The aggressive attitude of the ISIS Islamic group has its foundations in hatred not only towards the decadent western system, but above all towards the individual who is part of it. The battle of the Islamic State is praise for war, the celebration of the individual fighter, the exaltation of the "warrior" who hates the enemy as conceived by Nietzsche. Hatred is a peculiarity of the warrior and needs a contender to be applied. The war against the latter is not only an end in itself, but allows it to grow spiritually and materially.
The Islamic warrior does not love the earth and humanity, the destruction of historical sites and the brutality of the murders are proof of this, but he is trained in violence and is ready to accept his terrible last destiny: martyrdom in the name of Allah .
The warrior of the Islamic State does not attempt to oppose his status and accepts fate, hatred and the elimination of the adversary. The Westerner on the contrary is a soldier and as such he conceives the enemy as a collective and not as an individual. That is, it recognizes the contender in an army composed of elements in "uni-forms".
This uniformity among the enemies does not allow individual discrimination and is therefore considered in its entirety and nationality. On the contrary the warrior is a single fighter and therefore has a single opponent and on the latter he cultivates his hatred by declining the battle in a relationship with two subjects, an extreme of the concept of Carl von Clausewitz, who argued that the fundamental structure of the war is a duel between fighters facing each other. The warrior is not satisfied with peace because he transmutes it in the end of hostilities, but he wants war and he intends it as the only solution to the application of his hatred and to the realization of himself, creating a dichotomy between his destiny and that of the enemy . In fact, religious wars, or alleged ones, are repeated in the history of humanity.
In the parallelism between the warrior of Nietzsche and the Islamic one, there is no justification for the statement that: "the war that sanctifies every cause is good". Discrimination between soldiers fighting a just and unjust war is determined by justice and law; the attacked person needs to defend himself for justice and to recover his rights, but he must not violate the same parameters against the aggressor. Therefore it will be necessary to limit the response to the military alone.
Michael Walzer specifies that the soldier has the responsibility to accept personal risks rather than kill an innocent civilian; the instinct of conservation must not override the rights of non-belligerents. Ultimately, any military response, to be fair, must guarantee the compensation of non-combatants, a proportionality between the aggression suffered and the blow that will be inflicted and not lead to episodes of revenge or revenge.
Norberto Bobbio also addressed the theory of just war in the profile of jurisprudence, emphasizing that in this case a distinction is needed between a process of cognition and one of execution. In the second case, the war is understood as a punishment or as a sanction to be imposed on the enemy and the act of belligerence is exalted in the force which therefore places itself at the service of the law. In the process of cognition, military operations find their limits as they are not suitable to discriminate the just from the unjust, this because the war is right for both contenders.
The concept of just war is remembered by Roland Bainton in quoting Plato: in order to be considered just, it must have as its objective the vindication of justice and the re-establishment of peace. Where, however, the application of justice is fair, the rights of the defeated are not harmed and peace is not negative.
Quoting Thomas Hobbes, the concept of peace is negative, as forgotten by the absence of strength, and according to Kelsen, the law itself resorts to public force to guarantee compliance with the laws. This means that the legal status of peace is restricted to the illegitimate use of force, justifying it when necessary.
These passages do not belong to the adepts of the Islamic State guilty of killing civilian personnel and as such not belligerent and of using force not for public defense purposes. The Islamist cannot be considered right because he avenges himself against the enemy with brutality. Moreover, this alleged warrior hides and justifies his actions with hatred towards the infidel, but in reality it is not a question of men who have surpassed themselves enlightened by religion, but of adepts obedient to others of their kind whose orders affect on thought rather than acts.
The hatred of the ISIS warrior is also the search for a strong and preponderant identity, formally dissimilar from the Western one that is being lost in uncertainties, instability and voluptuousness. In this context, the religion of the West itself is in a decadent phase, in fact the inability to set concrete goals diminishes the meaning of life and the loss of life also involves faith. The state associations, be they financial, political or military, as well as the individual, aim at a precise identity that allows them a predominant role and to achieve this they sometimes result in episodes of violence, hence the need to emerge that translates into a typically Western "will to power". The will to assert and excel, leaves room for the fear of being threatened by the contenders, a circumstance from which fear and weakness originate. The emergence of these feelings turns violence into a denial of otherness in the need to affirm one's own, a process that promotes cultural-religious conflicts and facilitates the proliferation of fundamentalism.
Identity, in order to be recognizable, requires a comparison and this is possible only with another association or with another individual, therefore only the relationship between men undeniably defines the identity of an individual or a community. In some way this could be conceived as the search for truth and in the case of religious conflicts it is necessary to weigh the enrichment that belief gives to men, a condition that exceeds the will to power.
Implementations of weapon systems, economic interference and the emergence of the world market, have achieved the result of globalization, but have also favored the proliferation of organized groups that oppose this viaticum. The will to power is not globalization understood as the supremacy of the technologically advanced nations over those in development, but the ancestral human desire to live that has turned into a complex of ups and downs of relationships, relationships and chance. This induces the human being to the desire of possessing unnecessary goods until suffering from lack, a component that leads to the fulfillment of repressing a much more serene interior life and groped to prevaricate the next in the individual affirmation.
In a singular parallax, the Islamic warrior and the will to power end up almost coinciding, declining the definition of Gregoire Chamayou: "Politics is war, war is politics". It is enough to replace the political word with globalization to justify the hatred of the Islamic warrior and the need to excel the will of Western power.
The awareness of this condition could be the beginning of a viaticum to lead the parties to a more relaxed confrontation.
Bibliography:
Don Valerio Bortolini, "Interculturality and religions". March 2007.
ON Capoguerra, "Of war and warriors". The philosophy of the One, 2013.
Alex Barone, "We are the will of power". The dissident intellectual, June 2015.
Gregoire Chamayou, "Theorie du drone". 2014
