant than he is by nature, he told Europeans to be prepared for the "Day After", and perhaps he said it in the wrong ways and at the wrong times , with the same vehemence and arrogance that Europeans accuse Trump of.
Macron, unfortunately wavering and conditioned by his intrinsic weakness, was not apocalyptic. In his speeches and interviews, he always warned about Europe's vulnerability in terms of values, democracy and Europe as an idea.
Its implicit message was that Europe needed to defend itself from internal and external threats and from political parties that sought to challenge the essential architecture of the EU.
No other European leader has been so frank and clear about Europe's weaknesses as an ethereal entity sleepwalking into crisis rather than protecting what Europe itself – as part of the West – represents.
This too must allow us a different reading of events: not only Macron's gambles, traumas and internal problems, the negative legacy of Merkel who clips the wings and credibility of the Germans, but Biden's own withdrawal from the presidential race contain and highlight the vulnerability of Europe.
Ukrainian War (with great European responsibilities, especially German ones) and the now widespread and, I dare say, endemic conflict in the Red Sea are the litmus test of Western stability and credibility.
In the Middle East, leaving aside Iran for a moment, a loose cannon but a useful tool for both China and Russia, the leadership of the United States is not being questioned, but the leadership of the United States is being questioned (especially by China). credibility and fragility of the entire West, in particular of that fault line which is a divided Europe, almost on everything.
The President of the European Commission - Ursula von der Leyen, with too many shadows behind her (for both Europe and the USA) - wants the EU to have a defense chief and a collective defense spending policy: Russia's war against Ukraine supports this need, but not all member states are convinced.
Some member states want a union that eliminates unanimity and veto rights on foreign policy issues. They want a more integrated Europe instead of an EU "tied" to the member states and their "small" internal politics.
Essentially, we are talking about the very survival, if not re-foundation, of Europe: the twenty-seven member states of the EU do not agree on the management of the Union, precisely when greater political and economic integration would make sense.
Several governments want to regain more sovereignty, hypothesizing a "day after tomorrow" to the detriment of the possibility/necessity, in a full-blown emergency, of making Europe more capable and ready.
Defense therefore remains a national and sovereign issue, its evolution requires long times incompatible with needs, resulting in intrinsic weakness and only NATO can offer solutions in the current framework.
The problems and threats, with enormous collective risks, are of today, not of tomorrow or the day after and this is demonstrated by the path with "distinction" of Western countries towards the ongoing wars.
The overlap of conflicts and the worsening of the Middle East where the commitment of Western countries is direct, even if varied, has favored Russia and put Ukraine in difficulty, with doubts about the unconditional support it has enjoyed so far.
The policy of "distinctions" applies to Ukraine but is maximum towards Israel, forgetting too often - even in the USA, so much so as to make us doubt about the candidates - that Israel is a Western country, a unique outpost, isolated in an area as critical as it is fundamental not only for the development but for the very survival of the West and above all of Europe.
Hamas' war against Israel is not limited to Gaza, and ultimately it is not Hamas's.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long considered and flagged Iran as the biggest threat to his country: his decision to bomb Iranian-backed Houthi targets in Yemen is not a stretch, it is a sign of broader regional implications of the war in Gaza.
Containing the conflict will require the leadership of the United States and some Arab countries, in a new framework of balances and power relations, without counting on the EU, reduced to the rank of spectator in the region.
In a moment of virtual vacuum at the top, the departments of State and Defense of the United States find themselves at having to mediate even if the country is fully occupied and worried about internal issues.
Those commitments on the instruments created in the post-war period such as multilateral institutions led by the USA, already mentioned (NATO, WB, IMF, etc.) have lost their luster, prestige and credibility: Europe is not prepared for this either: nor the European countries , neither the EU nor the United States has committed to adapting these institutions; it is China, supported by Russia, that is trying to reshape, replace or destroy them.
It is difficult to understand if and how Europe can respond. As far as the United States is concerned, not only can immediate answers not be given due to the focus on a gloomy November 5th, but it does not seem that the matter is a priority in the (vague) programs of candidates: the world order does not seem to fit into their mentality and tradition.
Europe would have the opportunity to come forward, within the framework of a new agreement (and a new agreement with concrete mutual contributions, also in terms of defense and coherence) but - unfortunately - with the exception of a weakened President Macron, the leaders in Europe, especially in Germany, do not have the courage to explain and do what is necessary.
There is no talk of cohesion, there is no talk of reconstructing - updated - that matrix that had led to the post-war rebirth (cohesion and matrix that had made victory possible in the most serious moments of the conflict), we don't talk about investments for freedom and the possibility of development, we limit ourselves to arguing about the costs and expenses for defense when the future is at stake, we entrench ourselves in sterile relationships thinking of an "Uncle Sam ” which has already handed over to a new generation of politicians, who we do not understand and do nothing to understand them, to create a new transatlantic cohesion created on affinities and (why not?) again common values, including decisionism and reason of state (and on this, even if reluctantly, I must recognize that Macron was and is right).
Defending what the West and Europe represent also means identification and sharing of values, identification and coherence in alliances, complete and not convenient identification, search for affinities between the new political generations of the two Atlantic shores: to answer the questions ( i...”must”...) expressed vehemently but also sincerely by Trump but already latent in the directions of previous administrations, Obama in particular, it is certainly necessary to reconsider and connect the current fragmentation of alliances that have the USA at their centre.
The commonality of values, the global priorities, which concern the Indo-Pacific as much as the Mediterranean and the Middle East must be found in NATO but become a common basis with the EU, even in the delicate and painful issue of contributions, with a greater investment (and not expenditure) of the same, as an active and not passive part of the umbrella for collective security, in an alliance without subjugation or donations.
Photo: Élysée
