In such a politically fluid moment, and culpably distracted by petty squabbles, the Turkish initiative, aimed at obtaining full membership in the BRICS, almost goes unnoticed. If you look closely, it is not a exploit so unexpected, but of a final step preceded by political expressions that are increasingly disruptive and weakly inclined to preserve stability. Ankara feels it could be the interpreter of an Anatolian exceptionalism, which is however not so easy to manage for a country that, among other things, has to deal with ongoing economic difficulties and an internal policy that expressed contrasting feelings in the last electoral round.
That Ankara intends to break what it perceives as a Western yoke is understandable, that it intends to do so by placing on itself another very heavy burden is a little less. Just as it is obvious that in international politics there are no empty spaces, it is equally obvious that nothing is acquired by grace received, given that at this moment the economic balance of the BRICS is yet to be fully analyzed, if it is true that starting from China, the main shareholder, the situation is not so rosy.
Let's stage a little geopolitical psychodrama: while the West, masochistically gloating over yet another mea culpa, superficially seeks subliminal responsibilities, one could also try to see how much and how Turkey has contributed, strong in a political culture that does not always agree with the standards of the West. Let it be clear, the West is certainly not free from responsibility, but framing Turkey in a political-economic context characterized by marked authoritarianism (just to sweeten the pill) should lead to some reflection, corroborated both by the observation of the euphoric Russian enthusiasm, relieved by the displeasure induced by the unpredictable Ukrainian incursions and by being able to count on a partner who controls maritime Straits of particular importance to reach the warm seas, and by the fact that the double oven policy is currently difficult to apply. Let's be mercilessly honest: how much and what has Turkey done, net of Brussels' Byzantineisms, to adapt its standards to European realities?
The desire to take an active part in the various forums by directing their policies is typical of a political subject that makes power politics and strategic depth an intangible creed; the problem is to ascertain the capabilities or, secondarily, the exchange goods to offer to the hegemons of greater specific weight. If it is true that the intent of the Reis is to place himself in mediation between East and West, it would be necessary to ascertain the solidity of the iron of his vessel, unless the wavering characteristic of his policy is not accepted supinely also in the East, something that leaves one with more than one doubt, while keeping in mind that the position of Anatolia makes Ankara a possible rentier state, a bridge to the rich regions of Central Asia.
Frankly, it is difficult to envisage a Turkish multipolarism capable of mediating between NATO, China and Russia, which should however induce the European countries bordering the Mediterranean to carefully evaluate every possible evolution of a geopolitical bloc, the BRICS, born and developed with clear anti-Western intentions.
Bloomberg is not far from the truth when he says that Erdogan intends to pocket (in a Levantine way?) two rewards: economic strengthening with the Sino-Russian axis, and transforming Turkey into a gas hub from Russia and Central Asia, fulfilling a dream that some countries (see Italy) cannot even see in their most brazen dream projects, not to mention that Ankara could also succeed in becoming a launch pad for Beijing's electric cars to enforce EU customs agreements. After all, a not-so-bad little project, n'est ce pas? And at this point, why limit ourselves? Erdogan himself just a few days ago hypothesized joining theShanghai Cooperation Organization, assuming a relational basis win-win quite complex, if not impossible.
Given that politics is an activity of rare ferocity, and that international politics is even more so, it is frankly impossible to discern any intent characterized by noble diplomacy, as depicted by the usual interested parties. Clients. Let's be clear, this is just the first episode of a soap opera in a blatantly neo-Ottoman style, like those that the soft power Ancirano dishes out daily on commercial channels; we are therefore waiting for more structured Atlantic reactions, even if tainted by Washington's electoral weakness, until proven otherwise still the largest shareholder.
Photo: Kremlin
