Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has dominated international relations, leading liberal democracies and acting as a counterweight to authoritarian regimes. However, the last two months have raised many doubts (to put it mildly) about Washington's ability to continue to play its traditional global role, also in relation to the growing threats to international law and stability and to the independence of states posed, for example, by countries such as China and Russia.
The approach highlighted by the Trump Administration 2.0 towards traditional allies, extraordinarily similar to the Russian narrative (particularly in language) have in fact given the term "West" new contours, if not a new meaning. Until January 19, in fact, the concept of "West" was quite clear and was geographically identified with the area of the Atlantic Alliance and the addition of Australiai, an area that brought together countries whose societies were founded on the classical values of Euro-American culture.
During the second half of the 20th century, the West was mainly opposed by the Soviet Union, a major state structure that, among other things, occupied a large part of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a significant part of the Asian continent. The system had its own balance and its own ability to control crises and tensions. However, the system headed by Moscow it was not stable, as it was characterised by a political regime based on oppression, tyranny, political, moral and economic subjugation of individuals and peoples. And, in fact, it collapsed under the weight of its contradictions and its inability to relate cooperatively with its allies, who were considered subjects.
The West, instead, was built on a partnership based on shared social values, consultation, cooperation, mutual respect and collective action, and this has ensured democracy and prosperity for decadesii.
In this context, international relations could be depicted as a web of connections entirely managed by the major alliances, in which the non-aligned countries played a small role, that is, those countries (such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, Libya and Yugoslavia, to name a few) that had not formally joined either of the two blocs.
The fall of the Iron Curtain, and the consequent disintegration of the USSR, brought widespread hopes of peace and prosperity. But the end of the bipolar order, and of the system of relationships that had been built on that order, also brought a certain amount of instability, deriving from the many demands that had long been kept under the ashes of the old bipolar world. In addition, the impetuous economic growth, especially in Asia, of new players who then appeared on the international political scene and the resulting alteration of the balances, also forced the United States, the only remaining global power, to deal with the changes in a rapidly changing and increasingly difficult to decipher world.
We have thus seen a Bill Clinton intensify diplomatic relations to develop a political agenda that placed the promotion of democracy and human rights first, a George G. Bush use force to export democracy to the Middle East, a Barak Obama focus on the diplomatic management of international relations no longer for the promotion of American values and interests, but for their defense. These presidents were followed by a Donald Trump who pursued the objective of US growth mainly by resorting to unilateralism (see the agreement for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan), which will begin to tarnish the international image of the USA. The Biden administration has then applied a more pragmatic foreign policy than Trump's, focusing on relations between great powers, starting with China, but not neglecting to continue to weave relationships with traditional allies. Today we see the return of Trump, who confirms his deep aversion to multilateralism and would like, by dint of tweet, of executive orders, of propaganda, of threats and tariffs, to create a global system managed by a few, and an internal system managed only by people and ideas that he likes.
We were saying that we are immersed in a world that is difficult to decipher. In fact, the current balances see the coexistence, depending on the sector, of a unipolar world, where for example the US military power prevails unchallenged, a bipolar world, where China and the USA compete for global primacy, and a multipolar or apolar world, where there are no longer certain points of reference, but a multi-vector diplomacy dominated, characterised by the political activism of medium regional powers. Such are, for example, the activities of Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Qatar, which seek to project themselves with economic and/or political initiatives towards Asia, Africa or even Europe. A dynamism that we also find in the Indo-Pacific, with the partnership initiatives promoted by India, Australia, Japan, South Korea or Indonesia. A multiplication of connections outside the major alliances, even between countries that traditionally have difficult relations, such as India and Chinaiii. This entails greater flexibility in diplomatic relations with certain countries, depending on the interests of the moment. A multipolar dimension of international relations, therefore, with new powers whose economic weight gave them a strengthened political and military dimension.
And while the system of international relations is boiling, there is an actor that has assumed the role (formal but not effective) of spectator: China. In fact, while in the dark basements of the buildings it supports Russia in its campaign to destabilize the architecture of global relations, in official declarations it has positioned itself as a defender of free trade, of multilateralism supported by international organizations, of the defense of the United Nations Charter and of the ten points contained in the final document of the Bandung Conference (18-24 April 1955). A very balanced position, with which Beijing aims to present itself as a dialoguing entity, even if outside the international spotlight its actual behavior appears to be quite distant from its official declarations. In fact, from the Himalayas to the South China Sea, China has long been practicing the strategy of the "fait accompli", essentially adding apprehension to the tensions already existing in the area.
An overall situation of international tensions to which is added a worrying dimension of renewed economic competition, very aggressive, which has the aim of drastically reducing the concept of free trade. A competition that sees the USA attacking mainly the commercial relations with traditionally allied countries, now seen as subjects. The duties against Canada and Mexico, and those promised against Europe for April 2, despite strong doubts also in the USA, are clear evidence of this.
The new Trump 2.0 administration has, therefore, initiated a period of profound changes in the international scenario and this poses important challenges to our country, in the defense of its priority interests and in the choice of the most suitable tools and policies for their protection and promotion. Challenges that are part of a broader framework of review of the system of international relations, which Trump would like to be more muscular and selective, showing an aspiration to favor the dissolution of the aggregations of several States, starting with the European Union.
Added to this is the disturbingly manifest disaffection of Washington towards international organizations such as the OSCE, the OECD, the WTO and all the UN Agencies, starting with the World Health Organization. While this is partly due to the lack of vigor/effectiveness with which these Organizations, often unfortunately contracted in self-referential positions, face the various crises, it must be said that the American disaffection in recent years has grown in parallel with the return of identity closures and nationalistic impulses in various countries, with the result that the intensity of their involvement in said Organizations has decreased, no longer perceived as fundamental or indispensable.
In this context, the crisis of multilateralism, in which we had placed so many expectations for the most orderly management of international relations, is struggling to find adequate answers also because, after the re-election of the unilateralist Trump as president of the United States, the power that we had become accustomed to considering the majority shareholder of the international order born after the end of the Cold War is daily destabilizing the multilateral system, while the season of international regulation of trade and commerce is threatened by widespread resurgent economic nationalisms and worrying protectionist tendencies, now clearly expressed.
This raises the question of what is Trump's strategy. In fact, for his re-election he was able to skillfully ride the general distrust of the American middle classes towards multilateralist politics, which in their eyes was incapable of countering the growth of inequalities, convincing himself that the international order built after the end of the Cold War had failed and that, to become great again, the USA had to exercise its power more assertively to protect national interests, both economically and politically. An electoral revolt of a part of Americans, who identified with Donald Trump and favored his return to the White House, hoping for a change of pace that would remedy increasingly profound imbalances in global development that involved increasingly large sectors of American society.
Now that he has taken office, he cannot deviate from the propaganda themes flaunted during the election campaign. Trump and his collaborators must, in fact, confirm that they are the "tough guys" who were voted in, because they need to consolidate the electorate that brought them to the White House. Hence, the strong and often offensive tones towards other sovereign states or other Heads of State.
In short, the Trump 2.0 administration is already in the midst of an election campaign for both the XNUMX and XNUMX elections. mid-term (the Republican majority in Congress is slim and if it is not confirmed the President would become a lame duck) and for the next presidential elections, for which Trump has already raised (just two months after taking office) the possibility of running for a third term, or of electing one of his most loyal supporters (at the moment it seems to be JD Vance).
At the moment, therefore, Trump 2.0 does not appear to be particularly interested in the international repercussions of his statements, and continues with statements whose only result would seem to be that of a diffusion of overall uncertainty, having demolished some (considered) fixed points that had favored and characterized the growth of Washington's international image. In this historical phase, therefore, it would seem that Trump and his associates are doing everything they can to appear, in general, not very popular with the entire international community and to set the entire system of international relations back 200 years, fueling distrust towards Washington.
So, what future can we glimpse behind the current crisis of multilateralism? That of Trump, who already during his first presidential term hoped for the creation of a world governed by nationalist populist unilateralism, in which we would return to having single nation states, with their identities, their rigid borders, their foreign policies and the impossibility of collective negotiation or one that foresees, through a healthy dialectical comparison, the protection of legitimate national interests in a framework of non-prevarication with the equally legitimate interests of others?
The second would be desirable, because in a world in which everyone starts from the assumption that their own interests come first and prevail over those of others, not only will there not be a shared vision in the end, even among those who believe they have one today, but armed conflict would be inevitable sooner or later.
In conclusion, there is a need to adapt to new international relations that requires a concentrated effort by everyone. Faced with the desire of some to oppose national sovereignty to shared sovereignty, strengthened cooperation between a homogeneous core of countries appears to be the unavoidable tool to try to avoid immobility, if not the decline of our system of life.
In today's rapidly changing world, no one can, in fact, cope alone with the serious challenges that are emerging. Especially when faced with adversaries like Putin and Xi Jinping, threatening and determined to exacerbate every crisis. Not even the USA, however powerful it may be militarily.
Washington could still represent the backbone of a system of international relations capable of countering despotism, but it is essential to review the current unilateralist approach. History teaches us that the USA became large and powerful precisely when it voluntarily and definitively abandoned (until today) its isolationist policy, seen at the time as protection from the great European powers, and opened up to the world and international relations. A report win-win whose end (or drastic downsizing) would cause damage to all parties involved. The key to the planetary fortune of the USA, in fact, has been the creation of a system of international relations based on multilateralism and alliances between countries that share the same vision of society. A vision that the Trump 2.0 administration seems to have boldly lost. This can only sadden and worry.
i We must also add Japan and South Korea, which, despite having different cultural roots from the West, have embraced its way of life and share its values of democracy and civil rights.
ii Also supported by the economic aid guaranteed by the Marshall Plan.
iii In this context, the BRICS, guided by China, were born as aspirations of a third world pole, but they present internal frictions and divergences that weaken their international image.
