This article aims to analyze the structure of the European Union's foreign security and defense policy in connection with the profound transformations that have affected the national military instrument.
For the purpose of an adequate understanding of the overall scenario within which the aforementioned transformations take place, it will be necessary to outline the international scenario within which the defense forces move.
The international context of reference
The contemporary international context is characterized by three key elements: the end of bipolarity, economic, cultural and social globalization and the emergence of regional powers.
The end of the bipolar system consequent to the collapse of the USSR, has determined a substantial reorganization of the geopolitical and geo-economic type on a planetary scale.
With the collapse of the communist sphere of influence, different areas of the world have been characterized by instability: the countries of the former Soviet bloc, the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, Africa, areas that directly and indirectly saw their existence determined by the 'bipolar structure of the world, whose belonging to one of the two blocks guaranteed, at different degrees, political, economic and military protection. Consequent to the Soviet collapse, there was a general reorganization of those areas that constituted its spheres of influence. Moreover, since the beginning of the nineties and, above all, with the beginning of the new millennium, further risk factors of international security have occurred: the so-called failure of states, illegal immigration, piracy, transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The use of preventive war and the increase in the perception of the threat within states have been some of the effects of the post-bipolar international framework. The international scenario has seen the emergence of problems related to the control of information and energy supply systems that have obvious implications with national security, which however require ever greater coordination and collaboration between the States in order to manage and resolve them . All these security threats have, in hindsight, effects that go beyond the borders of the States and acquire the appearance of global phenomena.
At the same time, together with the processes mentioned above, globalization has taken place.
The intensification and spread of trade, the improvement of production techniques, the speed of transport and communication techniques, have determined a structural change in the economic and political structures of the world.
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The economic development of countries like China, India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa has, at the same time, distributed wealth and development prospects to millions of people who, up to thirty years ago, were excluded.
However, the increase in living standards leads to a worldwide increase in the consumption of resources such as water, food and energy sources.
This increase in the consumption of scarce resources could have significant effects in the dynamics, in terms of conflict for their control, in the international system.
In fact, economic demographic and social development always has important repercussions on the political ambitions of the states.
From here, we witness the phenomenon of the growth of new and old regional powers.
The states of new development whose ambition grows with the growth of economic strength, contribute, with ever greater force in wanting to reconfigure the global and regional structures.
In fact, the presence of actors such as China, India and Russia capable of transversely affecting contexts, such as Africa and the Middle East, or in their respective regional areas, with a policy able to reconfigure, is always greater. in terms of hegemony, economic expansion, political interests, the structure of regional and world spaces.
Notwithstanding the present and the future, US primacy as the only global superpower, nevertheless the ambitions linked to the increase of the economic and political strength of these actors are increasing.
The conjunction between the ambition of the emerging powers, and consolidated structures of power, produces an international framework in which there are several factors of geopolitical instability.
Hence it emerges how the international context of reference is characterized by significant risk factors that increasingly, like terrorism or uncontrolled migration connected to crises within states, have a global nature. This context increasingly determines and determines the spatial structure of the major regions of the world, posing the problem of the most effective organizational arrangements for dealing with these elements. .
The context outlined has obvious strategic implications and involves a clear definition of the objectives and ambitions of the states or regional organizations they set up.
From the previous analysis it should emerge clearly that the transnational nature of risk factors implies a redefinition of the scale with which country security should be pursued.
This is even more urgent for contexts such as the European one, which are at the center of various crisis focuses.
The countries of the European Union must, within the limits and possibilities offered by the community context, increasingly decide and influence the international dimension. EU objectives and strategies must be consistent with the vastness of political and economic interests in the field. The consistency and clarity of the vital interests of European states on the world stage will have significant effects both on the aspects linked to the internal and external security of individual countries and on the global role that the EU will have to carve out; on pain of marginalization and subordination to crises and emerging actors from other parts of the world.
Some aspects of ESDP
As is known, although characterized in its development by stationary phases and uncertainties, a foreign security and defense policy dimension exists at EU level.
The question to be asked is whether, at European level, the security and interests of the member countries and therefore those of the Union, can be usefully guaranteed by the ever closer cooperation between the states in matters of defense policy.
Certainly, phenomena such as terrorism, the crisis of the states in the Middle East, the ambitions of regional powers, issues related to illegal immigration, call into question the means that with the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union has endowed itself with guarantee its safety and stability.
In order to understand how and if the EU can define its own security strategy within the international framework, it is essential to understand the current decision-making and operational capacity that the Treaty provides to the EU in pursuing its foreign security and defense policy and put it in relation with the changes that are affecting the national military instrument.
It will therefore be necessary to clarify some theoretical elements about the nature of the European Union.
One of the most qualifying elements of the political / legal debate of our time is that of the nature of the EU.
The criticism of the absence of an EU foreign and security policy on the one hand is now habitual, because it would not have a single center of imputation but would be, at every crisis and every event ready to shatter among the interests of the individual member states, on the other, because a security and defense policy on a European scale would be superfluous for the purpose of pursuing security which would be better ensured by the individual state.
These readings, although expressing legitimate and partly truthful criticisms, do not allow an objective understanding of the limits and opportunities that ESDP offers.
In order to clearly understand the working mechanisms of the European Union, an effort is needed to understand the juridical-political connection that characterizes the relationship between States and the Union.
It is not useless, in this place, and in this time of crisis in Europe, to recall that the States are and remain, the Subjects who, through the Treaties, decide either to transfer parts of the sovereignty to the EU and which, from the degree of the portion of power transferred, derives the competence, and therefore the effectiveness, of the Union's capacity for action and decision. From the above it is clear that one of the factors of European integration is constituted by the relationship that is not always linear and progressive, between States and European institutions in the sense that from the dialectic between national prerogatives and pushed towards ever greater integration, the profile of Community policies arises. In assigning competences from States to the EU, national identities as well as interests play a decisive role. Indeed, in the transfer of certain policies to the European level, the traditions, history and culture of the member states play a fundamental role, in the sense that, if for certain policies (such as commercial matters) the transfer of sovereignty has been more easy given the "functional" nature of this aspect of associated life, as far as other subjects are concerned, history, legal and cultural traditions of States hold back the attribution of competences to the community level.
This aspect is even more important in the field of foreign and defense policy in which geopolitical entities and strategic interests are compared, which are not always coincident.
In this complex framework linked to the development of the Union with its uncertain results, the ESDP is to be placed.
Its construction process could not be understood except in connection with the profound transformations that have affected national military instruments.
The evolutionary process of the national military instrument, has achieved in recent years numerous objectives such as the complete professionalization of forces, the reform of military leadership, the unification of technical-military intelligence and is still ongoing. The transformation process pursued in recent years has had to develop, also taking into account the context of economic crisis that has reduced the possibility of spending. In this framework, the national military instrument is called upon to adapt to a geopolitical and geostrategic context in which different crisis factors, which will not exclusively have the form of a high-intensity conventional conflict, will unfold at different levels: from operations unconventional, to asymmetric warfare, to risks related to the computer domain, to those around the control of energy resources and to those concerning the cyber sector. This change implies an evolutionary adaptation of the Armed Forces with a substantial increase in command, control, and intelligence capabilities, and a synergistic and multipurpose development of forces, able to adapt to different operational contexts.
Operational contexts which, with the intensification of crises and conflicts in the states (civil wars, secessions, failed states) or in certain areas of the globe, combined with the increase in migration, have profoundly influenced the scale of safety-relevant contexts national level, making it definitively global.
In fact, we have moved on to a more dynamic conception of the armed forces in which traditional operations are accompanied by political, economic, social and cultural measures; we could talk about an expansion of the operational sphere and the battlefield.
In a context in which risk factors are global in nature, national security must be guaranteed and maintained not only in areas of greater proximity to homeland but also in distant areas of the globe given the changes in the nature of the above risk factors exposed.
The extent of the changes that have occurred has highlighted the need to strengthen the European defense dimension understood as a complement and development of the national defense system.
The reading proposed here tends to analyze the ESDP within what is defined above as the constitutive dialectic of the European Union: tendency towards unity and national prerogatives combine in the architecture of the treaties and inform its development.
A first important element for understanding PESDC is the one related to the limits given to it.
Pursuant to Art. 4 TEU The Union respects the equality of the member states before the treaties and their national identity inherent in their fundamental, political and constitutional structure (..) It respects the essential functions of the state, in particular the functions of safeguarding territorial integrity, to maintain public order, and to protect national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each member state. This first element clarifies that the competence in matters of internal security remains a jealously guarded prerogative of the member states.
This declaration establishes the criterion according to which the aforementioned matters are inviolable of sovereignty in which the EU is not called to intervene. This is precisely one of the constitutive elements of the State-Union dialectic: competence remains national in the area of security and interiors, which shows how, despite the European context that increasingly invest the associated life, the sovereignty of states does not disappear. the EU is not, nor does it want to be, a macrostate such that it can perform police functions and guarantee internal security. From what has been said, it clearly emerges that it is on the side of cooperation and ever greater integration that the foundations of the common security and defense policy are to be laid. In effect, it is a question of building a defense dimension intended as the strengthening of the capacities of the individual states. In particular, its operating field projects it towards the external operation of the safety function.
The PESDC, an integral part of the CFSP, intends to guarantee the EU an operational capacity by resorting to civil and military means (Art. 42).
This capacity is essentially aimed at ensuring the maintenance of peace, conflict prevention, strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The PESDC contains the premises for the gradual definition of a common defense policy of the Union (Art. 42 paragraph 2): this last article constitutes an element that establishes the principle of sovereignty leaving to the States the possibility of determine the forms and contents of the common defense.
This primacy of States is also expressed in the manner in which decisions are taken.
They are in fact taken by the Council, which decides unanimously, on the proposal of the High Representative for the CFSP or of a Member State.
As we shall see, the elements that tend to preserve the principle of sovereignty are joined by others that constitute an evolutionary step towards the formation of a common European defense.
A first evolutionary character is represented by Art. 43.
It expands the range of Petersberg missions including joint disarmament actions, humanitarian relief missions, military advisory and assistance missions, conflict prevention, peacekeeping missions and crisis management, including, missions aimed at re-establishment of peace and stabilization operations at the end of conflicts, being able, the aforementioned missions, to contribute to the fight against terrorism. The decisions on the missions "are adopted by the Council which establishes, the objective, the duration and the general methods of implementation" (Art. 43 TUE, paragraph 2).
Articles of evolution also have the articles 44 and 46 TUE.
Within the framework of "the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the execution of a mission to a group of Member States that wish it and have the necessary capacities for such a mission (Art. 44); the Member States participating in the mission shall inform the Council on its progress. In the event that the implementation of the mission generates far-reaching consequences or a change in the scope of the mission is required, the Board adopts the necessary decisions.
One can see how, in the case where a mission is entrusted to certain Member States, it is quicker to carry out missions starting from those states that want and can implement them, thus making a possible construction of coalitions more streamlined and effective. between States and indirectly, more efficient Union action as a whole. The device outlined in Art. 44, however, traces the decision on the custody and modification of missions to the Council as a body of the Union, thus maintaining its function as a political propulsion center on the subject of PESCD.
The Art. 46 TUE is the mechanism of permanent structured cooperation.
The procedure for activating the permanent structured Cooperation foresees a precise will on the part of the States that meet the criteria and sign the commitments on military capabilities specified in the protocol on permanent structured cooperation. First, the States notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Art. 46 TUE).
Subsequently, the Council adopts a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation, this decision is taken by qualified majority.
Furthermore, each Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in permanent structured cooperation, notifies its intention to the Council and to the High Representative (Art. 46 paragraph 3) thus making the cooperation open and flexible in its structure. In this case, too, notes the role of the Council: "The Council adopts a decision that confirms the participation of the Member State concerned that meets the criteria and signs the commitments set out in the articles 1 and 2 of the protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council decides by qualified majority after consulting the High Representative "(Art. 46 paragraph 3). It is emphasized that the participating States can also exit the permanent structured Cooperation by notifying the decision to the Council.
Finally, of certain importance as a key to the construction of a common defense is the provisions of Art. 42 par. 7 TUE.
If a Member State is subjected to armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States are required to assist and assist it by all means in their possession, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This is without prejudice to the specific nature of the security and defense policy of some Member States. Article that creates a real obligation of aid and assistance between Member States without prejudice to national specificities in matters of security and defense policy. This article, with its obligation of collective assistance constitutes, to date, one of the most important preconditions for the creation and conception of a Europe understood as a common defense space. Common defense area which is the prerequisite for guaranteeing the internal integrity and external security of the Member States.
Ciro Luigi Tuccillo
