Antonio Li Gobbi, a few months ago left the active service, in the unusual role of moderator of a round table on the topic "What future for security in Europe?".
We have dealt with the topic of security in a varied environment, making use of illustrious speakers, different in terms of background, experience and points of view.
Our goal was not to provide answers (a task not compatible with the time available), but to generate doubts and undermine the easy "certainties" that too often characterize the approach to security issues.
In today's multipolar world, we Europeans (and we Italians in particular) are stunned and confused when confronted with the issue of security.
We realize that the conceptual parameters we used to refer to in the past are no longer adequate and the tools we used are no longer valid. However (due to laziness or myopia) we have not elaborated new ones.
It is true that, in a sense, we have lived as "sedated" for 45 years, within mechanisms of purely ideological bipolar opposition. The opposition that was conveyed to us and we (erroneously) perceived more as a contrast between political ideologies, or rather between two different conceptions of the citizen-state relationship (the communist and the democratic one), which as a geo-strategic contrast between two superpowers. Moreover, throughout the Cold War period, the comparison between the two areas of influence dating back to the US and the USSR was played on a virtual level (that of military deterrence, which today has lost much of its practical value).
We have lost the awareness that in the real world conflicts develop through the synergistic recourse to a vast and diversified series of tools - ideological, political, economic, propagandistic - that go alongside the military. Military instrument that may perhaps appear to be the most visible, but I often consider it the least effective if not integrated into a credible mix.
In these years, we Europeans have lost the awareness that all these tools must be used and dosed to guarantee our safety. It's not a new situation! We are now back to the "normal situation". If we think about it, with the exception of the two world wars and the American Civil War, conflicts have almost always been asymmetric. Moreover, a quarter of a century has passed since the end of the "cold war", but it seems that we have not been able to fully realize it.
A further element of confusion is represented by the fact that by now we have become accustomed to the idea of permanent alliances. We no longer have the perception that, in a rapidly changing situation, when risk situations evolve and change, the perception of the insidiousness of the new risks by individual allies may be different.
I'll explain. The perception of the danger of a conventional Russian attack on Europe by a Lithuanian or a Polish is very different from that of an Italian. Similarly, concerns about the crises afflicting the Middle East and North Africa cannot be perceived by all allies with the same intensity. In this context, we are perhaps also a bit upset about recognizing (with some embarrassment) that with regard to some issues (for example those relating to the Middle East) we appreciate more the way in which the former enemy expresses himself (Russia ), of how much we don't share the politics of our greater Atlantic ally. Also in this field our reference parameters are not always adapted to the new situation.
A further element of confusion (and, therefore, of fear) is fundamentalist terrorism.
Terrorism has always set itself more psychological objectives than "kinetic" ones. I believe, however, that this new form of terrorism scares us Western Europeans (and we Italians in particular), not so much for the risk (certainly limited) of being potential victims of an attack, but because we are no longer able to conceive conceptually " martyrdom "for a cause, an ideology, a religion. We can, perhaps, still conceive the "hero" (whether positive or negative) who accepts the risk of falling during an action, but not deliberate suicide. We do not understand it and, therefore, we are terrified of it.
As I said, the objective of the round table was certainly not to provide any answer (there would have been no time, even if there are such answers). It was proposed to install doubts and perplexities and to provide elements for reflection. We hope we managed to do it.
It would seem that Europeans have lost antibodies to address the issue of security. In your opinion, what is the public's perception of the subject?
Let's start by saying that there are different factors between nation and nation, which involve different perceptions of which represents the most serious risk for each.
As I have already said, the perception of the Russian threat is very strong in the Baltic countries, Finland, Poland and, albeit to a lesser extent, in the other countries of the former Warsaw Pact.
Then there are the countries with a colonial tradition of centuries (GB and France), whose perception of national security goes beyond its own territory, as connected with both cultural and commercial ties with the former colonies.
Then there is a security problem connected to the terrorism generated by Islamic fundamentalism. Risk certainly perceived to a greater extent in those nations that have suffered recent attacks or where there is the presence of substantial non-integrated Islamic communities. This risk, however, could be perceived by what George W Bush called "new Europe" in a less serious way than is perceived in "old Europe"
Perceptions regarding the perniciousness of individual risks are different from country to country: for this reason it is difficult to find a common line on safety.
In 1980 Khomeini wrote to Gorbachev that Islamic fundamentalism would replace the communist ideology in opposition to the West; looks like he saw right.
I am convinced that he was absolutely right. It is clear that the Western concept of life, essentially secular in the political and religious fields, was at the time threatened by Marxist ideologies as it is now by religiously inspired ideologies. In both cases, we are dealing with ideologies tending to regulate the relationship between the individual and society very closely, attributing to the latter the possibility of "regulating" the lives of citizens and interpersonal relationships.
In a certain sense, Marxism saw the individual as a function of the common good of society, just as today religious fundamentalism considers it an "instrument" in the service of a religious belief.
I am not a historian, but I think that the persecutions of the Christians, in the early years of the Roman Empire, were essentially due to the egalitarianism advocated by the new Faith, which threatened to undermine the elitism on which Roman society was based.
It is true that the signs of the threat could already be seen for some time in Islamic fundamentalism and some wrote about it. I am thinking in particular of Samuel Huntington (who already anticipated his theses on the clash of civilizations in 1993 in Foreign Affairs and who had well identified, among contemporary civilizations, the "Islamic" and the "Western").
For their part, the US - this was their strategic mistake - continued to foment Islamic extremism as a latch to break up the USSR. Then becoming their own target.
How do you view NATO in the coming 20 years? Do you have a future?
NATO is our history. Europe and Italy would not be what they are if they had not developed within the Alliance. European integration without NATO might not even have started and, in any case, it would never have reached current levels. I believe in the Alliance, I recognize the great merit of having safeguarded freedom and democracy in Europe from the 1945 to the 1990, as well as, of course, peace.
After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the USSR (respectively July and December 1991) with the apparent end of bipolarity, there was, in my opinion, a somewhat amateurish and idealistic approach to the problem on the part of the United Nations of the management of the numerous crises that were emerging (I refer to the Secretariat of Boutros Boutros-Ghali from the '92 to the 96 and to its' Agenda for Peace').
I believe that the role played by the two superpowers during the "cold war" in containing and controlling conflicts and tensions between states was not well understood. The UN tried to assume a direct political-military role in the management of international crises. In this ambitious task he totally failed (as the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia showed).
In this context, NATO (which had won the "cold war" without firing a shot) established itself as the only supranational organization capable of intervening both politically and militarily for the management and solution of a crisis situation (in its areas or outside of them). NATO did it, on behalf of the UN (but with considerable autonomy from the UN), starting from the intervention in Bosnia in the 1995.
Today, however, I believe that NATO has lost some polish. One cause is certainly the uninspiring trend in the situation in Afghanistan, at 15 since the launch of ISAF and at 13 since NATO took over the guide. Furthermore, the Alliance's reaction to the recent Ukrainian crisis has, in my opinion, highlighted the different perceptions about security that divide member countries more than unite them. But we have already talked about these different perceptions. However, NATO remains a particularly good, efficient and structured political-military organization.
The problem, in my opinion, is not NATO as such, but what is expected of alliances. In this regard, I think we must return to a vision of relations between states prior to the "cold war". It seems difficult to me today to be able to consider any supranational alliance (or "the promise of military aid that two or more states exchange with each other") as marriages of love (ie "until death separates us" i) or as clothes "for all seasons". I think, unfortunately or fortunately, we have returned to a situation of instability in which alliances can only be more or less temporary unions aimed at the pursuit of limited and contingent objectives.
NATO was born with the aim of defending Europe from the Soviet threat. Is there still that contrast? Is the current confrontation between the USA and Russia of an ideological or geopolitical nature? For me it is today only of a geopolitical nature.
So let's see where the risks are and what alliance can be more functional to the pursuit of our current security objectives.
Let's look for example at what is happening in Syria and how the US and Russia operated there.
One cannot help but notice how American interventions in the Muslim world over the last twenty years have often been harbingers of problems that are still unresolved. Furthermore, to date, the US has favored relations with strong states in the Sunni world, even close to Wahabism.
Today, Russia seems to be close to many state powers in the Shiite world. These are facts that cannot but be taken into consideration when studying a strategy to defend ourselves against Islamic fundamentalism.
We also consider that even during the Obama presidency, the trend that has been going on for years that sees a shift in US interest (political, economic, military) towards the Pacific at the expense of the Atlantic has been further confirmed.
It should be borne in mind that Turkey is and will remain a member of NATO. There is no denying that in Turkey the Erdogan presidency is pursuing a policy of Islamization of state structures. Turkey is conducting its own policy aimed at acquiring a regional hegemonic role. A role that is not necessarily in line with our security interests in relation to the risks associated with Islamic fundamentalism and those connected with uncontrolled migration flows. Is Turkey like a bulwark or a Trojan horse today?
My conclusion is that NATO, as it is today, may not be the most suitable structure to guarantee us from some of the threats that loom, including that connected with Islamic fundamentalism.
Last line on BREXIT. Is it an opportunity or the end of a project that is not only political but also defensive?
I am a convinced European and I would also like a federal Europe. Having said that, to proceed on the basis of greater integration, we need similarity between the countries that embark on this journey. One of the EU's problems is that, over time, for commercial reasons, it has perhaps expanded too much or too quickly, becoming a big club of countries that have little in common. In this club it is therefore difficult to reach decisions that are both substantial and shared.
Britain has probably decided to join the club first to slow down the integration process from within.
For exclusively "Military" the exit of the United Kingdom represents for the EU the loss of the country that has the most powerful and capable military structure.
Moreover, from a security policy point of view in general terms, it could be more formal damage than substantial for the EU and for the credibility of its military commitments (we remind you that, in any case, for the "5 article" operations we are would always be addressed to NATO).
I believe, in fact, that the importance of the "only" military instrument for the achievement of geo-strategic and international security objectives is often overestimated.
Tomorrow, without the British "handbrake", the EU could perhaps try to be more ambitious and acquire the capacity for political and military intervention that has been lacking until now.
Capacity that was lacking not due to the lack of available military assets, but due to the lack of a cohesive political will to intervene and to provide a unified vision at a geo-strategic level.
Obviously, in the defense and security sector, an EU (without the United Kingdom) would be more strongly conditioned by the Franco-German binomial (and in my opinion, France would be the driving force in defense and security ). Moreover, in this context, Italy (as the third economic and military power of this "new EU") could easily play a more significant role than the current one and fill some of the empty spaces left by the British.
That is why I am inclined to consider that, in the long run, BREXIT as regards defense and security policy could also prove to be an opportunity for the EU (and for Italy), if we have the strength and courage to put ourselves to the test.
