The revolutionary events that took place at the end of the last century, consisting of the fall of the Soviet empire and the acquisition by the United States of the role of the only world superpower, quickly caused a radical change in the geopolitical structures and the way of conceiving international relations .
Since 1648, the year in which the Peace of Westphalia was reached, which ended the Thirty Years War, geopolitical relations had been based on the concept of State - Nation, Reason of State, absolute respect for national sovereignty and balance of forces. This structure changed the previous system based on the identification of the State in a religious function and that substantially, even through successive wars and revolutions, maintained the title of international system more effective for the maintenance of peace to the point that, after the revolution French, representatives of the major states of the time gathered in the famous Congress of Vienna in order to restore the order of international relations prior to the revolution itself. Also the following period of the Risorgimento struggles continued to have as their background the structures identified with the peace of Westphalia. Until the First World War the international scaffolding remained the same. Subsequently, the balances changed, but the two world wars still presupposed a conflictual structure based on the State - State relationship. The same post - war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union has maintained this approach, albeit in a more "broader" sense that defined, rather than a clash between State and State, a clash between state blocs, identified in the West and in the eastern one.
With the end of US bipolarism - USSR and the resulting cold war, founded on the cd. zero-sum game where both countries on the basis of the nuclear threat tended to contain their aggressive attitudes and those of the orbiting States in their respective areas of competence, the principles of the Westphalian approach (though different from the original ones) were upset, outlining a international scenario totally different from the past. If before the wars and armed conflicts took place in a conventional way through the clash between two or more armies of opposing states on the classic battlefield, today wars and conflicts are more of an endogenous type and take on the characteristics of civil wars. rather than wars between states, in territories in which the juridically understood state no longer exists. A situation of this kind, which currently occurs mainly in the Middle East and in central-northern Africa, has the potential consequence of expanding into the pacified neighboring areas, such as the European countries close to these conflict zones, and transforming the same areas in bases for international terrorism.
.jpg)
In this context, the role of global leader, lighthouse and dispenser of democracy and freedom self-assigned by the United States has led the country and its allies to undertake, over time, a series of "humanitarian" missions aimed at protecting civilian populations , victims of the internal feuds of individual countries or of conflicts between neighboring states, with the parallel aim of spreading the concept of democracy and freedom as interpreted by the Western tradition. Such humanitarian interference, very often bankruptcy, has contributed to increasing the intolerance towards Western countries in general, and towards the United States in particular, by local entities that have begun to undertake activities to combat this intrusion into internal affairs. . Activities which subsequently resulted in what is commonly referred to today as unconventional conflict and which finds its maximum expression in terrorist activity.
The events of 11 September 2001 confirm this description and in their tragedy marked the beginning of a new era. An era in which war is no longer conducted by two or more distinct entities, which are states or human groups in opposition to each other, but between one or more States and an invisible enemy, deconstructed in a network of cells scattered in the world; an enemy who acts with methods that go beyond what is imposed by the rules governing armed conflicts; an antagonist whose moves and means are unpredictable as not acting on the basis of a conventional doctrine, but on the basis of a new form of combat in which surprise, clandestinity, and total disregard for human life turn out to be the lines guide of every action.
However, even in this changed context, some elements remain constant, even if adapted to the new world contingencies. Direct reference is made to the strategy as a channel of contact between politics and the use of force.
The use of force and the relative military operations are not an end in themselves but represent the instrument adopted to carry out the political design of a juridically or sociologically identified subject. The crystalline relationship of dependence between military force and political objectives must therefore be emphasized. Both exploit the strategy to determine their own interests and the best way to pursue them, but each will have to articulate its actions based on a plan that takes into account different elements. In such a framework, the strategy applied to military force will always be subordinated to that applied to politics which will have as its ultimate goal the achievement of a favorable situation in its own right and which is embodied in the concept of peace and security. The subordination of military action to the pursuit of the political goal is clear, therefore, if one considers that military force cannot produce peace; its purpose is to outline a new political arrangement that is prodromal to the construction of peace (1). In his work "Of the war" Carl von Clausewitz defines war as "the continuation of the politics of the State pursued by other means". This definition embodies the clear and necessary dependence of military action, and its objective, with respect to the political purpose. These principles are pillars of conflict, both conventional and unconventional. In support of this it is common ground to state that military strategy makes no sense if not included in a global strategic plan that coordinates the use of force with that of the other instruments of the State (2) also usable on the basis of its own employment strategy (3). In such a context, the final objective of the actors is not the simple destruction of the opponent's installations or military structures. The material strength of the enemy is not the last step of the entire operation. This represents a tactical objective, functional to the pursuit of the strategic objective that consists in undermining the intentions of the enemy and that is its specular political-strategic plan.
If the concept of strategy has remained fundamentally identical to that of the past, the scenario within which this thought finds its application has certainly changed. The changed geopolitical framework and the emergence of terrorism as the main means of aggression on the part of non-state entities highlights the current inadequacy of the previous instruments and the previous "Western" doctrines used to conduct military operations. The traditional muscular confrontation between the actors in conflict in which the United States, given its potential war mass, always came out winners thanks also to a prudent use of soft and hard power has given way to a different way of approaching the operational theater . In a context in which the opponent does not use the same tools and therefore does not use planes, ships, tanks or brigades of soldiers, the mere display of war muscles, aimed at intimidating the opponent or attaining victory in times very short (or maybe even without a fight), it appears no longer effective. This is also because due to the structure no longer vertical but as a net of the adversary, in which the same does not occupy more precise positions but moves on difficult terrain of difficult mapping and uses techniques and tactics a - doctrinal, the use of a large number of soldiers moving in platoons or companies and the use of particularly heavy vehicles, with a consequent extremely onerous logistical commitment, is no longer the most effective method to use. To date the FF.AA. Westerners are modifying and adapting their doctrines and operational abilities, giving priority to the aspect consisting in the rapid projection of forces and in their flexibility lowered in a joint and combined context with the European and Atlantic allies characterized by the sharing of situational awareness (situational awareness).
In such a frame the element that distinguishes between success and failure is information.
In the fight against terrorism, both the one conducted within the national territory, and the one conducted in the operating theater (Afghanistan and Iraq for example), the main objective to be conquered is the so-called. information domain. By informational domain here we mean the product of the sum between what can be called information superiority and what we can indicate as informational supremacy.
.jpg)
For information superiority means the ability of a force in the field to impose its superiority in the research, processing, dissemination and exploitation of information with respect to that of the adversary (to which the possibility of effectively counteracting the conduct of operations is prevented) to the order to gain control of a specific tactical area.
Informative supremacy means the ability to incriminate in the context of the operational theater a general information structure that is able to coordinate and synchronize the whole flow of information obtainable and the different intelligence disciplines deployed in the field and from other sources also not military. This in order to create an information framework that allows the decision maker to have at his disposal a lot of information analyzed and coordinated between them that allow him to have a fair advantage on the adversary.
The sum of these two factors gives rise to the informative domain of the entire conflict situation.
Informative domain whose most important characteristic, precisely in view of an ever greater operational interaction between the Armed Forces of the various States involved, must be that of being able to share in the shortest possible time, and in the most clear and rationalized way desirable, the entire information flow collected by the various subjects employed in the field. The materialization of such a reality is the goal of the project that most Western states are implementing and which is called NCW (Network Centric Warfare) or NEC (Network enabled capability) (4).
The revolution brought about by the incessant development of IT (Information technology) has conditioned various aspects of society including the economic and social aspects through the sharing on the Internet, of a huge amount of information that can be acquired by anyone. The future is on the net. The awareness of such a change has also led the Armed Forces to reflect on such a reality, assuming the awareness that the changed geopolitical and conflictual context requires a restructuring of the entire military system. The Centric Warfare Network finds its muse in the cd. Metcalfe's law which states that the utility of a network is greater than the sum of its component elements. This power is proportional to the square of the number of nodes that are part of it. A system that allows the sharing of information acquired by each unit deployed on the battlefield (node) in a network increases shared situational awareness, which represents an important force multiplier especially in joint operations and allows to gain a great advantage in all and three domains in which military operations take place: physical, informative and cognitive (5).
The informative domain given by the sum of superiority and information supremacy in a net-centric context provides the advantage of allowing the implementation of the so-called. EBO (Effects Based Operations) that are defined by the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) J9 as: "to obtain a desired strategic outcome or to effect the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict. [...] Furthermore, an "effect" is the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific military or non-military action "(6).
The informative domain therefore allows to reduce the timing of the decision-making process and put in place a series of actions that realize a rapid modification of the initial conditions of the collision that does not allow the opponent, who does not have this information capacity, to adapt promptly and effectively to the new conditions imposed. In addition, shared situational awareness allows allied forces to be real time informed of these changes and, by taking advantage of their "modern" flexibility features, to adapt to the new operating reality.
In a context like this that will be the background to every future operation, both in the fight against terrorism and in more symmetrical military operations, a fundamental role is played by the intelligence that through its disciplines will allow a collection and analysis of the continuous information in favor of the commander responsible for the operation at every level: tactical, operational and strategic.
On the basis of the foregoing it is clear that the secondary issue declassification of the debate concerning the Armed Forces, and the security sector in general, turns out to be extremely inappropriate and dangerous. The need to keep the Armed Forces modern, computerized, ready, adaptable and able to interact with their civil and military partners at every level is a matter of absolute importance. The current geopolitical situation added to the continuous and incessant evolution of technological development suggests in a crystalline way the need to dedicate part of the country's resources to the continuous and continuous updating of the military instrument; this as an instrument of political strategy and not an end in itself.
The internet age has also absorbed opponents who use the network to achieve their functional and informational goals and this is a very important signal to be reckoned with.
The Internet reduces the distances and even the times and it is precisely for this reason that the possibility of an information overtaking, facilitated by Western political uncertainty, even if apparently remote today, could soon arrive.
Within a similar scenario, being able to rely on an efficient security compartment widely understood could prevent unpleasant events.
Andrea Strippoli Lanternini
(photo: US DoD archive)
(1) Jean C., War, strategic aspects, 2010
(2) Economic, technological, diplomatic, psychological and communicative
(3) Jean C., War, strategic aspects, 2010
(4) The difference between the two denominations rests in the different methodological approach used to achieve the same result. The NCW concept prepared by the USA corresponds to a more drastic approach aimed at quickly replacing the entire military instrument with a widespread net-centric capacity. The NEC approach, on the other hand, of British origin, aims to achieve the same result through a more gradual “spiral” path, adapting existing platforms and systems to a net-centric concept
(5) General Staff of Defense, Net - Centrica transformation. The future of multinational and interdisciplinary interoperability, 2005, page 7
(6) 1.0 Effects-based Operations White Paper Version, "(Norfolk, VA: J9 Concepts Department, US Joint Forces Command, 2001)
