The most recent events should make even the most skeptical think about the future of the Atlantic Alliance, or at least of "this" Atlantic Alliance. I say this as a convinced "Atlanticist", but also as a person who believes it is necessary to face reality.
Let's be clear, it is not the Ukrainian question that represents the pathology that could prove fatal for the Alliance. Ukraine is a critical situation, of course, but it represents just a symptom of a much deeper problem, which we have refused to see for too long.
This is not about discussing the continuation of the conflict in Ukraine. Without US support, European countries alone, despite the statements of Starmer and Macron, would not be credible in providing support to Ukraine to continue the conflict. Of course, they could continue to provide money. Support in terms of armaments would be limited, because European armies have already bled themselves dry for Ukraine and, let's be honest, European industry alone would not be able to provide ammunition supplies without a significant reconversion (which would take time and we know very well that Kiev, especially without US support, he doesn't have much time).
Above all, however, it would lack the most technologically advanced support that, today, only the US can supply Ukraine. Even more importantly, without the US, the deterrent power to counter a possible Russian escalation (not necessarily nuclear) would be lacking. Deterrent power that the US has and that European countries do not have (despite the much more limited purely national nuclear capabilities of Britain and France).
Some (superficially) suggest that Europeans, as individual countries or as the EU, could send their own military to support the Ukrainians. It would be a sign of coherence, of course. But it would not be very realistic. This would mean, alternatively, place their soldiers under Kiev's command and control (in short, do as North Korea does in favor of the Russians) or impose many of those caveats (i.e. limits) on their operational use which would make them more of a burden than an aid to the Ukrainian armed forces.
Let us recall that, in this case, the countries sending troops to Ukraine would be exposed to justified Russian attacks on their territories (and this time it would not only be cyber attacks).
Furthermore, we must acknowledge that, despite the combined US and EU support, things on the ground for Ukraine are not going well. Of course, Russian military power has not turned out to be as effective as we in the West considered it. On paper, one might have expected that the Russians would be able to gain control of strategic cities such as Kharkiv and Odessa quite quickly. The Ukrainians prevented them from doing so, it is true. However, on the ground, the Russians have been steadily advancing, albeit very slowly and at the cost of huge losses (losses of men and weapons that the Kremlin can, however, absorb and restore much more easily than Kiev).
It is unfortunate, but perhaps it would be a good idea to take note that if the US turns the other way, the Europeans today Unfortunately, they could practically do very little for the Ukrainians if they continued to fight.
This - as just written - "Today"! For “tomorrow” it will depend on the choices that will be made.
First of all, it seems urgent to take note, once and for all, of a trend that does not appear to be able to change: the widening of the Atlantic and the disappearance of the coincidence of strategic interests between the USA and its European allies. The West no longer exists in terms of security and if it did, it would only be represented by the Latin deity of Janus the Two-Faced: the US looks to the Indo-Pacific, the Europeans to Russia and the Mediterranean.
In essence, we must avoid acting like those who, faced with a marriage that is now in tatters, stubbornly persist in not taking note of it, accepting continuous insults from their spouse in order to avoid reaching divorce.
The gradual weakening of the bond between Europeans and Americans is nothing new. It is a problem that has been increasing over the years for decades and which we have often tried to avoid taking note of here in Europe.
Since the end of the US-USSR confrontation, the strategic interests of the US and the European members of NATO have begun to diverge.
Previously, such relations were based on a symbiosis that guaranteed benefits to both, not only to the Europeans. The US provided protection to the Europeans and they they supported foreign and trade policy.
With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1990, US interests turned even more towards the Indo-Pacific.
To save the "Atlantic marriage" the Europeans followed the USA for twenty years in Afghanistan and in other "adventures" that they did not always respond to their security interests either. On the other hand, many in Western Europe (what George W. Bush contemptuously called “Old Europe”) felt an obligation of gratitude for US protection during the “Cold War” years, even if they no longer perceived theRussian Bear as a real threat. On the contrary, the countries of the "New Europe" (i.e. the new members of the "Atlantic Club" who had recently escaped the Soviet yoke) looked with confidence and a certain devotion to the USA, which they believed was the only one that could protect them from Russian threats, threats that, unlike ours, they still considered relevant.
Today the situation is clear. The US intends to focus on the confrontation with ChinaThey do not want Russia to get any closer to the Dragon and they want to remove it from Beijing's embrace, even at the cost of recognizing a "victory" in a theater, the European one, which for them today packaging. If this means the collapse of Ukraine, so be it.
The Trump Administration (through the voice of the “bad cop” JD Vance) has clearly stated that:
- US interests are primarily focused on the Indo-Pacific and China,
- Russia is no longer considered an enemy to be fought militarily, but rather a competitor with whom the US can come to an agreement and who could be useful to the US in containing Chinese power,
- Europe's security is no longer Washington's interest,
- the security and territorial integrity of Ukraine is a problem of Ukraine and, possibly, of Europeans,
- Any US political, military, economic support provided to allied countries has a cost: a cost that must be paid (by buying US gas or weapons or by giving up control over one's own valuable raw materials, such as rare earths).
Of course, then some European leaders can hope to gain benevolence by dealing in isolation (and perhaps behind the backs of others) with the “good cop” Trump, hoping to obtain personalized concessions. I fear that it is a policy that will not pay off and that the two policemen then they will have a big laugh at the expense of the individual European leaders who will have gone on a pilgrimage, hat in hand, to the White House.
The recent US decisions regarding Ukraine have also shown that Washington has abandoned the imperial approach to managing international affairs. An imperial approach that assumes that, whatever the party in power, national interests and international alliances remain unchanged. The US approach now appears much more utilitarian: “as long as you serve me, I support you, then I abandon you”. But above all: “if your cause was defended by my political opponent (Biden) now that I am in the White House, I no longer feel obliged to support you and if you had trusted the promises of my predecessor, poor you”.
It is clear that from now on, if Europeans ask Washington for support for their security needs, they will have to be willing to pay, pay now and pay cash: it will no longer be enough to repay with political loyalty. It could be much more expensive for us, but perhaps clearer.
On the other hand, the USA will no longer be able to obtain political support from the Europeans "on credit" (as in Afghanistan), because that credit they played it in Monaco first and at the White House a couple of days ago.
It is therefore necessary to take note of the fact that NATO, focused on the transatlantic bond and the certainty of a united military response to external aggression, no longer exists.
The US, despite what Elon Musk has declared, will not leave NATO. They would have no interest in doing so. Moreover, NATO may survive, by inertia, but it seriously risks becoming (or rather has probably already become) what the WEU (Western European Union) was in the past: an excuse to attend (useless) meetings and discussions in Brussels.
If European countries want to tackle their security problems together and not each on their own, they must quickly equip themselves with the military tools to guarantee, independently from the USA, both defense to the East (from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea) from a Russian/Belarusian threat (with a Russia that will be emboldened by the US withdrawal from the continent) and security to the South towards the Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa (counteracting in the region the interests hostile to us of the Chinaand Russia and Turkey, in addition to the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and, perhaps, dangerous US initiatives).
Having taken note that, by now, Europe will probably be able to do little about Ukraine, it is necessary to start looking at long-term solutions, with a political and military decision-making structure that can only be achieved within the EU and certainly not on "Brancaleone armies" based on variable-geometry associations of countries (like the one hypothesized in London today under Franco-British leadership).
Moreover, unilateral Franco-British initiatives in recent history (from the Suez crisis in 1956 to Libya in 2011) they don't seem to have had much success.
It would therefore be necessary to look to the EU which, unlike ad hoc agreements, can make use of a shared political-strategic decision-making structure and a well-established political structure.
However, the EU needs to be provided with a permanent military command structure similar to that of NATO, which can be used autonomously for EU operations. and that, in the event of interventions by the Alliance (if NATO were to survive in a credible manner), it could be integrated into it.
Clearly this It does not require a phantom and unrealistic “European army”, but only a clear EU vision of its defence and security needs. and the adoption of financial procedures that ensure a fair distribution of financial burdens among member countries and, possibly, the acquisition of a common, albeit minimal, nuclear deterrent capability. A deterrent that the EU, as such, does not have.
It would be expensive, it would require leadership policies with a vision that goes beyond the horizon of the next elections (a rare thing indeed) and would require accepting the fact that, as Merkel had already predicted in May 2017 during Trump's first term: “we can no longer completely trust some allies” and “Europeans must take their destiny into their own hands”. Recent events, JD Vance's statements in Munich and Trump's meeting with Zelensky last Friday tell us that we must take those words seriously.
A painful evolution, but as in the case of a failed marriage, the sooner we acknowledge it the better, both for the future of a battered NATO (against which there is a risk of therapeutic obstinacy) and to seriously address the no longer postponable needs of European defense. European defense that would deserve a study that goes beyond the empty slogans that are heard these days (such as thesingle european army).
Photo: NATO
