The “random” numbers of GDP percentages for Defense

These days everyone is talking about percentages of GDP to be dedicated to defense. The US is asking for the 5%, there are those who propose the 3%, without having even spent the 2%. But does it make sense or are these just numbers thrown out there at random?

For years we have been hearing the same refrain that “NATO wants the dedication to be 2% of GDP to defense spending.” In the meantime, let us remember that the commitment to bring defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2024 had been assumed by the Prime Minister pro-tempore, Matteo Renzi, within the framework of the 2014 NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government in Cardiff. This collective commitment by the European countries had been strongly desired (term soft, I would say "almost imposed") by the Obama administration.

I believe it is useful to remember that perhaps the most significant aspect (or perhaps the only truly significant one) of the aforementioned commitment undertaken in 2014 within NATO is that at least the 20% of defense spending (i.e. at least 4 per thousand of GDP) by 2024 was to be dedicated to “defense spending on major new equipment, including related research & development” or to innovation in the defense sector (reference Wales Summit Declaration, art. 14), a point which does not seem to have received the attention it deserves up to now.

Now Trump is demanding that his NATO allies raise the percentage of GDP they devote to defense to 5% of GDP (I repeat, he asks his allies for it, but he doesn't seem to have any intention of letting the US do it, which dedicates about 100 million euros to defense) 3,8% of their GDP).

In response, Rutte and Von der Leyen, as intimidated as brats caught stealing jam, have committed to guaranteeing the 3%. Moreover, I cannot help but wonder by what authority, since neither of them has authority over the state budgets of the member countries of the Organizations they represent (i.e. NATO and the EU).

The unpleasant impression is that these numbers are thrown out almost at random, as if you were bargaining on the beach with the “vu compra” who is trying to sell you a counterfeit bag.

Of course, as a soldier, I have always believed that defense was a serious matter and required consequent spending commitments. Moreover, I have also always believed that before defining how many financial resources to dedicate to defense (as to any other public sector) it was necessary to have clear objectives and priorities that were set. Precisely as a soldier, I have always had more than a suspicion when I heard talk of “increasing” defense spending, without however clearly defining the operational objectives that were to be pursued. Nor did I hear talk at the same time of “improving and rationalizing” such spending.

Personally, I believe that the problem lies not only in the “quantity” of spending but also in the “quality” of such spending.

The problem is complex and I believe that it cannot be addressed only by setting the numbers of the percentages of GDP to be dedicated to defense or by defining the percentage of the defense budget to be allocated to the modernization and acquisition of armaments.

The problem should be addressed at different levels (NATO, EU and national)

Let's start from the NATO level, it leaves me quite perplexed to set figures referring to the GDPs of individual countries without having previously defined what exactly the Alliance requires of those countries to face shared threats and operational needs. I reiterate, "shared”, because it may make little sense to define percentages of spending without tying them to objectives of interest to this Alliance (since more than one country can legitimately have purely national strategic interests that go beyond the common interests of the Alliance). What the US spends for its global strategic interests (for example in favor of South Korea or Taiwan) or what France spent in the Sahel countries may not always and not all be of interest to NATO.

Also to prevent unnecessary duplication of assets between individual countries, it might be more useful to define the operational capabilities (in the nuclear, land, naval, air, cyber and space fields) that individual Allies or groups of Allies should be able to make available for NATO needs, rather than worrying about how much these countries spend.

It is tragically true that many European countries (including Italy and Germany), convinced that they live in a peaceful world, have for decades considered defense spending to be “wasted money” and will now have to devote more resources to this sector than they have done so far. It is, however, equally true that the US requests regarding defense spending by European countries, rather than aiming to achieve military autonomy for the European pillar of NATO, aim to force allies to turn to the star-spangled defense industry for purchases.

At EU level, JD Vance's call for allies to be able to "fend for themselves" should be seized upon in an attempt to give a credible essence to the Union's foreign policy and to strengthen its military structure. To strengthen the EU military capacity it may be necessary to shelve the constraint (desired by the USA) of avoiding NATO-EU duplication. Because only by creating an EU command structure similar to the NATO one (and integrable into the NATO one) will the EU be able to acquire real autonomous operational capacity. And that costs!

It should be noted that other organizational solutions, aimed at avoiding possible duplications, as suggested by the NATO-EU “Berlin Plus” Agreement of 16 December 2002, have not actually worked (also due to the hostility of some non-EU NATO countries).

However, even the EU should perhaps clearly establish its strategic objectives before hypothesizing percentages of GDP to be dedicated to defense. To do so, it will have to take into account the needs on its eastern border with Russia (given the clear indication that the US may lose interest in it in the future) but also of its southern border (which the US has long been uninterested in), that of the Middle East and North Africa, where Islamic terrorism, Russian and Chinese interference constitute a threat that has been underestimated for too long. On the basis of the identification of these needs, the EU should define which operational capabilities member countries should be able to provide. (capabilities that will obviously be the same ones that these countries provide to NATO). This analysis does not appear to have been done.

Above all, however, The EU should address industrial policy in order to ensure not only the standardisation of weapons systems between individual countries but, where possible, their identity. That is, that the Armed Forces of the EU countries renew their arsenals by adopting the same types of armaments, ships and aircraft, all possibly produced thanks to European industrial cooperation.

This, however, is not what the US wants, nor what the individual member countries want, which tend to safeguard the interests of their companies rather than the functionality of their respective military instruments.

Finally, everyone seems happy with President Von der Leyen's intention to free defense spending (I assume that it is only the share relating to research and modernization expenses) from the constraints of the Stability Pact. Personally, it seems to me like an election campaign statement, to keep everyone happy (the USA on one side and countries like Italy, with major debt problems and which barely allocates about 1,5% I wonder, however, what President Von der Leyen will answer to those political forces (perhaps not enthusiastic about defense spending) who will ask to break free from the constraints of the Stability pact spending on public health or education or energy transition.

Coming to Italy, too often in our country defense spending has become a useful container from which to draw to meet needs that had little or no impact on the operational capabilities of the military instrument. Already in 1930 Mussolini urged the Minister of War Pietro Gazzera “a program of works ... I say works, not armaments or equipment, .... so as to occupy a significant amount of manpower of work”¹. The decidedly inadequate conditions in which our soldiers faced the Second World War are also the result of such a mentality!

In Italy, from 1945 to today, too often the policy of acquiring weapons systems, vehicles and equipment has been dictated more by the need to keep some sectors of the national industry in difficulty working than by the operational needs of the Armed Forces (sometimes even leading to the acquisition of systems or vehicles initially designed for export but which had not found sufficient approval on the foreign market).

It should also be kept in mind that In Italy, the Defense Department bears a significant portion of the costs for the Carabinieri, which perform almost exclusively police functions (apart from essentially some MSU contingents engaged in external operations). Furthermore, for over thirty years, that is since 1992 (operation “Vespri Siciliani”), significant army forces have been engaged in support functions for the police forces (currently operation “Strade Sicure”).

So, at NATO, EU and national level, the issue is not just “how much” is spent on the defense sector but rather having clear ideas about “what is being spent on” and this presupposes having clear ideas about what the threats are and who can or cannot be counted on any longer.