The legacy of the daring

(To Paolo Palumbo)
17/03/17

When one speaks of the bold, two things immediately come to mind: the first is Govanni Messe, the second is Col Moschin. Giovanni Messe was the glorious commander of the IX assault ward who became famous for his exploits in the 1918 when, a handful of valiant men, he conquered the Fenilon hill, Col Moschin and Fagheron, undermining the Austro-Hungarians from their positions. Famous episodes, narrated by the coeval and later historiography, with an almost embarrassing emphasis on the glory of Italian soldiers and their courage. Of those words, sometimes spent inappropriately from fascist propaganda, there was a lot of truth and authenticity. The men who fought for the Masses were truly a bunch of extraordinary people who had been tired of waiting for the enemy, preferring to get out of the trenches to go and flush him out. The "daring" experiment was thus one of the best things that the Italian army produced during the First World War, nevertheless - as often happens in our history - once the urgency and the need for glory were over, the men of Messe became uncomfortable , elements to be condemned to oblivion. Mussolini's propaganda machine raised the memory of the assault units from the ashes, but he did so for his own use and consumption, exploiting its meaning, permeating it with a sinister opportunism triggered by the need to create the myth of a warlike and warlike Italy. Of the true sense of being bold, of his innovative way of fighting no longer spoke and the General Staff took good care not to do it. The war in Africa and the continuous defeats caused by the British special forces of David Stirling, convinced Rome to create a similar group, dedicated to the war "over enemy lines". Thus was born the X Arditi (under the command of Colonel Renzo Gazzaniga) that overall was a disastrous experience, not so much for the quality of the soldiers - bold in the soul and daring in action - as for the unpreparedness shown by the State Major in organizing and planning the shots. The boys of the X were literally sent to the fray, with information often wrong and with resources reduced to light.

The September 8 armistice split the country into two, but also the X division that divided between those who fought for the allies (Guido Boschetti battalion) and those who deployed with the Social Republic (under the command of Vito Marcianò) . Of the first we know a lot, the second - of course - almost nothing. The end of the war transformed the remains of the Armed Forces into an ingenable monster from which to stay as far away as possible. Paratroopers, daring, sailors of the X MAS suffered the damnatio memoriae from politics, but something even more serious than ordinary people who began to see in that uniform a symbol of shame.

NATO's birth, international political contingencies, and US support prompted the Italian government to change thoughts about the military world. Italy, given its strategic position, had to have an army, but not only. The allies demanded efficiency and preparation, and the only ones to guarantee it were the paratroopers of the many officers who had spent day and night in the El Alamein sand. In this context they renewed the activities of the Viterbo military paratrooper center, within which the Plotone Speciale was created by Lieutenant Franco Falcone. The word "special" rejoined with discretion in the Italian military landscape. No one had to know anything, the first saboteurs were clandestine, "people - as General Mark Bertolini reminded them - in search of rogues" that did not content themselves with what was reported in the official military manuals. From this restlessness, the saboteurs were born that from the fifties to the seventies testified of great capacities, recognized more abroad than at home.

Were they therefore the heirs of the bold?

The doubt about the paternity of the army's special forces - a "false problem" - triggered a historical military debate that saw two lines of thought contrasted. The first held that the bold were an experience terminated in 1918, devoid of any link with the incursors of today, on the other many saw a "line of continuity" moral between the boys of Messe and men of Vannucci.

The bond between bolders and raiders goes beyond the dates, facts or laws that govern men in uniform. In the First World War the daring did not win alone: ​​the infantry - "queen of the battles" - poured a contribution of blood far superior to the Black Flames; nevertheless the meaning of the assault departments must be read in a different, almost "philosophical" way, bypassing the concept of battle as an end in itself. Although the brave were few, their courage served as a spiritual engine for entire infantry departments who enjoyed the glorious echo of their deeds, longing to follow them and stay at their pace and understanding that to win you had to go out of the earth and mud of the putrid trenches. The men of Messe uprooted the dated doctrinal convictions of a General Staff faithful to the dictates of von Clausewitz, attached to the concept of the great masses of infantry to move as in a bloody kriegsspiele . The daring broke up schemas and methods, but obsolete and the same - years later - they did the saboteurs of Acconci who, with few means and courage, drew in the mistrust of the State Staff the effectiveness of new techniques, capturing all the nuances of a continually evolving military world.

That is why the daring are rightly considered by the ancestors' apes. There are no uniforms, banners, symbols (although they also have a part for today's boys), the one that really bridges is the mental attitude, the desire to test, overcome and compete with yourself and with the best in the world. Today the boys of the 9 ° With Moschin they are not only athletes with rucksacks, but men with a brilliant intelligence, an opening and an uncommon mental elasticity, with great qualities of problem solving and extreme adaptation. As were the daring and then the saboteurs in the past years, Nono's incursors are the best children of this time.