Strength in numbers is not just a school motto, but a strategic truth: either Europe learns to defend itself together, or it will remain a sum of weaknesses.
I read the letter published on Difesa Online written by a soldier in which, drawing on his long experience in the field, he firmly states that a European army is and will remain a utopia. Understanding and respecting the author's point of view, I have decided to offer an alternative reflection, equally anchored in reality but with an eye to the future.
It's true: every soldier carries with him his own national identity, his own flag, his own pantheon of heroes. And it is equally true that, during international missions, differences in approach, operational caveats, and underground rivalries have often been encountered. But this very experience demonstrates that cooperation is possible, and above all that European security can no longer depend solely on the chaotic sum of national armies.
The interoperability problem is a structural problem, which must be addressed together with others to allow for the creation of a defence European common free from constraints imposed by external partners. Today, the armed forces of the EU countries operate over 170 major weapon systems, compared to approximately 30 in the United States.
Just to give an example: in Europe we have about ten main battle tanks, while the USA has 1. This generates inefficiencies, logistical problems and exorbitant costs for maintenance, spare parts and training.
Interoperability remains a declared but unmet objective. Joint exercises often serve to “plug holes” and not to build a real integrated capacity. A European army cannot exist without a deep harmonization of armaments, doctrines and operational languages. EU member states collectively spend more than €320 billion on defense each year, a theoretically massive figure, second only to that of the United States. But this spending is fragmented, redundant, and often ineffective.
According to the Annual report of the European Defence Agency (EDA), approximately 70% of defense spending remains purely domestic, without any coordination or synergy with other member countries. The result is a duplication of systems, a waste of public resources and a weakening of European strategic deterrence.
The European defence industry is among the best in the world in terms of technology and know-how, but it is extremely dispersed and internally competitive. French, German, Italian, Swedish companies compete among themselves, instead of joining forces to face the American, Chinese or Israeli giants.
Projects such as the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) program, led by France, Germany and Spain, or the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) for the tank of the future, demonstrate that European industrial cooperation is possible, but requires political vision and mutual trust. The lack of common standards hinders competitiveness and undermines European technological sovereignty.
In this sense, the recent j between Leonardo e Rheinmetall, a virtuous example of collaboration between two European defense excellences, which demonstrates how transnational industrial synergy can strengthen both the competitiveness and the strategic autonomy of the continent.
Today's challenges - from the cyber threat to terrorism, from hybrid wars to instability in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe - know no borders and cannot be effectively addressed by any state alone, not even the strongest. The illusion of national strategic self-sufficiency is today more utopian than the idea of a common defense.
The European army, in fact, does not exist because there was no serious desire to build it, not because it is conceptually impossible.. The Union has made progress: from PESCO to battlegroups, from the EDF (European Defence Fund) to the European Defence Agency. But everything remains fragile and incoherent because it lacks political will, not cohesion.
The amalgam is built: as happened in the post-war period when former enemies transformed into allies in NATO, or as can be seen today in joint training schools, in inter-force courses, in European academies.
European identity is not given once and for all, but is created over time. Common symbols - the Ode to Joy, the star-spangled flag - do not yet evoke the same thrill as the national anthem, of course. But how many Italian soldiers felt that thrill in 1862, a few months after unification? The nation was built with difficulty, amid divisions and mistrust, and today the defense of Italy is unthinkable without the contribution of the Alpine troops, the Bersaglieri, the sailors and the aviators who come from every region. Why should it be different for Europe?
Common defense does not mean eliminating national armed forces, but networking capabilities, standards, commands, logistics, to form a real framework European. It is a necessity, not a luxury. The United States has only 1 Pentagon. We have 27 defense ministries, 27 budgets, 27 systems of procurement often redundant. A single European 5th generation fighter aircraft instead of three different national programs would mean less spending, more interoperability, more effectiveness.
The future does not pass through the fusion of national armies into a bureaucratic and impersonal colossus, but through the progressive construction of a hard core of shared capabilities: permanent integrated commands, single logistics, common intelligence, European procurement, binding operating standards.
To give up on building a European army because today we lack a common language, shared memory and unified command means condemning Europe to strategic irrelevance.
It is true, we are not ready today. But we will never be, if we do not begin. As with every historical challenge, we must have the courage to begin something that perhaps will not be concluded in our generation, but that is indispensable for future generations.
For this reason, with respect, I say: the European army is not a mirage. It is a construction site still open. But it is the only way to a European sovereignty vera.
