No, this is not the novel by Fruttero and Lucentini, a beautiful and lucky novel that also inspired a television series starring Marcello Mastroianni. Instead, it is the night that fell over Europe because of Putin, now more and more a prisoner of his desire to return to the times of the Tsars. It matters little if, with the Revolution of October 1917, those times were rejected by the Russian population itself, in whose name Putin unleashed this war, in accordance with his very personal imperialist program of re-appropriation of the Novaya Rossiya and the restoration of Ruski Mir.
Almost eight months after the beginning of the night, it is therefore worthwhile to quickly analyze some significant aspects of this war, namely the economic, military and geopolitical ones, summarizing what so far proved by the facts.
Economic aspects
First of all it must be said that the economic sanctions they are not measures that tend to "defeat" the country they are aimed at or to resolve disputes quickly, given that the sanctions have a range of action that goes at least in the medium term. Instead, they are intended to lead this country to "milder advice", to convince it to abandon unilateral decisions in favor of dialectical confrontation. Basically, induce the aggressor to stop hostilities and bring him to the negotiating table.
Having said that, from the analyzed data it would seem that the theses according to which the Russian economy would have been able to cope with the sanctions without great damage, overcoming the initial difficulties by making greater use of internal resources, or through the strengthening of commercial exchanges with other friendly countries (read China) have so far been blatantly denied by the facts.
As a Yale University study last August describes well, the effects of the sanctions are, however, making themselves felt heavily and they will affect the Russian economy for decades after the night is over.
According to this authoritative study, theRussian self-sufficiency turned out to be a pious illusion since national production is now on the way to a semi-paralysis, bringing with it a shortage of supply and inflation. According to some estimates, inflation today would be around 20%, with peaks of up to 60% for products dependent on imports.
And here we touch a very sore point for Moscow. The import of goods, services and technology, in fact, has decreased by 50% since the beginning of the conflict, with heavy negative repercussions on the internal market and on industrial production, particularly military production. While an intransigent position on the part of the sanctioning countries can be sensed, it should be emphasized that also by many countries that have not adhered to the sanctions against Moscow there are drastic reductions in the commercial relations of the sanctioned products, mainly due to the fear of incurring secondary sanctions in Western markets, much more important to them than the Russian one. Even imports from China have fallen by 50% since the beginning of the year. A clear result that not even the "cunning" of some has affected.
Regarding exports, another particularly sore point, the strong Russian position on raw materials has drastically reduced and traditional Western importers are effectively reorienting their supplies, especially of gas and oil. This does not mean that the operation is painless for the nations applying the sanctions. There is a cost, both in economic and social terms. However lo shock caused to the Russian economy and far more serious than Western hardships. The export of gas, for example, cannot be redirected to other markets (read China) in a short time, causing significant losses and a wait for the construction of new pipelines which is estimated in years.
In order to continue selling oil, Moscow is selling it at very discounted prices, to the happiness of China and India, who are buying it up. A price (including gas) that could further decrease (with heavy losses for Moscow) if the price cap, proposed by the USA (for oil) and Italy (for gas). An approval that has so far been delayed by the reservations (how disinterested?) Of the usual frugal countries like Germany and Holland which, coincidentally, gain from maintaining the current system.
Furthermore, many companies have left Russia. There is talk of about 1.000 companies which represented 40% of GDP and which employed about a million Russians. Among the citizens who left Russia almost immediately, very many had upper-middle income, which further impoverished the country. Then we leave out the fact that some of these wealthy / executives have died with mysterious suicides or unfortunate falls from the stairs or from the windows.
After an initial depreciation, the ruble has recovered and today appears as a solid currency. However, it should not be overlooked that this is an evaluation "drugged" by the fact that in Russia it is essentially not possible to access other currencies. On the domestic black market, the US dollar today has a much higher value than the official one, which has never been so strong for over twenty years. To support businesses and citizens, the Government then created a system of subsidies, loans, etc ... the total amount of which is unknown. Finally, Russia has no access to international financial markets and the domestic one is paralyzed. This does not allow to recover the money for important investments, such as the aforementioned pipeline to China could be.
A picture that is not at all reassuring in the medium and long term that the governor of the Russian Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina, as a serious and competent professional, had immediately sensed the day after the approval of the first sanctions, but that only those who did not want to see did not see.
In the European debate, many analysts tend to emphasize the economic cost that sanctions have on the countries that impose them, a sign of their alleged ineffectiveness. In the specific case of Putin's Russia, it appears that the sanctions are having their effect, despite the regime propaganda insists on denying it (after all, it is their job).
Military aspects
Since the beginning of the conflict, we have been flooded with information regarding the problems the Russians encountered in conducting military operations. Convoys blocked, soldiers who deserted leaving their equipment on the ground, vehicles that were abandoned because they ran out of fuel or for lack of spare parts, generals killed because their position was discovered by listening to communications with cell phones, poor effectiveness of military operations, despite the large gap in numbers and equipment. While the internet does not represent reality, many have wondered if the army that came out of such descriptions was really the army that for decades had been rated as one of the strongest in the world.
Sticking to the facts it must be said that theRussian armydespite repeated attempts, he failed to quickly subdue the country and install a pro-Russian government in Kiev, despite what appeared to be an overwhelming military force. The attempt to surround the main cities, based on the assumption that the Ukrainian resistance would be weak and chaotic, in some areas even absent, assuming a friendly attitude on the part of the population, also failed. Contrary to Russian expectations, the resistance turned out to be organized, well armed and determined, both on the part of the Ukrainian regular army and that of the forces of volunteers and reservists enlisted in much of the country.
After three weeks, the Russians have gone from trying to take Kiev and subdue the entire country, to a war of position and carpet bombing, with a series of gruesome urban sieges and bombings, which have claimed dozens of civilian casualties. , affecting only minimally the Ukrainian military device.
At the heart of the matter was a clear lack of coordination, planning and training among Russian forces, coupled with a logistical chain that did not allow men, ammunition, fuel, medical supplies and food to arrive in a timely manner where needed. This, despite the Russian railway network (Rossijskie železnye dorogi - RZD), 86.600 km long, is particularly dedicated to freight transport (11.800 locomotives against 3.100 for passenger transport) and has the ability to quickly and easily transport troops and armament from one coast to another of the country and of the former -soviet empire. Indeed, the lengthening of supply lines and the vulnerability of railway lines to acts of sabotage forced the Russians to rely on road logistic lines within Ukrainian territory. The immediate Ukrainian attacks on railway bridges, in fact, made it possible to significantly slow down the flow of supplies to the troops, who did not arrive at their destination or arrived with enormous delay. The result was the abandonment of vehicles and armament due to lack of fuel or spare parts, the lack of ammunition in the first months of the fight and the raids in supermarkets by Russian soldiers to stock up on food.
In spite of what Putin initially stated, non-professional personnel were also involved in military operations. The creation of a professional army, in fact, is a matter of will, time and money (training, equipment, etc ...). Too much energy for a country that, although immense and with immense natural resources, has a GDP lower than that of Spain alone. (read article "Some thoughts on the Russian army")
The enormous logistical problems have also drastically reduced the effectiveness of those departments, causing heavy and non-replaceable losses in the short / medium term. The result was that the morale of the troops and confidence in the hierarchical chain dropped beyond all limits, forcing Moscow to send many generals to the front in order to direct the operations personally..
After a very difficult first phase, the Russians then conquered (albeit at very high prices) the entire eastern Ukrainian coastal area, up to Karkiv and accentuated the pressure (and bombing) on Odessa, without conquering it.
Since last August, the Ukrainian counter-offensive has allowed Kiev to recapture some territories and to push further on the north-west-south line. Due to these Russian failures, the whirlwind of generals leading the troops in the field continued. The current phase sees a complete disorganization of the Russian defense, whose troops withdraw in front of the opposing forces, leaving a lot of armament material that is sometimes reused against the Russians themselves. This forced Putin to declare partial mobilization and to recruit personnel "at random", often without training or even in poor health. This provoked a wave of strong protest from the Russians, who began to understand what was actually going on and took to the streets to protest… or fled abroad, creating long lines at the borders.
In the meantime, parallel to the continuation of infantry fighting, the debate about the usefulness of tanks in modern warfare. While the US general Curtis Scaparrotti, who held the post of Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe in the period 2016-2019, believes that a good deterrence against aggression steps from a significant armored component, on the other, the Ukrainian events indicate that the effectiveness in combat by tanks is no longer what it once was, since technological evolution has made it possible to achieve high levels of lethality with precision anti-tank missiles. A debate that had already started in the early 70s but that the Ukrainian events have helped to rekindle.
In this regard, the supporters of the armored vehicle claim that the impact force capacity of a tank brigade cannot be replaced by other means, while the proponents of the portable weapon, take as an example the "Javelin", an anti-tank missile that has about 4.000 m of range, which not only proved highly lethal thanks to the high-capacity warhead but, being thrown with the "throw and forget" method, allows the operator to quickly change position and make himself invisible to all 'opponent.
But not just missiles. As the fighting first in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and then also in Ukraine showed, drones also represented an effective alternative to the armored tank. The debate continues.
About the Naval Forces, it must be said that at the beginning of the hostilities Russian superiority appears to be total. Moscow deploys a “Slava” class missile cruiser, the Moscow, two “Krivak” class frigates and three “Grigorovich” class frigates, as well as seven “Kilo” submarines and 21 corvettes and patrol vessels. Shortly before February 24, seven amphibious units from the Baltic and North Sea fleets also arrive in Sevastopol. The 810th Marine Infantry Brigade is present in Crimea. Ukraine has a “Krivak” class frigate, immediately sunk (3 March), and 17 other small surface units. The Navy infantry integrates the Ground Forces.
The Russian fleet is assigned three missions: blocking enemy ports, contributing to the missile campaign against deep-sea targets and supporting land operations along the Ukrainian coast.
The first phase of the fighting sees the Russian units take control of the sea routes and block the Ukrainian ports. The islet of the Serpenti is also occupied, near the border between Ukraine and Romania, important because it is at the center of an important underwater gas field and an excellent maritime surveillance point in the area facing Ukraine.
On February 28, Turkey decides, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Montreaux, to close the Straits to all military ships. The Black Sea fleet is therefore isolated from the rest of the world.
Time passes but, despite the approximately 235 SS-N-30 “Kalibr” cruise missiles launched from the ships, the Russians are unable to conquer Odessa. In fact, the Russian Navy lacks a real capacity for aerial assault from the sea and, in any case, the failed attack on the Kiev airport during the first days of the war, with the elimination of the Russian Special Forces units, suggests caution. Even a landing in force does not seem feasible, given that the conformation of the coast does not favor such operations, the accesses to the port of Odessa are heavily mined and on the coast there are good anti-ship artillery batteries. Russia, therefore, gives up conducting amphibious operations in the Black Sea and the Navy infantry is diverted to Mariupol and the Donbass. Landing ships are used to transport combat materials.
On 24 March the Saratov, “Alligator” class, is hit by OTR-21 “Tocha” ballistic missiles and sunk. The strong explosion, the unit was loaded with ammunition, also severely damages two other ships. On 13 April the Moscow, the flagship unit of the Black Sea fleet. (read article "Military and geopolitical implications of the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva”) The loss also affects the Russian collective imagination. Moscow then decides to implement a "remote" security blockade. No unit of value should come within 60 miles of the Ukrainian coast. However, other Russian ships are sunk or severely damaged on May 12 (Vsevolod Bobrov) and June 17 (Vasily Beck). Losses of auxiliary ships which cannot be replaced due to the blockade of the Turkish Straits. On June 30, the island of the Snakes is reconquered by Kiev.
The recent evolution of the fighting has seen the ships that were based in Sevastopol move to the Azov Sea and, after the damage of the bridge connecting with the Crimea, a large part of the Black Sea fleet has headed to the open sea further east.
As regards the Air forces, the rare and ineffective Russian air activity failed to annihilate the Ukrainian air defense. The air campaign was therefore carried out prudently and with the use of a massive use of missiles. There failure of the Russians to acquire air superiority it does not allow to formulate any reliable hypothesis about the real effectiveness of the armed force.
The Ukrainian events have also underlined once more the effectiveness of the cyber warfare. In an increasingly computerized world, the possibility of entering and altering the opponent's control centers represents an opportunity to be seized. The adversary operating systems, command and control or arms management, represent the privileged target of hackers, but cyber attacks are not limited to the military sector. The means of railway transport, the control systems of merchant ships or airspace, communication networks are objectives that allow to create confusion, to delay the arrival of troops, vehicles and materials on the battlefield, unbalancing the trend of operations. However, it was noted that the destabilizing effects of a cyber attack are almost never decisive on the overall course of the fighting, but they only have temporary effects. In this too, the war in Ukraine has given clear signals.
The attack on the rail network only temporarily delayed the arrival of fresh Russian forces on the battlefield, as operators switched to manual train driving. Cyberwarfare tools rely on vulnerabilities of the adversary, which can however only be exploited for a short time, since those who are attacked are generally able to rapidly develop countermeasures. It is, therefore, instruments that generally cannot be "tested" ahead of time, because the attempted interference alarms the opponent, who notices the flaw and takes action accordingly. The logical implications are that the real capabilities in this area are mostly unknown, precisely because they are normally used only once, at the right time to inflict as much damage as possible on the opponent. However, it is indubitable that IT capabilities have now become an irreplaceable corollary of modern warfare, in support of military operations.
Geopolitical aspects
The Russian invasion brought out the profound division between the Asian countries. On the one hand there are the most advanced economies of the region and the majority of the members of theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which have strongly condemned Russian aggression (some even by approving economic sanctions, such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore), while on the other there are countries such as Vietnam, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, which they opted for neutrality together with India and China.
The former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, traditionally allied and deeply dependent on Russia, has shown a strong distance from Moscow and even allowed a pro-Ukrainian protest in Almaty, the country's largest city. As NBC News reported, the country also denied sending troops in support of Russian forces in the special military operation in Ukraine.
A division that emphasized the difference in values between democracies and authoritarian countries and which predictably will not fail to influence future events in Asia and the Indo-Pacific. Starting from the cohesion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the collaboration forum between the United States, Australia, Japan and India. In particular, India's refusal to openly condemn Russian aggression and to review the terms of long-term cooperation with Moscow created discontent in Tokyo and raised doubts about the real effectiveness of military collaboration in QUAD. This led to a reflection on the possibility of limiting collaboration to the economic sphere only. Beijing, for its part, is trying to dissolve the reasons for friction with New Delhi and, with this in mind, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi made an unplanned visit to India (March 24-25, 2022).
The meeting between Putin and Xi Jinping in Samarkand, on the occasion of the conference of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) September 15, being the first official meeting since the start of hostilities in Ukraine, represented much more than attending an event. The occasion allowed, in fact, to understand how Moscow is increasingly dependent on Beijing, following the Russian aggression and its break with the West. An addiction that seems destined to accentuate but which does not appear as a one-to-one correspondence of amorous senses but rather a relationship in which one of the parties appears much stronger than the other.
In the background, but not so much, a China that continues to move with extreme caution (the aforementioned abstention in the UN is significant) because it must balance internal problems and an economy that no longer travels in double digits, while it must keep steady relations with the West, which are not insignificant. However, Xi Jinping did not fail to convey, with the subdued style typical of the Orientals, all his concern for the Ukrainian crisis. hoping that hostilities cease as soon as possible. He also renewed the promise of "friendship without limits" which, however, it did not appear unconditional at all. One thing appears certain. The war in Ukraine will result in a geopolitical strengthening of the Asian front against a dominant China on the continent. With this interpretation, Xi Jinping's concern appears very concrete.
Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine forced a review of long-standing theories on deterrence strategies in Europe, with all the implications involved.
Conclusions
The aggression against Ukraine is a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter. It is a war that has opened a particularly delicate and dangerous chapter in international relations and which will not fail to have a negative geopolitical impact and inevitable fallout in the global economy. The pretext cited by President Putin, preventing the genocide of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, appears pretext to most analysts and the presence of neo-Nazis in Ukraine, although real, appears deliberately exaggerated.
The Russian economy has proved extremely vulnerable to Western sanctions. This for two main reasons: its dependence on exports of hydrocarbons and other raw materials and the high degree of integration into the international economy, which Russia had achieved in thirty years of fruitful trade relations. The first proved to be an incurable element of rigidity, while the second allowed for significant gains and a recovery of international image, but the lack of adequate internal investments has led Moscow to depend heavily on the import of advanced industrial goods, technology and financial capital. foreigners. The level of autarchy reached by the Soviet Union was based, on the other hand, on a large exclusive economic zone represented by the European and Central Asian countries that were members of the Soviet system.
In this context, one gradual lifting of sanctions can only be linked to the beginning of an overall negotiation that regulates the issues between the contenders, starting with the safety problems of each, taking into account geographical and demographic factors, to finish with the definition of the respective economic and industrial capacities, from which military ones also depend.
From a military point of view, it took months for President Putin to amass more than 175.000 Russian soldiers on the Ukrainian border. But since these forces went into action, the Russian military has gone from one logistical failure to another. If you don't have logistics, if you don't have fuel, if you don't have spare parts, if you don't have enough ammunition, sophisticated weapon systems become paperweights and troops become beggars begging for food..
Furthermore, the Russian forces are now exhausted and the forced mobilization of thousands of inexperienced soldiers does not improve a situation that appears desperate. Some analysts speak of staggering human and equipment costs, and even of supplies and ammunition that are running out.
Finally, the human factor should not be underestimated. Russia has an army that, in consistency, dwarfs Ukraine and a decidedly important defense budget, but Ukrainian citizens have waged a campaign of resistance that has imposed a heavy cost on Russian forces, blocking their march towards Kiev. In fact, all the populations that suffer aggression want to resist and this gives them a strength (even moral) and motivations that are enormously superior to those of the aggressors.
From the international point of view, faced with the substantial paralysis of the United Nations, the world order is now more than ever threatened by blackmail, armed aggression and the risk of reprisals against civilian objectives. Russia today finds itself in a position of substantial political and economic isolation and, in order to acquire further indispensable armaments, it has had to turn to North Korea and Belarus, not exactly the top of the class.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that Putin's decision irrevocably changed Russia, Ukraine, Europe and, more generally, the global geopolitical balance. The Russian president, who had built much of his political credibility on stability and economic progress, often comparing his government with that of the turbulent 90s, today has shown his most secretive nature, managing to recreate within a few weeks that same instability that he said he wanted to fight. Maya Angelou1 stated that, "... when someone shows who he is, believe him immediately ...". Putin over the past fifteen years has repeatedly shown who he really is. It is our fault that we did not promptly acknowledge his nature.
The Russian aggression against Ukraine is, however, above all a human tragedy. Many Ukrainians have lost their lives, loved ones, homes, jobs and freedoms due to the war. And this should not be forgotten. But also the Russian boys, many of whom have turned into cruel killers and torturers, as evidenced by the evidence gathered in the liberated towns and villages. But they are mostly kids sent to die without even knowing what they were doing or why.
A tragedy that has brought Europe and the world back to darkness. As the great Eduardo said "... has from passà to nuttata ...", but this is a night that is not yet known how long it will last.
