Al-Shabaab's strategy

According to the definition by Boaz Ganor, president ofInternational Institute for Counterterrorism, suicide attacks represent the intelligent weapon of terrorist organizations. The shaihd (the martyr) chosen to be exploded is, in fact, able to select his goal and wait for the most opportune moment to release his load of death. A strategy that has a very long history, especially in Israel, where in the past Hamas organized real campaigns of attacks to sow panic in the various cities of the Jewish state. In order to cope or even prevent a suicide attack, there are no really effective means and any procedure you want to follow must always be taken into account a high number of deaths. Regarding Israel, in the last decade, the episodes that involved martyrs with explosive belts have undergone a downward decline even though, in other parts of the world, they continue to be one of the most exploited methods, mainly in those places where preventive and supervisory measures have not achieved the effectiveness of Western countries. Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the most striking example is Africa where the al-Qaeda-affiliated organization in Somalia - Harakat al-Shabaab - has reached a negative record in terms of victims caused by attacks with explosive vehicles or belts.

Bloody Somalia

The group of Al-Shabaab (literally "the Youth") has a genesis matured during long years of civil war and foreign interference. After the dramatic American experience in the 1990s and the death of Mohamad Farrah Aideed, Somalia had its first president, Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, who after just six years was ousted from a coalition of Islamist parties gathered in the Islamic Courts Union ( UCI) for which Al-Shabaab it represented the armed arm. It was in this transitional phase that the Ethiopians, supported by the United States, brought to power the movement of Abdullah Yusuf, leader of the Transitional Federal Government (GFT), who ousted the Islamists from the government thus plunging the country into a civil war .

In the 2007, the Islamist transfrontiers began to gather support among the dissatisfied population of the Ethiopian presence and the bad government of Yusuf. In 2009 the military disengagement of Ethiopia rekindled the clashes between Islamists and Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed became president of a country without having control of the territory. Once again, Somalia became a crossroads for foreign soldiers, this time sent by the African Union (especially from Uganda and Burundi) who tried in vain to restore order and keep national and international routes open. This new foreign interference strengthened the approval of the Islamist militants who, for some time, had been closely watched by the leaders of al-Qaeda. The first rapprochement between the two organizations took place in the 2006 when the Islamic Courts front of the Islamic Courts sent two suicide bombers against targets of the federal government in Baidoa; on that occasion Dr. al-Zawahiri (photo) renamed them "the lions of Somalia".

From that moment on, the organization, initially led by Aden Hashi Farah "Ayro" and then, from 2008, by Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Godane, extended its tentacles throughout the country, sowing terror among the government forces, but especially among the sent by the AMISOM mission (African Union Mission in Somalia) sponsored by the United States and the United Nations. According to the most recent reports the soldiers of Al-Shabaab they range from the 3.000 to the 7.000 units, divided on a territory divided into three command areas: Bay and Bokol, Southern Center and Mogadishu and finally the Puntland and Somaliland. Since its inception, the Islamist group has shown a propensity to use suicide attacks through the use of VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) with which they hit, the 22 February 2009, an AMISOM base in Mogadishu killing six employees.

A peculiar organization

The acquisition of the brand al-Qaeda gave impetus to the Somali Islamist gangs that intensified their attacks on the multinational force in which several soldiers from Uganda and Burundi were fighting. To gain more credit in the jihadist world, the 11 July 2010 Al-Shabaab he put in place a terrible simultaneous attack on Kampala, for the first time outside the national borders. On that occasion two suicide bombers blew themselves up in a rugby club and an Ethiopian restaurant, just as people watched the World Cup final. There were 74 dead, while other 70 people were seriously injured.

Obviously the ease with which Al-Shabaab he can find volunteers shahid it is the result of the strong influence that the group quaedista has on a population whose conditions of life are at the limits of the human. Hunger, despair and the lack of a stable government allow a rapid recruitment among the ranks of desperate young people ready not only to sacrifice themselves for Allah, but above all to fight in the streets of Mogadishu or to embark on boarding the western ships. The primary objective of the jihadists is above all the staff of the United Nations and Unicef ​​also because they are organizations that with the distribution of food and medicines, try in every way to alleviate the distress of the population by subtracting it from the propaganda of the terrorists¹.

In the 2011 the directive of Al-Shabaab set up a section specifically charged with overseeing the work of foreign agencies in Somalia (OSAFA) that condemned the UN, UNICEF, all NGOs and even the Red Cross. In fact the work of the International Community has not always brought benefits to the Somali population, but rather only to the few who controlled the market. As reported by Abdel Bari Atwan, the mechanism for the distribution of foodstuffs was not perfect, indeed from the beginning revealed serious gaps that damaged local production. In 2006, for example, indigenous farmers obtained a good harvest, but when they showed up on the market, World Food Program the United Nations decided to distribute its aid to the entire population in one fell swoop, thus crushing all internal traffic. But the incredible thing was that the same mistake was also committed the following year. As a reaction, Al-Shabaab precluded any interference of WFP in its territories thus favoring the use of internal resources, although, it is useful to remember, for their own benefit. The defense of the territory and the preservation of a unitary national interest is however a peculiarity of Al-Shabaab that differentiates it from other African jihadist organizations. The initial "non-alignment" with the international jihadist and its grounding in the territory allowed Somali Islamists to play an effectively alternative role to international organizations. However Al-Shabaab it never succeeded in replacing the United Nations supplies: the war and some badly collected crops lowered the level of trust towards the terrorists who were preparing for a dangerous leap in quality.

The presence of al-Qaeda in Somalia had begun timidly in the 1990s when the Americans set foot in Mogadishu to hunt Aideed. At that time, bin Laden confided to transform the conflict in Somalia into a new Afghanistan, but did not take into account some factors that made the place impenetrable even for its henchmen. The lack of laws, the excessive power of the clans and the widespread corruption that prevailed in the country did not allow easy infiltration: the Somali clans did not easily bend their alliances, but above all demanded a serious outlay of money for the transit of men, arms and goods in their territories. Although the Somali Islamist component remained skeptical of al-Qaeda at home, many young believers were left to be enchanted by the Saudi sheikh's jihad projects: hundreds left the Horn of Africa to go fight alongside the Taliban.². Some time later, the generation that emigrated to the war in Afghanistan became al-Shaabab's backbone.

In the 2012 the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri, along with Godane, published a video (frame on the right) in which he proclaimed that the "Youth" Somali warrior would become part of the al-Qaeda family. It was the moment everyone was waiting for because that legitimacy consecrated Al-Shabaab as the main representative of the Jihad in East Africa.

Organization, tactics and finances

Somali diaspora to the sites of jihad guaranteed Al-Shabaab a basin of guerrillas well trained. The same Godane, one of the charismatic leaders of the organization, had made his bones fighting alongside the Taliban in the 2001. The association with al-Qaeda profoundly changed the modus operandi of the Somalis who, from a "nationalist" perspective, accepted a more "international" vision of the Jihad. The operational structure of al-Shaabab it rests on three levels: the first, the command one (qiyadah) that controls the activity of foreign fighters (muhajirins) and Somali guerrillas³. The distinction reported by David Shinn carefully identifies the category of gods foreign fighters subdividing them into three categories: those born in neighboring countries, mainly in Kenya, with the nationality of that country, followed by the Somali natives whose relatives are then migrated, and finally the soldiers who have no ethnic connection with Somalia. For their attacks, the Somali terrorists prefer the simultaneous use of suicide bombers and machines filled with explosives. According to data collected by Combating Terrorism Center of West Point from the year of their formation (2005) until October of 2017, 216 martyrs of Al-Shabaab they conducted 115 suicide attacks. The discrepancy between the two figures is caused by the fact that the Somalis send more suicide groups on the same target thus increasing the chances of success and the number of victims⁴. In this macabre statistic, Al-Shabaab it comes in second place immediately after Boko Haram confirming that suicide bombings have become the preferred weapon of groups operating on the African continent.

Among the most serious attacks we have already recalled that of July 2010 where a series of contemporary attacks caused several victims in Kampala, Uganda. The 24 August 2012 Somali terrorists struck the Muna Hotel in Mogadishu. A commando disguised as government personnel sowed death among the people and after two hours of fire fighting with the police, one of the terrorists blew himself up: there were 32 dead including many members of the Somali parliament. The last bloody episode dates back a few days ago, the 13 April 2018: a violent explosion during a football game killed five people and injured 10 (photo).

There has been no year in which the dynamite activity of the Somali terrorists has known requie: from the 2014 on we have witnessed helpless to a crescendo of attacks with a very impressive success rate. Al-Shaabab is an organization that has very high profits resulting from the infiltration of legitimate and illegal goods into the market. According to data collected by Center on Sanctions & Illecit Finance from the 2012 to the 2014 Somali terrorists have raised over 83 millions of dollars from the taxation and sale of coal which is currently the main source of income. The sugar smuggling with Kenya in 2015 has yielded over 12 millions of dollars deriving from an illegal taxation of 1000 dollars in transit cargo. Al-Shabaab It also has control over drug trafficking (khat) and the management of abductions from which it obtains large sums of redemption⁵.

The absolute domination of terrorists in East Africa raises serious questions about the effectiveness of Western strategy to restore order in one of the most complicated countries on the planet. The problems of Somalia have very deep roots and the presence of other countries as referees - never impartial - of their domestic politics is a historic failure. Al-Shabaab it remains a highly localized organization and its main adversaries are the AMISOM military, nevertheless a certain tendency has emerged to export terrorists around the world using the well-known channels of illegal immigration. Overall, Africa still seems to be a very unstable front, even for the same terrorists whose "power games" are constantly evolving.