On Saturday a certain number of people took to the streets, all for different reasons, with opposing logics. Some, and among them a few with conviction and knowledge of the subject, had been called to demonstrate for peace and against a rearmament that would take away resources for well-being.
A specious summons: It's not about rearming Europe to wage war on Russia, it's about rearming Europe to dissuade anyone, including now Russia, from waging war on us.
Those who think that Putin will stop once Ukraine is divided, perhaps with the help of Trump himself (an interpretation that needs to be re-read), are deluding themselves.
Putin's intent (and his very survival) is clearly to reconstruct the traditional Russian sphere of influence, when Europe was divided between the Western bloc, led by the United States, and the Eastern bloc, in the hands of the Soviet Union.
Victory emboldens dictators and criminals: Putin belongs to both categories*.
If Trump does not intend to do so, Europe will have to stop him, for its own survival and not to replace the American policeman in the game of the inevitable, necessary, new world order.
It is not about retaliation, about waging war on Russia, but about giving credibility and gaining respect through deterrence; which one and with what “thickness” and in how much time?
Certainly and inevitably one must think of a "nuclear umbrella": it will have to be common, but how? The French and British premises and resources are there, but they are not sufficient, neither in number nor in time for integration; common European defense and deterrence can only be the offspring, the evolution without any discontinuity of the current transatlantic alliance and of the spirit that had shaped it.
The compactness of the EU is still evolving: Macron has offered Germany the French nuclear umbrella as Merz had asked for during the election campaign, a not subtle distinction from a true European sharing; the United Kingdom, a Labour-led "external", not by chance bitterly fought by Musk, is getting closer to the European Union on this aspect and is not abandoning Ukraine; the current only Russian "bridgehead" in the European Council, Viktor Orbán, has been isolated; fragmentation, to say the least, the disarray of the Italian representation in the European Parliament is not a good image of our country, which can undermine actions and credibility at Council level.
A lack of unity that is more than an alarm: if we have to talk about European defense, we cannot proceed with unanimity among 27 but with reinforced cooperation, a formula that is certainly valid but that can leave exposed flanks and make us reconsider NATO as the only option in the short term.
Italy is the traditional and perfect field of disinformation and propaganda: hesitates, split as much as, if not more than, the times of the Cold War.
Split by a transversal contestation that sounds like a blatant contradiction regarding one of the essential and decisive cornerstones of a democratic and peaceful policy, the defense policy, in every aspect, as a return to the origins and relaunch of the spirit and construction of Europe, with a capital E, the democratic, liberal, constitutional, safe and peaceful one.
European unity and the common European spirit cannot take off without a sort of “national solidarity” around the future and the prospect of a Europe, whose strength must also be demonstrated by military deterrence.
It is not just a matter of choosing about Ukraine, about solidarity and the defense of an attacked country, but of choosing in this way about one's own future.
If Italy hesitates it must be only on what role to play as mediator or not, not on what to do, which is only to acquire a credible deterrent of its own.
Mediation can only be that of gathering greater support, of smoothing out a common path, of sowing and cultivating a political space between Donald Trump and Ursula von der Leyen, thanks to the greater activity and credibility achieved by the Italian Government with a lively international policy across the board.
The fixed point is the awareness that we are subject to a certain threat, Putin, and to a latent but also temporary risk, Trump.
The journey is long, the "European army" is not there yet, it will not be there for a long time, it cannot be used as an excuse for inaction and delays, and it will not be born until Europe, after having stopped at the currency, will pool its resources.:
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resources, with a common tax system, abandoning politics in the tax havens of the North and minimal concessions to the Southern front,
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will have a common and binding foreign policy,
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will elect by universal suffrage a president who is not answerable only to his national electorate.
In the meantime, which is certainly not short, much still depends on Trump, given that after the unjustifiable farce and expulsion of Zelensky from the White House, a glimmer of hope seems to have reopened, a hope against all odds and despite all the doubts about Putin's ambiguities: perhaps it is necessary to reread the news several times, review the background and believe, at least a little, that You should not judge the president of the United States by his words, but by his actions.
Trump is arrogant and unpredictable, it is not yet known how unreliable he is, but it is a warning bell, even more so when the EU is no less, even in the choice of forms: "ReArm Europe”, immediately adopted as a slogan, was neither an appropriate, convincing nor a driving force, and the concept of “rearmament” It has been exploited by adverse propaganda and has generated an incorrect narrative.
Europe is not preparing to wage war, but to ensure peace, its own development through peace, for this perhaps the concept of regain one's defense, which involves that of reindustrialization of defense, recovering those investments too hastily thrown away under the pacifist wave that had overwhelmed the common sense of geopolitics.
The misunderstood “European strategic autonomy” is no longer a theoretical question, but a pragmatic priority, aimed at ensuring the credibility of the European Union as a geopolitical actor and this has a cost, which must be balanced by benefits, by investments that mean employment, research, acquisition of new technologies.
Trump, with his pressure on NATO allies to increase military spending, is certainly shaking up Europe but, beyond the antipathy he may arouse (and is easily exploited) his requests are not unjustified and extemporaneous and have at least the merit of pushing European countries to reflect on their own strategic autonomy.
It is not a question of replacing the United States but of assuming a greater share of responsibility at least in the defense of the European continent, a share of responsibility that also means bargaining power towards friends and adversaries.
Trump and his “ways” must not be an easy tool for propaganda, exploiting him in a frontal and uncompromising confrontation between the national opposition and the unwelcome political party, which, moreover, governs by popular mandate and so far with popular approval.
At the moment to ensure stability and deterrence there are no alternatives to the transatlantic bond, especially in a world where threats are increasingly complex. A structural divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic would compromise the credibility of the entire Western defense apparatus, but above all it would increase the exposure and fragility of the most exposed part, on the front line, the EU.
Like it or not, but we must be pragmatic, the European security architecture is founded on the Atlantic Alliance; even if Europe must grow in terms of strategic autonomy, we cannot afford a break with the United States.
Italy must not choose the "band" in which to be, but its Government must commit to promoting a strengthening of European capabilities within the framework of NATO, according to the principle of "complementarity and non-duplication".
The inappropriate and stinging term "rearmament" has been used but too often, and inappropriately, we only speak of “European Army” inducing misconceptions and recalling the past of the last century, but the threat is multidimensional and instead we should always and only talk about "European Defence”; the best contribution that Italy can give, due to its position and its nature, is the sea and the defense of maritime security everywhere and in any case, and in this it has credibility and experience compared to its European and Atlantic partners, and this is already one of the applications of the principle of "complementarity and non-duplication".
Our geostrategic position, combined with the ability to dialogue with numerous regional actors, allows us – always and immediately from a European defence perspective – to play a role of 'security provider' not only from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Finland but across the oceans, as well as contributing substantially to NATO, EU and UN missions.
Europe, and Italy as an active and authoritative part, is not preparing to wage war, but to guarantee peace and manage its persistence. Democracies equip themselves with defense tools precisely to avoid conflict, strengthening the capacity for deterrence.
Historically, peace is maintained when one is able to defend it. A vulnerable and unprepared Europe would be an incentive for those who want to destabilize or threaten it. Investing in security and defense capabilities means protecting our citizens, their well-being and their future, our infrastructure and our critical services, our sovereignty.
Cohesion and wisdom are transversal and rightly come also from representatives of the opposition in the fracture that has opened: common defense cannot be limited to the creation of a "European army", but must be based on technological capabilities, strategic autonomy and strengthened cooperation between Member States.
Draghi, a profound connoisseur of “AmeriKa”, had not by chance launched the first real political reasoning on the future of Europe after the installation of the new US administration: It's time to act, not just talk.
He did so in a hearing at the European Parliament, a political reasoning based on facts, and with concrete proposals: “We need to break down internal barriers, standardize, harmonize and simplify national regulations and push for a more equity-based capital market”. A political program concrete, focused on the strategic nodes of European integration: defense, technology, energy and capital markets. Areas that, indirectly, also respond to the demands of an opposition that contests the (virtuous) spending on defense and a common plan still in evolution, attributing instead the shortcomings in health and education to these choices, when in reality they are the result of endemic tax evasion and chronic, transversal bad administration.
* (From an international legal perspective, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin in March 2023, accusing him of war crimes related to the forced deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia. However, Russia does not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC, and many countries do not follow up on such warrants - ed.)
