With some suffering, we recently saw in Washington how advanced age and the confusion of objectives can today make even those who for decades have been a great protagonist of international politics appear inconsistent and disoriented.
No, I am not referring to President Joe Biden, but to the Atlantic Alliance which, in recent days with the Summit (i.e. the "Summit of Heads of State and Government") in Washington, intended to celebrate its 75th birthday.
In a geopolitical situation like the current one, which I would not hesitate to define as extremely critical, characterized by conflict situations on the eastern and south-eastern borders of the Alliance (Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Israel-Hamas conflict), by the blockade of the Suez maritime routes which strangles the vital flows towards Europe, without considering the growing annoyance with which governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America look at "our battles" often considered ideological and far from their feelings, I would have expected the approval of a document on the one hand stronger and on the other more articulated. Instead, personally, I found the Summit Declaration even more dull than many of those that preceded it in recent years.
It is true that finding agreement at 32 is not easy (it is easier to omit any point of contrast so as not to compromise the smiles for the final photo of the leaders). Furthermore, a shaky US leadership at the very least may have generated panic, especially among leaders who had embraced its line without ifs or buts and who perhaps feared having the Ukrainian money in their hands if Trump were to return to the White House. Therefore, it seems to have been preferred to focus on a few points on which agreement can be found, ignoring all those that could generate disagreements, and to secure aid to Ukraine before a possible change in US policy.
Of course, on the sidelines of the Summit, important agreements were signed between nations (such as the quadrilateral agreement between France, Germany, Italy and Poland) but these are agreements between individual member countries and not collective decisions of the Alliance, or the sending of the famous (and now not brand new) F16s, the subject of bilateral agreements between donor countries and Ukraine.
Looking at the Summit Declaration in more detail, I found the tone in addressing the counterparts jarring. I felt like I was witnessing the arrival of a sour teacher in class, aware of having no influence on her unruly students, who scolds in a severe tone the naughtiest, most mischievous and reluctant students, threatening severe punishments.
It's a shame that the harshly scolded reprobates (Russia, China, Belarus, North Korea and Iran) were not in class and that, in any case, it is unlikely that the teacher (understood as NATO and not as the USA) will be in a position to follow up on her threats of punishment exemplary.
It is also perplexing, already in Article 1 of the Declaration, to reiterate two concepts that should absolutely be taken for granted and which do not, in my opinion, require to be declared. That is, "NATO it is a defensive Alliance" is that "Article 5 of the Treaty is ironclad”. Restating the obvious raises doubt among Latins “excusatio non petita accusatio manifest” e I don't really think it's appropriate to do that.
Leaving the form aside and coming to the contents, the image of an Alliance that has had an important past in guaranteeing stability in Europe1 it cannot be reduced to the emphasis on the competition for who spends the fateful 2% on defense and to the sole "external" support provided to Ukraine (support which in the past has been more verbal than real). It is little and, in my opinion, not very significant.
Regarding the financial aspects, I would like to remind you that the commitment made to Cardiff Summit in 2014 it was not just to bring by 2024 le Defense spending at 2% of GDP for each member country, but above all dedicate at least 20% of this expenditure (equal to at least 4 per thousand of GDP) to "defense spending on major new equipment, including related research & development " or innovation in the defense sector. This requirement, strongly desired by the Obama Administration and then supported by all subsequent US administrations, as it is formulated a parameter that did not have the efficiency of the Alliance's defense as its priority objective. In fact, without being tied to operational capabilities that individual nations must make available to NATO, the spending figure actually has little to do with the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Certainly, in drawing up this constraint, Washington thought about the effect it could have on the more isolationist American electorate, those worried about burden sharing which they considered unfair. Above all, however, one cannot fail to take into account the fact that the largest producer and exporter of armaments in the world, the USA, could not fail to gain economically from any increase in military spending by European countries.
In reality, what contribution do, for example, US military expenditures in favor of South Korea or Taiwan or French ones in the so-called Francafrique it's questionable to say the least. Of course, the military instruments of many Alliance countries (including ours, but certainly not only ours) are not fully adequate for possible threats of the new geo-political context, but it is not a question of how much you spend but of the operational capabilities that you are able to guarantee (i.e. how and what you spend on should be far more important than how much you spend).
From this perspective, the emphasis given to the increase in spending decimals seemed a bit out of place to me, especially by an organization (NATO) where the key principle of financing military operations is “costs lie where they fall”, that is, everyone pays the costs for the transport, use and support of their contingents in operations. That is to say: “he who gave, he who had, he who had, he who had had….. " An approach that is poorly compatible with determining national spending parameters.
It was predictable that support for Ukraine represented the central topic of the Declaration. Furthermore, as already highlighted in a previous article on this newspaper (Stoltenberg, NATO and Western weapons in Ukraine), NATO's role in the conflict has so far been quite limited. Of course, there was the reinforcement of the Eastern border of the Alliance, implemented exclusively within the territory of the member countries, without any trespassing. Deployment of assets (air, land and naval) with the aim of dissuading and possibly countering possible encroachments of Russian/Belarusian forces into NATO countries and demonstrating the military cohesion of the Alliance in the event of aggression. Activities in full coherence with the tasks of "defense and deterrence" which, since 1949, have represented the “core business” of the Alliance.
For the rest, the secretary general has, in fact, done his utmost to convince individual nations to do more in terms of direct military aid to Ukraine, economic sanctions against Russia, economic support for Ukraine, etc. Decisions, however, taken elsewhere (in Washington, within the EU or in individual European capitals). In this process, NATO has at most the role of monitoring and possibly coordinating the flow of what has been made available to the countries bordering Ukraine. Everything, however, always based on what was decided upstream individually by the individual donor countries, countries that are not just NATO members.
In Declaration, in addition to many declarations of principle (which remain in principle), to the accusations aimed at defined Russia “the most significant and direct threat to alllies' security” (accusations which, however justified, take their time) and to the warnings addressed to China, North Korea and Iran to stop supporting the Russian war effort (callings which may appear out of place given that we too militarily support one of the belligerents) , only two concrete measures of a certain scope appear: the constitution of NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) and the financial commitment relating to Pledge of Long Term Security Assistance for Ukraine.
The NSATU will have the task of coordinating the supply, by NATO and partner countries, of weapons and training to Ukraine, in an organic and sustained manner, so as to ensure that support to Ukraine is increased, predictable over time and consistent with needs. The NSATU will be located in an Allied country (in Wiesbaden, Germany) and will provide support to the Ukrainian defense. La Declaration he says that "the NSATU, will not make NATO part of the conflict”. On this point it will be interesting to see what the Russians think, because it seems like the classic throw the stone and hide the hand.
Il Pledge of Long Term Security Assistance for Ukraine it seems like a lot attempt by the Biden administration to take action and block aid to Ukraine before Trump's probable arrival. The plan envisages a donation that includes military and financial support of 40 billion dollars a year (the Italian share would be 1,7 billion dollars). Without going into the specifics and extent of the figure, what is worrying is that it is not a "one-shot", but rather a "long term support", i.e. an indefinite commitment (at least until Washington's position on the matter radically changes).
It was foreseeable that the Declaration also dealt with of Ukraine's accession to NATO (it is declared “Ukraine's future is in NATO”) but no dates are defined. Hot topic, which everyone is debating NATO Summit since the Bucharest meeting in 2008, when Bush's USA wanted to start the invitation process for Ukraine and Georgia, which France and Germany opposed with foresight at the time. Article 10 is in fact being scrambled2 of the Atlantic Treaty, but it is not the first time: for 30 years now we have become accustomed to the access of nations that do not have the potential to contribute to the security of the Alliance (as the article provides) and which must depend on external aid even for basic functions, such as the defense of their airspace.
The different national positions regarding access are known, also in relation to the provisions of article 53 of the Atlantic Treaty. Personally, I would not be enthusiastic about Ukraine's hasty accession to NATO, before the implementation of the provisions "democratic and security sector reforms" also requested by Declaration (parag.16). Furthermore, the accession of Ukraine (and in prospect of Georgia and Moldova, as promised for some time) would lead to an Alliance even more concerned about the Eastern front and indifferent to the South.
Furthermore, I consider the repeatedly promised rapid access to the EU much more worrying, not only for easily understandable economic and financial reasons, but also in terms of defence. Few seem to realize that Article 42 paragraph 7 of the Treaty on European Union4 on the subject of common defense obligations in the event a member country is subject to attack are more stringent than those of the art. 5 of the Atlantic Treaty!
The US attempt continues, which began under Obama and continued under Trump to increasingly involve NATO in the confrontation between the USA and China in the Indo-Pacific. This is demonstrated, as well as by the repeated attacks on China in the text of Declaration, by the presence of US partners in that region: Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The writer believes that the European component of NATO already has too many problems connected with the Ukrainian crisis (with which it is more or less dealing) and with the instability in North Africa (the object of worrying Russian and Chinese penetration) and in Middle East (including the Houthi threat to free navigation) to get involved in this expansion towards the Indo-Pacific.
Unfortunately, the "Southern front" continues to be the Cinderella of the Alliance. It is briefly mentioned only in one of the last of the 38 paragraphs of the Declaration: the 32nd. Afterwards, very urgent topics are discussed, such as climate change (34th paragraph) and the project Women Peace and Security (35 °).
There is no mention of the situation in Libya (which has been in chaos for 13 years after the brilliant NATO operation Unified Protector and where for years there has been a cumbersome Russian presence that should worry Rome), of the Sahel (where the French and Americans are expelled and replaced by Russians) and above all of the worrying situation in Israel, Gaza and Lebanon. Too difficult to find an agreement?
The paragraph however underlines the need for a new approach towards North Africa and the Middle East and provides for the designation of one “Special Representative" to compare with the countries of the region. It will then be necessary to see which powers and which de facto delegations will be attributed to him Special Representative, hoping that it is not just a cosmetic role and that adequate staff will be assigned to him (which might be more difficult). We will witness the usual race by politicians to "place" an Italian in the position rather than a Frenchman or a Turk, but will we also be concerned about the skills assigned to the position? I'm afraid not.
Regarding the "Southern front" it is surprising that, instead, there is no desire to enhance and reinvigorate two well-established partnerships of the Alliance on Mediterranean Dialogue (which was also wanted by Italy at the time), which brings together various countries in North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel) and theIstanbul Cooperation Initiative, which brings together various Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. A missed opportunity.
Good news, for South front, is instead the opening of a NATO Liaison Office in Jordan. It would be important for Italy if NATO managed to open one in a North African country too (even if it would be much more difficult).
In conclusion, the birthday of an Alliance was celebrated which does not seem to be in great shape, which makes a loud statement about the Ukrainian crisis, without however assuming real responsibilities towards Kiev, which fears for a possible change of tenant in the White House (demonstrating how much the Alliance has become dependent on the USA), which agrees to follow the sirens of the Indo Pacific without realizing that it does not have the capacity to venture into those treacherous oceans and which, on the other hand, deals only with extreme sufficiency with the immediate risks arising from his south side.
In short, in Washington, Biden seems not to be the only one who has not aged well.
1 We refer in particular to the following two periods in the life of the Alliance:
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from 1949 to 1989 (the year of the end of the "cold war"): it represented the military rather than political framework of European defense from the Soviet threat and "overseas base" for the maintenance of US military assets permanently on the European continent;
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from 1989 to 2001 (year of the attack on the Twin Towers and the start of the global war on terror American ): this time it acted as a political structure rather than a military one, capable of filling the void left by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and of fulfilling the functions of "lighthouse" for the start of the process of "democratization" of Eastern Europe, which the EU would not yet be able to fulfill on its own (and which in any case the USA did not want to leave to the EU alone). In this period, NATO has fulfilled an important and irreplaceable military and political role for the pacification and stabilization of the former Yugoslavia (with the launch of effective military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and North Macedonia);
2 THEArticle 10 of the Washington Treaty states: “The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite to join this Treaty any other European State capable of promoting the development of the principles of this Treaty and of contribute to the security of the North Atlantic region. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall notify each Party of the deposit of any instrument of accession".
3The article 5 of the Washington Treaty states: “The Parties agree that an attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America will be considered as a direct attack against all Parties and, accordingly, agree that if such an attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of self-defense, individual or collective, recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties attacked by immediately undertaking, individually or in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including use of the Armed Forces to re-establish and maintain security in the North Atlantic region. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof will be immediately brought to the attention of the Security Council. These measures will end when the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to re-establish and maintain international peace and security."
4Article 42 para 7 of the Treaty on European Union reads:.”If a Member State suffers armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States are obliged to provide it with aid and assistance with all the means at their disposal, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This is without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States"
