I had already highlighted in this newspaper (read article - Gaza Deal: Will It Be “True Glory”?) as the January agreement that the Israeli government had been forced to accept (due to pressure from the United States and part of its own public opinion) represented, in fact, a generous concession to Hamas.
It was, unfortunately, foreseeable that Hamas would be able to pass off to its public (even in the West) a campaign conducted hiding behind women and children as a heroic military victory over the regular Israeli armed forces. It was also foreseeable that the agreement (which would not in itself have led to a “peace” that, instead, appears increasingly remote) would have been, unfortunately, a harbinger of a reinvigoration of Hamas terrorism. Terrorism that saw, for the umpteenth time, that brutality pays and that could have swelled its ranks also with the hundreds and hundreds of released prisoners.
However, perhaps something could change in the near future.
Meanwhile, we must consider the Trump factor. In Washington, the timid and hesitant Biden administration is no longer there. Mind you, I am not an admirer of President Trump and I believe that we Europeans should prepare ourselves for some very tough confrontations/clashes with Washington. I do not like his "Marquis de Grillo" attitude towards the Allies considered subjects (note well, with Bush Jr., Obama and Biden the substance of the US-Europe relationship was similar, only the style changed). That said, I recognize that Trump has decidedly clearer ideas than many of his predecessors (precisely Bush Jr., Obama and Biden) in relation to the Middle Eastern reality. Clarity of ideas that he also demonstrated during his first term, for example by weaving the Agreements of Abraham and taking a firm line towards Iran.
Above all, Trump evidently wants to resolve as quickly as possible the two “war” crises in Ukraine and the Middle East that he inherited from the previous administration. Not so much for the sake of the “peace” invoked by Pope Francis, but simply to be able to dedicate himself fully to dealing with the economic conflicts of the USA with China and, also, with Europe. Economic issues that fascinate him much more than military conflicts and whose mechanisms he has a deeper knowledge of.
To resolve the two ongoing wars the Tycoon lent to politics will likely adopt his usual method of negotiation: forced bargaining and unpredictability. Shooting long and then shortening and never making the other party understand what his possible "red lines" are (insurmountable limits that Obama and Biden instead continually declared, without doing anything when they were regularly crossed).
In relation to Ukraine, things seem to be already slowly moving and not necessarily in the direction desired by the EU and Zelensky (perhaps we will be able to have some vague indications of this already after the meeting of NATO defense ministers on February 13 or after the next Munich Summit).
For conflicts involving Israel, the issue is much more complex and involves many more regional actors. Moreover, the style seems to be always the same: disorienting the counterparts, negotiating at 360°, threatening retaliation, even with the risk of alienating valuable allies.
I believe that his recent statements, which have left many commentators perplexed and have aroused facile irony from many others, should be understood in this light and not in a literal sense. I am referring, among others, to those relating to the "emptying" of Gaza, to the need for neighboring Arab countries to welcome refugees from the Strip, to the fact that the US financial aid granted to countries in the region is not something acquired or due out of kindness but is strictly conditioned by the commitments that these countries are willing to assume to satisfy Washington's geopolitical interests. In this case, Washington's primary interest is to ensure Israel's security, re-establish its relations with the Sunni Arab countries (Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf monarchies and, above all, Saudi Arabia) and to render the Iranian regime and its proxies (Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah) harmless. I also assume that Trump intends to achieve these goals relatively quickly so as not to allow Beijing (his "real" enemy) to take advantage of the situation.
We have all seen that, even before taking office, Trump was very active in foreign policy and it is clear that the Netanyahu government accepted the January agreement essentially due to pressure from Trump, even though he was not yet “officially” in office.
But if Netanyahu has fulfilled, for better or worse, his part of the January agreement, what can be said of Hamas?
The tragic drama of the hostage release, in my opinion, said many things. Clearly, the message for the Palestinian audience in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as for Hamas supporters around the world, was one of strength, the main points of which could be summarized as follows: We are undefeated, the Israeli lead has not tamed us, 16 months of war and bombings have not broken our spirit, but also: Gaza is standing and the population is all with us, we enjoy unanimous popular support.
However, in Europe and America, where there was a cry of “genocide of the Palestinians”, Palestinians described by many as “helpless victims of Israeli military aggression”, what effect did those bellicose stagings have? Or what message did the images of the oceanic gatherings of exultant Gazans during the theatrical ceremonies for the release of civilian hostages, defenseless, malnourished and forced into unworthy performances, surrounded by the display of militiamen with shiny weapons, immaculate pickups and untouched uniforms (uniforms that certainly had not been worn in combat, perhaps precisely because when it came to fighting it was more convenient to pass oneself off as defenseless civilians or humanitarian workers) convey to our whining public opinions? Were these images consistent with what we have been told for months and months, or with the narrative of the alleged "genocide” of the Palestinians, with the narrative of starving Gazans and above all with the refrain that Hamas should not be confused with the entire population of Gaza?
Perhaps these images were not entirely consistent with the message that for 16 months the effective Pro-Pal propaganda had managed to impose in Europe and America and I hope that someone here can reconsider his positions.
Can we therefore expect that in the days to come the support that Hamas enjoys in Europe and America may be slightly weaker than what we have witnessed in recent months? I would hope that this were the case, but perhaps the excellent Ernesto Galli della Loggia is right to be sceptical about it (Corriere della Sera, 12 February)
Above all, however, we must ask ourselves what effect those images may have on Israeli public opinion. Of course, now that we also know the conditions in which the hostages were held during the long months of captivity, the national will to free them all as soon as possible at any cost will certainly be dominant. Moreover, at the same time, the awareness that perhaps more than half of those not yet freed have already been killed will probably be more widespread. I think, in particular, that the fate of the Bibas brothers may have an important effect on Israeli public opinion and, perhaps, also on European and American public opinion (but perhaps I continue to overestimate our sensitivity towards Israeli hostages). Furthermore, although releasing hundreds of prisoners each time to obtain the release of a few innocent hostages is a sad blackmail that must be given in, even in Israel we realize that we are freeing the minds and arms of tomorrow's potential "October 7ths."
On the other hand, Hamas probably also realizes that exhibiting hostages who look like they came from Auschwitz or show signs of torture may certainly cheer up the more fanatical Gazans, but could undermine the support that the terrorist organization has so far enjoyed in the West. Above all, Hamas is aware that when it no longer has any live hostages to exchange, its negotiating power will disappear and Israeli retaliation will be inevitable.. Therefore, it is clear that Hamas continues to use any pretext to prolong the captivity of the hostages and the duration of this dramatic exchange as much as possible. Pretexts, of course, but pretexts that are often considered relevant by certain complacent Western media.
In light of these feelings, these deep wounds (on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, mind you, both peoples have suffered) it is obvious that Israel will not be able to accept having Hamas on its border. Given that the Gazans have not yet dissociated themselves from Hamas, Israel will not be able to accept leaving the Gazans to manage the Strip, with or without UN supervision (also as a consequence of the questionable evidence of impartiality demonstrated by some UN agencies in Gaza). It also seems clear that, today, even the PA (effectively emptied of popular support in favor of Hamas) cannot represent a credible alternative for the administration of the Strip. The current Israeli government is certainly fully aware of this and presumably so are, albeit with different sensibilities, most of the parties currently in opposition in the Knesset. Above all, however, this seems to be clear to Trump, who in this perspective has thrown a stone in the pond with his shock proposal on Gaza.
It was predictable that all the Sunni Arab chancelleries would condemn in the strongest possible terms the proposal of the “Yankee cowboy”, launched in a decidedly unconventional way during an interview. Nor could it have been otherwise.
We will then have to see what the extremely confidential agreements will be that the Arab chancelleries themselves will make with Trump, also based on any threats of retaliation that the Tycoon could air. Both the Hashemite Jordan of Abdallah II and the Egypt of Al Sisi, in order not to offend strong internal sensibilities, must to appear in support of the Palestinian populations. Furthermore, it is known that neither would be enthusiastic about receiving Palestinian refugees in their territory. The first recalling the problems that the Palestinians had already caused it at the end of the 60s and which led in 1970-71 to the repression remembered as “Black September” and Egypt recalling the internal security problems it had in Sinai, after it had been given back control of it with the second Camp David agreement of 1978, and much more recently with the Muslim Brotherhood, close to Hamas.. Other Arab countries also have to take into account their own public opinions, fueled by decades of anti-Israel propaganda, and it was inevitable that they would condemn Trump's provocative proposal.
Moreover, many of those same countries look to the US for military cooperation and in the fight against Islamic terrorism, receive economic aid from the US and trade with the US. They need the US, certainly. But if the price to pay, in terms of image, becomes too high, they could also give in to the Chinese enticements.. The situation is not simple.
Trump, as usual, could threaten economic retaliation, but this remains a risky bet, because Beijing could take advantage of it to offer the countries of the region what Washington threatens to take away from them and Trump certainly does not want to take such a risk.
The question is: to what extent will Trump, in order to favor Israel, be willing to antagonize local actors who could, in reaction, move closer to China?
In short, there are many question marks, but we could expect some developments in the situation even in the short term.
If Hamas continues to delay in releasing the hostages, it cannot be ruled out that Trump will give Netanyahu the green light for a military operation that is much more incisive than the previous ones (perhaps even with possible US air and naval support), perhaps having reluctantly obtained the willingness "for strictly humanitarian reasons" of Arab countries in the region to "temporarily" host Gazans who intend to leave the Strip (provided that Hamas lets them leave).
At the same time, the US, thanks to the combined provisions of the right of veto within the UN Security Council and the possibility of turning off the taps of the hitherto substantial US funding to UN agencies, could, if they wanted, actually reduce to a minimum the UN humanitarian activities in favor of the Strip, this time truly leading it to starvation. Something that a fairly unpredictable administration like Trump's could also decide to do, even if these would be decidedly dangerous choices.
The situation is certainly uncertain, at the moment both Hamas and the Israeli government and Trump's USA themselves are facing very difficult choices, but perhaps Netanyahu and Trump have better cards in their hands than Hamas and the Ayatollahs.
In this whole situation that is shaking the Middle East and part of North Africa, how does the EU intervene? Does not intervene. Distracted, for a change, she continues to repeat slogans and theoretical recipes that are not currently practicable and to complain because (unfortunately, rightly) nobody cares.
Photo: US Air Force
