Information management and cyber risks of the Forza NEC system: some reflections

(To Andrea Puligheddu)
01/02/17

The "Forza NEC" program is now a consolidated presence among the projects aimed at matching digitization and Armed Forces. Consecrated as early as 2005, the netcentric concept aims to achieve - through a consolidated C4I system (Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence) - a real operational transformation of the organizational structures, in order to make them more suitable for facing future operations. As is known, the idea behind the NEC project (Network Enabled Capability) as conceived at NATO level, was to generate a specific synergy, activating the capacity (precisely, enable capability) to concentrate in a single communication network structure (network) elements that are completely different from each other, both theoretical and operational in nature, with a technological and human imprint, in order to obtain a considerable strategic advantage over the opponent.

As specified also within the masterly works of the Institute of International Affairs on the program (M. Nones, A.Marrone “The transformation of the Armed Forces: the Forza NEC program", Ed. Nuova Cultura, 2011, publicly available source among the most qualified), the fulcrum of the netcentric theory lies in the interconnection in network of three subjects:"sensors", Or technical and / or human elements that perceive and detect natural and human activities,"makers"Ie elements that on the basis of the available information take a decision and"actuators", Or elements that put the decision into practice (usually they are weapons, but hypothetically also soldiers). All the elements just mentioned are in fact always integrated into a single structure, established for the sole purpose of synergistically exploiting information and operational capabilities to achieve effects consistent with the desired objectives. In other words, the intent of the Forza NEC program is to generate a force multiplier by linking all the elements operating in the scenario into a single network, so that through access and information sharing the higher levels of command get the full shared knowledge of the situation (situational awareness).

The last typical factor that implies the project is the cd "spiral approach". In essence, the program aims to be implemented - and in fact is thus structured - through precise phases, called spiers.

In this way it is intended to have greater flexibility in the action, favoring the gradual achievement of results and allowing the operating personnel on the project to be able to make improvements even during the work in progress. In Italy this program is fully operational from 2007 and in theory (for the avoidance of technical delays and unexpected events) it should know its final conclusion in the 2031.

In fact, at the state of the art, Forza NEC is in fact in the process of being concluded for some of its sub-spirits (such as, for example, that of operational experimentation) while it is in full swing for others. An opportunity to take stock of the situation is the Network Enabled Capability Technology Conference, promoted by the SMI Information Group underway, the 1 and 2 February 2017 in Rome. The event brings together the major experts in the sector and the stakeholders involved, who report on the progress through cycles of specific meetings.

Certainly, there are still many aspects to be defined. But in addition to the technical data, the question of which will be left to those in charge, it is certainly interesting to ask ourselves some questions about the critical points and the problematic aspects that the netcentric method presents from the definition of its own structure. Assuming that you do not have a profile as a technologist, I believe it is possible and interesting to carry out some general considerations in advance (both of strategic character that inherent the management profile of information) regarding the critical issues that the adoption of a netcentric concept entails for the operators involved, as well as from the perspective of avoiding the use of disproportionate tools to obtain advantages - in the final analysis - not fully compliant with the set objectives.

Among the Forza NEC vulnerabilities first and foremost is the critical mass of the information you intend to manage. The program provides for the interconnection of multiple nodes and the synergy of heterogeneous systems, both in terms of development and context. In particular, Forza NEC intends to integrate:

  • SIACCON → or the EMS Command and Control System;

  • SICCONA → other Command, Control and Navigation System for the Digitization of combat platforms;

  • FUTURE SOLDIER → Project launched in the 2008 concerning the digitization of soldiers in the field;

  • BLUE FORCE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS (BFSA), an identification system for Allied units developed within NATO;

  • DEFINED RADIO SOFTWARE (SDR), a type of communication software based with multistandard capacity, innovative compared to traditional systems hardware based.

As you can see, the sources of information gathering are many. These sources - as expected - must also be coordinated as a whole under the same organizational structure, subject to common standards also from a logical and organizational standpoint.

It goes without saying that a challenge of this size will require a strong synergy within NATO and conspicuous efforts both for the defense administration and for the industrial partners involved in the project, primarily for the information gathering and management phases. In fact, all these systems are created with the intent to collect and manage discrete masses of data concerning the areas in which they find themselves operating: natural conditions and environment, friendly, enemy forces, real-time updates, geo-referencing, route and routes from follow for vehicles, receiving and sending communications etc.

Therefore regardless of the degree of technological complexity that the program requires (and will require), the development of Forza NEC will have to be focused on devising precise standards and methodologies regarding the flow of incoming and outgoing information, limiting the level of risk and in such a way as to codify them under the organizational profile, without compromising the strategic advantage. Comforts however to see that some elements adopted (like the principles transforming while operating ed evolution throughout production) are intended to prevent the dangers associated with the integration of systems so heterogeneous between them; however, this does not entirely shelter you from other types of dangers. An example of a conceivable risk in this sense is undoubtedly that of the generation of a peculiar “Signal to Noise”Due to the excessive amount of information. In the absence of a filter that regulates the information contents, there is a risk of putting decision makers in positions of stalemate, or forced to provide a decision-making output slowed down by the analysis of too much information in situations that would instead require, by their very nature, a discreet celerity.

A crucial element is therefore undoubtedly the degree of efficiency generated by the information collected. In fact, much information, although organized, entails extensive management charges. For these reasons, a decisive point in the development phase (Concept Development & Experimentation) is the simulation through techniques and models of the functioning of the systems (Modeling & Simulation - M&S), prior to their realization. For this purpose, Forza NEC uses the ITB, or rather theIntegration Test Bed. It is a structure of several interconnected sites, organized in such a way as to support the testing activities on the systems, verify their level of effectiveness and identify further aspects that can be improved in subsequent phases. Crucially, from the point of view of the information handled, it is to propose standards on the security and conservation of the information collected that are 1) as clear and uniform as possible 2) continuously updated and communicated. Always with a view to avoiding an information overlap (too much data and little use), it would be advantageous to study - through M&S - solutions and models of conservation of specific information, different from those adopted outside a netcentric conception.

The strength of this concept is that to generate reliable information. The degree of reliability of the information provided is the prerequisite for the correct functioning of the systems and for this reason the sensor network plays a role of primary importance. In particular, it is necessary to take care of the human component of the sensor network, an essential and first step in the digitization of instruments. In this regard, the "Future Soldier" project, launched since the 2008, aims to train the personnel employed during operations in conceiving themselves as real "mobile" sensors, essential for the tactical support provided by the upper levels. The duty of the Defense Administration is to verify that these dynamics are carried out, as is correct, always within the limits and in terms of the dignity of the person, with particular reference to the use of biometric systems and invasive technologies for the operator. If used, they must have the sole purpose of monitoring the health status of the operator, so as to optimize any interventions to protect the same in the field: it must absolutely be avoided that every single information processed may be stored in any unencrypted form and used differently at a later time for a different purpose.

Last risk factor - in my most critical opinion of the previous ones - Is that cyber. In a historic moment of technological avant-garde such as this, where the quantitative and qualitative level of attacks has reached unthinkable rates compared to just a few years ago, to pose the problem of cyber risk in serious terms it constitutes an inevitable imperative.

As is known, there are no pre-packaged technological solutions that - right down to the end - guarantee the invulnerability of the systems. It is also not necessary to remember that - to date - land military networks and systems are the most naturally exposed objectives of the entire world scenario (closely followed by companies and public administration systems), in addition to the fact that there have been several attacks that have caused serious damage to military administrations around the world, even indirectly. Think, one above all, of the theft of data carried out against Yahoo which has seen among the information taken away those of 150.000 employees of the US Administration and Armed Forces.

Certainly the most obsolete and widespread systems are more subject to the technical risk of structured attacks, vice versa the more up-to-date ones allow a more practicable safety in practice: apply the maximum guarantees available at the level of security measures, train and train the personnel involved in the net-centric field on the basic elements of cyber risks (from network and device security to social engineering) is considered the "abc" of a correct protection of information. Impossible, at least in my opinion and competence, to be able to make further technological reflections on the relationship between this last type of risk and Forza NEC; what is certain is that, in the development and implementation of systems, the prevention of this type of risk will be one of the most decisive elements supporting the full effectiveness of the netcentric conception, to guarantee an operation that really serves to generate savings in terms of resources and human lives and not, instead, a dispersion of information and the strategic advantage they generate.

(photo: US DoD)