The chronic political instability of Pakistan, in possession of a nuclear arsenal and permeable to the presence of Qaedist and Taliban elements in the area, is a source of concern for the international community, also for the not remote possibility that nuclear assets can be used by actors non-state.
The eventual collapse of the government structure, which would transform Pakistan into a Failed State, represents the credible elective scenario that would allow the Qaedists to control Islamabad's nuclear weapons. The political weakness does not prevent the country's authorities from increasing military nuclear capabilities, despite the fact that the inadequacy of the control systems and the penetrability of access to the arsenal by subjects who are not entitled to use them are quite evident.
Islamabad is currently working on the construction of two reactors for the production of plutonium and an infrastructure for reprocessing, while new vectors for strategic warheads are being studied, which include a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), two Short Range Ballistic Missiles and cruise missiles adapted for nuclear warheads 1.
Some sources report that Pakistan currently has a stock of 90-110 nuclear warheads, a large increase from the 70 warheads calculated in 2009. The DIA2 estimate, dating back to 1999, which envisaged reaching 80 nuclear warheads by 2020 , level largely reached ten years earlier than expected.
The Pakistani nuclear program: the genesis
Islamabad has launched its research program for the acquisition of military nuclear capabilities in the mid-'70 years, achieving a decade later and consecrating the 28 May 1998 with the first of five nuclear tests, in response to tests in New Delhi.
While fully joining the Nuclear Weapon States, Pakistan, like Israel and India, has neither signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, nor is it a signatory to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 3.
The Pakistani nuclear program was initially based on the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as a fissile material that, with gaseous centrifugation, reached the weapons grade stage, usable for military purposes. From rough estimates, the amount of uranium and plutonium already in the 2008 was sufficient for 80 nuclear devices, the number of which could grow in the presence of more advanced technologies. At that time, Islamabad used technological tools of Western derivation, relying on assistance provided by the Chinese.
The dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, head of the Pakistani nuclear program, has in fact acquired the necessary know-how in Europe, working at Urenco4, a company specialized in uranium enrichment with offices in Europe and the United States. The dense network of international contacts in the meantime activated it proved useful for the clandestine sale of technology and information on nuclear devices also to North Korea, Iran and Libya.
The stormy relations between Pakistan and India have played and still play a not marginal role on their respective nuclear doctrines and on the nuclear arms race. The four conflicts (in 1947, 1965, 1971 and the last one in 1999) and the contrasts that have occurred between the two countries lead us to read the disputes over the borders and for the control of strategically important regions as a signal of the extreme precariousness of the geopolitical balance of the area and of the ambiguity that marks the diplomatic relations of both governments. The threat of resorting to nuclear weapons is another sign of distrust: Islamabad has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, passing the ball to the opponent's court and asking India to sign first, aware of the military superiority of the neighboring country, but also rejected the Indian offer of a bilateral agreement on the adoption of a strategic policy based on "No First Use", proposing the balancing of the forces in the field, conventional and otherwise, of both countries . The proposals and relaunches, which always ended with nothing, led Pakistan to adopt an aggressive strategic policy based on "first use", also with the intention of making up for the considerable shortcomings of its conventional forces.
The doctrine of first use is politically counterproductive and economically difficult to sustain for the investments to be made in the field of target acquisition systems, satellites and surveillance and intelligence vectors that make it possible to execute a "launch-on-warning" , in the case of no-first-use doctrine we speak of “launch-on-attack”. The launch-on-warning doctrine requires rapid decision-making and that nuclear forces are kept in constant operational readiness with an adequate level of alert.
Islamabad is therefore not interested in renouncing, unilaterally, nuclear weapons or in agreement with India, while in a global context of disarmament it would probably not be in a position to oppose pressures that could come from the United States, Russia or China. It would however be conceivable that, even in this eventuality, it would insist on the contextual and verifiable disarmament on the Indian side.
Pakistan's access to nuclear technologies has been fostered by a series of events that start from afar.
The Atoms for Peace5 program, which President Esenhower had brought to the attention of the UN, in order to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power, has instead encouraged countries without nuclear weapons to undertake studies and research that have been involved in the civil sector. followed radiated on the military and armaments.
The declassification of numerous studies, which took place internationally with the UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, then facilitated access to material not otherwise available, which Islamabad has come into possession of.
Pakistan, worried about India's undoubted conventional superiority and its interference in its internal issues, such as the secession of its territories towards independence (Bangladesh), has started the nuclear program, deeming it necessary for its survival. The level of alarm rose with the Indian nuclear tests of 1974, touted as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" 6, but which used fission devices of about six kilotons. Previously, the Indian underground tests, which also occurred in response to the Chinese nuclear tests of 1965, had been perceived by Islamabad as the expression of an indisputable gap that had to be filled as soon as possible. Even in 1974, Pakistan did not have autonomous nuclear fuel production capacities and technologically advanced facilities: the only asset was represented by a small handful of scientists who have acquired in the West the know-how useful for the production of natural uranium such as fuel for a small heavy-water nuclear reactor, which is also subject to an international safeguard regime.
Despite the international sanctions imposed on Islamabad7, Khan managed to start a program for the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), illegally obtaining nuclear technology.
In the 8s, US policy on nuclear non-proliferation and containment was shelved following Islamabad's role in the Afghan conflict, as can be seen from President Carter's deliberationsXNUMX; in this changed scenario, with Islamabad as political partner of the USA for the fight against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, Khan's network was in a position to expand its illicit activity of acquiring material and know-how in clear contrast with the limitations of 'export of dual use technology, illegally transferring skills and abilities to rogue states and at the same time proposing itself as a privileged interlocutor in subversive projects of fundamentalist terrorism.
The Pakistani nuclear doctrine
Between 11 and 13 May 1998, India carried out a total of five nuclear explosions, to which Pakistan responded with six nuclear tests between 28 and 30 May 98. Almost at the same time, Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif illustrated the aspects of Islamabad's nuclear policy9, insisting on the ability to respond to possible aggressions and attributing responsibility for Pakistan's rapid option to Indian nuclear militarization, given that the strategic balance in the Asian region had taken place. radically altered.
According to Sharif, nuclear weapons will be used in the event of aggression, whether nuclear or conventional, "in the interest of national self-defense ... to deter aggression, whether nuclear or conventional" 10. Pakistani unconventional capabilities become, in their own right, devices to preserve the territorial integrity of Islamabad from external threats, through the application of the doctrine of minimum and credible deterrent11, based on the awareness that the threat to the use of nuclear weapons represents above all a political tool to avert military actions harmful to the vital interests of a nation12. Deterrence is connected to the degree of credibility of the opponent, and therefore to military capabilities, strategic and national security needs, such as the size of the nuclear arsenal, the level of retaliation and the operational readiness of the nuclear forces. A further instrument of deterrence is represented by the difficulty for the opponent to have precise knowledge of the real enemy potential, the enigmaticity is functional to the same strategic doctrine.
It is fully evident that all conventional and non-conventional armaments are adjusted to the worst crisis scenario, which makes deterrence absolutely credible, no longer minimal, because it is capable of managing an unconventional conflict.
A "minimum" but credible arsenal prevents any attempts at emulation and rearmament, allows strategic balance and contains possible proliferation.
The notion of deterrence has been an integral part of Pakistani nuclear policy since the adoption of the strategic doctrine, but the terms credible and minimal entered the doctrine at a later date. Economic conditions suggested keeping the arsenal contained quantitatively, but the level of credibility was increased by the aggressive political tones of Islamabad.
The Pakistani nuclear policy, having to respond to a wide spectrum of possible threats, provides for the use of nuclear weapons even in the event of a conventional military attack, in order to compensate for Pakistani strategic weakness and the small number of its conventional forces; the options provided by the doctrine include the no first use towards non-nuclear weapon state, the first use towards aggressors equipped with unconventional weapons.
The costs of such an aggressive strategic policy are evident which, although born with defensive purposes, is still anchored to a deterrence with negative implications, especially from the point of view of the security of nuclear weapons. Pakistan, for example, does not keep all nuclear warheads de-assembled by the carrier, to allow for a quick first strike in the event of a threat to internal security. The dispersion of these devices, in order to make the survival of the weapons possible and therefore allow the second strike capability, requires delegations of authority at medium-low levels of the chain of command in order to allow the use of nuclear weapons in certain and desperate situations. Delegations which, however, entail a strong erosion of the levels of political and civil control over non-conventional armaments.
The chain of command and nuclear control
The revelation that Osama Bin Laden had hidden for years in a compound in Abbottabad, just 50 km north of Islamabad, has certainly raised important new questions about the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. The International Community wonders if non-conventional Pakistani armaments have adequate levels of security that prevent potential terrorists from seizing them.
The USA, through Marc Grossman, Special Representative for AfPak, offered economic and technical assistance to Islamad to strengthen measures concerning nuclear safety13: about ten million dollars in aid based on a program for the most part remained classified. The implementation of nuclear safety was implemented after 11 September 2001, and even more so from summer 2011 to today, although Pakistani concerns were more focused on possible US strikes or Indian sabotage rather than on the vulnerability of the country. arsenal of acts of terrorism.
The chain of command and control that manages the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is strictly compartmentalized: the organization consists of a National Command Authority (NCA), a Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and a Strategic Forces Commands14.
The National Command Authority, established in 2000, oversees all civil and military organizations involved in the management of the nuclear arsenal, including those carrying out nuclear weapons research activities. The Prime Minister is head of the NCA. At the time of the establishment of this body, General Musharraf was Prime Minister who, once he became President, remained equally at the top.
The NCA includes government leaders, the Armed Forces and the Director of the Strategic Plans Division15.
A nuclear strike is decided by consensus, but the President of the National Command has the final vote. The National Command Authority consists of two Committees, the Employment Control Committee, which oversees the command and control system on the nuclear arsenal, and the Devolopment Control Committee which has administrative responsibilities and internal control on the chain of command.
The Director of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), acting as secretariat for the NCA, is responsible for formulating the nuclear policy and developing the operational doctrine regarding the use of unconventional weapons. The SPD decides the minimum quantity of the nuclear arsenal based on the threats, their deployment in relation to the force projection capabilities of the Pakistani Armed Forces16 that have their strategic commands, top operational planning, control over structures remains with the NCA which exercises it using the Strategic Plans.
The military structures involved are then coordinated at the interforce level, by the Armed Strategic Forces, which then refers to the NCA Secretariat organically inserted in the office of the Chief of Defense Staff who is in Rawalpindi, near Islamabad.
The authority on the command and control system of the nuclear arsenal was formalized and structured through a National Command Authority Ordinance17 formulated in 2007 by President Musharraf18. In the presidential ordinance, which assigns the legal bases to the nuclear command and control system, the functions of the National Command Authority are specified which, for this purpose, exercises command and control over research and development activities, production and use of nuclear technologies 19.
The system provides consensus within the National Authority for the decision of a nuclear strike and two, maximum three people, who authenticate the launch codes for nuclear weapons. The command and control system is much less clear when a possible attack on Pakistani territory has already occurred or it is necessary to guarantee the survival of the weapons and allow a second strike. It is evident that, in these cases, the civil / political command on nuclear weapons appears to be strongly subordinated to the military one, which should guarantee the ability to respond in the event of an attack.
The Pakistani Government has stated that, to increase security, nuclear warheads are stored separately from the carriers, requiring each of these components separate codes before being physically assembled.
Pentagon reports claim that warheads and missile carriers, however de-assembled, are kept in infrastructures that are very close to each other and allow their almost immediate assembly 20, which exposes the fissile material to potential unauthorized access.
The launch on warning usually provides for codified timing for the alerting of strategic forces and for the consequent decisions21, also due to the geographical proximity of India to Pakistan, it is difficult to believe that Islamabad can keep its armaments de-assembled, since in a hypothetical scenario of a direct attack by New Delhi on the nuclear infrastructures of the aggressive neighbor, it would make it almost impossible to assemble the warheads with the carriers and the contextual counter-offensive.
Much more risky the possibility that the nuclear weapons, tested and vectors, separated and de-assembled, attract internal threats from non-state actors, not so much peregrine hypothesis especially in the case in which Islamabad more space were cut the persistent factors of internal political instability. While in the event that the devices are de-assembled within the same infrastructure for the implementation of the policy of "first use", they would be vulnerable to a possible attack outside the facilities that, already because of their particular dispersivity in the territory, they are complex to defend against sabotage and theft of fissile material.
Already a few years ago, El Baradei, former Director General of the IAEA, had expressed serious concerns about the possibility that control over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal could be taken by radical extremist groups, by out-of-control militant organizations, whose presence in the area Afghan-Pakistani is well known 22.
It does not escape how the junction of any strategic doctrine is represented by the continuity of command and control over the nuclear arsenal and the ability of the authorities to survive a first strike. The chain of command must be able to take decisions and communicate them promptly and safely to the forces still in operation; a response to an unconventional attack requires a high reaction capacity of nuclear forces, with considerable effects on the chain of command and control.
Pakistan has two types of equipment suitable for the transport of strategic weapons: the Air Force bombers and surface to surface missiles assigned to the Army.
The F16 fighters are capable, with the appropriate modifications, of transporting unconventional weapons up to 1000kg, with a transport capacity of 1500 km they are the only ones able to penetrate in depth the Indian defenses. The fighters were sold by the US with the knowledge that it would not alter the regional strategic balance, no technology was introduced in the Asian area capable of reducing the Indian military advantage over Pakistan23.
The unit with unconventional capabilities is believed to be the 9 Squadron in the Sargodha Air Base, at 160 km from Lahore and headquarters of the Central Air Command24.
Nuclear weapons are housed in a Weapons Storage Complex25 a few kilometers south of the base, where the F16s are equipped with unconventional assets.
Pakistan has three types of missile vectors with nuclear capabilities 26, Hatf III (Ghaznavi) with a range of 300 / 400km, Hatf IV (Shaheen) with strategic transport capacity up to 450 km and Hatf V (Ghauri ) that reaches the 1500km. Islamabad is also developing the Hatf VI (Shaheen 2) a two-stage MRBM that, once operational, will be able to reach targets located at 2000km. Any missile tests, based on the agreement concluded with India in October 2005, will be notified prior to the execution of 27.
Conclusions
Recent estimates, from open sources, suggest that Pakistan is currently in possession of a range between 90 and 110 nuclear devices 28.
According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials29, there are two facilities dedicated to the production of plutonium: Khushab-I (operational since 1998) and the more recent Khushab II. Together with the other two infrastructures under construction, they reach a total capacity of approximately 40-50 MWt. From the two currently operational, Pakistan is able to produce 6 to 12 kg of plutonium per year, sufficient for three nuclear weapons, which could reach 50 kg when the other two facilities are active. Adding these figures to a stock of 100kg of plutonium, sufficient for 25 nuclear weapons, and foreseeing the additional production capacity of highly enriched uranium, with an estimated stock of 2.600 kg, sufficient for about 170 nuclear warheads, ten years from now. the Pakistani nuclear arsenal would match the British one.
The proliferation of unconventional weapons represents a major threat to international security, for Pakistan, due to the strong presence of the Taliban in the tribal areas, constant vigilance is essential in order to eliminate any possible source of danger to nuclear facilities.
Pakistani political-institutional summits, as well as the military structures that operate the operative command on strategic armaments, do not underestimate the importance of such control activities, not least because the armed forces of Islamabad and the political establishment are not immune to complicity with fundamentalism. The contiguity with extremism is facilitated by the presence of former Taliban refugees in the border areas with Afghanistan and in which Islamabad has assumed absolutely ambiguous attitudes. The possibility, then, of a suicide attack at a nuclear weapons storage site, or containing fissile material, is certainly not to be excluded.
The position of the Armed Forces on the operational control of the nuclear arsenal 30 also appears to be predominant in the chain of command over strategic forces. The ambiguities of the National Command Authority Ordinance do not allow to remedy potential conflicts between the political authorities and military leaders of the Strategic Plans Division in the event of a crisis. Ensuring stability, especially in the hypothesis of an ongoing conflict and respect for the decision-making power of the civil authorities on the military, represent the areas to be protected both to avoid accidents and to reassure the international community.
Greater collaboration in the civil nuclear sector, with the help of the International Community, even in the absence of full adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, could allow the Government of Islamabad to achieve high safety standards. Nuclear security cooperation with Washington could violate US bonds underpinning the non-proliferation regime, a "limited" security cooperation for civilian nuclear applications would certainly be legitimate and desirable.
Methodologies for the analysis of threats and related to security systems for civil nuclear infrastructures are fully adoptable also for nuclear facilities: guarantees for the transport of fissile material and equipment, procedures aimed at developing safe technology, procedures for the assessment of reliability of the personnel involved.
The threat of nuclear terrorism on weapons systems, fissile material and the same infrastructures is such that it does not allow the adoption of superficial or disorienting criteria. A limited approach to civilian nuclear, commensurate with the current needs of Islamabad, could help to define criteria of judgment and standards on the assessment of the threat to nuclear safety, to trace fully applicable parameters in the military sector and to increase the physical security of facilities and material fissile. Despite the strong restrictions imposed by the nuclear non-proliferation regime, civil assistance and collaboration agreements are advantageous and certainly suitable to reassure the international community on the will of governments to guarantee international security.
Fabrizio Minniti
1 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/delivery-systems/
2 DIA Report 07/1999, “A primer on the future threat: the decades ahead: 1999-2020”.
3 The CTBT prohibits any type of test or explosion caused by nuclear weapons, in order to verify compliance with the provisions contained in the Treaty, and explicitly indicates the structures authorized to monitor and detect possible suspicious events. The Treaty consists of a preamble, 17 articles, two annexes and a protocol for verification procedures. http://www.ctbto.org/
4 http://www.urenco.com/page/2/about-URENCO.aspx
5 The Enduring effects of Atoms for Peace. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Lavoy
6 India: nuclear weapons. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/
7 R. CRONIN and W. DONNELLY, Congress and Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, in Congress and Foreign Policy, 1980, Committee Print, House International Relations Committee, 1981.
8 Memo to President Carter gives Pakistan green light to pursue nuclear weapons program. http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=a122679memotocarter
9 Text of Prime Minister Muhammed Nawaz Sharif at a Press Conference on Pakistan Nuclear Tests.
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd26/26pak.htm
10 See ibidem.
11 Threat Reductions in South Asia, Zawar Haider Abid (Pakistan's Army, Strategic Plan Division. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/zawarabidi.pdf
12 See R. GALLUCCI, Limiting US Policy Options to Prevent Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Relevance of Minimum Deterrence, National Defense University, 1991.
13 Marc Grossman inherits the worst job in the world, B. Riedel.
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/02/15/marc-grossman-inherits-...
14 Pakistan's nuclear oversight reforms.
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nbm/nuclear-black-ma...
15 See ibidem.
16 National Command Authority. http://www.nti.org/facilities/584/
17 http://paktribune.com/news/National-Command-Authority-Ordinance-promulga...
18 http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1300934560_193.pdf
19 See Ibid.
20Proliferation: Threat and Response, 2001, DoD. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf
21 Nuclear Weapons Status Alert Debated. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_12/NuclearAlert
22 P. FIDDIAN, UN's El Baradei details Pakistan nuclear weapon fears, 1/2008.
http://www.armedforces-int.com/news/uns-el-baradei-details-pakistan-nucl...
23 Pakistan's Profile. http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/
24 Sargodha Air Base. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/sargodha.htm
25Central Ammunition Depot, Sargodha. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/sargodha.htm
26 Pakistan's Missile Facilities. http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/facilities/
27Agreement Between India And Pakistan On Pre-Notification Of Flight Testing Of Ballistic Missiles.
http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/agreement-between-india-and-pakist...
28 Pakistan: Country Profile. http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/nuclear/
29 Country Profile: Pakistan. http://fissilematerials.org/countries/pakistan.html
30 R. LARSSEN, Nuclear Security in Pakistan: reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, in Arms Control Today, July / August 2009. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_07-08/Mowatt-Larssen
