Intelligence sharing in the international context. Limits and perspectives

11/06/15

The rapid expansion of the network and the transition from an almost predictable one-way threat to a series of multilateral and asymmetric challenges have made the current liquid and unstable geopolitical picture.

Given that the traditional method of hard power and the concept of containment based on the cd. "Zero-sum game" are no longer applicable, the need to put information, that is intelligence, as a primary means of contrast emerges overwhelmingly. Although it is undisputed that intelligence is in itself an effective tool, the variety of inputs that must be contextualised and correlated within complex scenarios suggests to articulate an effective and efficient intelligence sharing system as an effect multiplier. The optimization of this methodology must be based on the balance between the concept of need to know, which provides access to information only for those who, with appropriate authorizations, need it to perform their duties correctly, and that of need to share, according to which the sharing of information within the intelligence community is crucial for an adequate contrast to existing threats.

Given the growing commonality of interests in strategic areas and on the basis of experiences deriving from the most recent international missions, Organizations such as NATO and the EU have decided to adopt an operational doctrine based on the comprehensive approach, consisting of a crisis management modality. which involves all the characteristic aspects of the operational theater: political, military, social, religious, economic. Such a system requires the presence, upstream, of an enviroment intelligence sharing functional to a rapid and reliable information exchange at different levels between the various subjects involved. In NATO, in addition to projects such as Network Centric Warfare (NCW), with the aim of increasing the shared situational awareness of the commanders through a more efficient sharing of the information acquired by each unit within the operating environment, they are present various bodies dedicated to carrying out intelligence sharing activities:

The Intelligence Division, located within the International Military Staff (IMS), which produces intelligence assessments of an operational / strategic nature destined for the Military Commitee in which the representatives of the member countries participate;

The NATO SitCen (Situation Center) which collects the intelligence products originated by the designated NATO bodies and disseminates them within NATO HQ to all representatives of the countries participating in NATO;

The Intelligence Unit (IU), which replaces the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) from 2007, realizes greater intelligence sharing among the various NATO recipients on risk and terrorist threats;

the Intelligence Fusion Center which has the task of supporting Allied Command Operation (ACO) by sharing intelligence products that predict potential crises, as well as supporting the planning of NATO-led operations.

The multi-faceted and unconventional nature of the threat has placed the information exchange as fundamental also in the policies adopted by the European Union in the field of law enforcement and security. The Council 2006 / 960 / GAI Framework Decision on the simplification of the exchange of information and intelligence between Member State authorities has established the fundamental importance of intelligence sharing in the EU, placing the will to standardize and speed up information exchange, basing this cooperation on the "principle of availability" by virtue of which the relevant data can circulate freely in the European territory without being affected by the limits of the national borders and the differences in the rules. A potential operational line for increased police cooperation is undoubtedly to strengthen the contents of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU which, inter alia, provides for the possibility of having measures to strengthen collection, storage, processing and analysis. and exchange of information of interest. In this context, EUROPOL is the European reference point in this area, with particular reference to the coordination of the various police operations between the Member States relating to the most serious criminal events.

In addition to this, the Lisbon Treaty has envisaged a reinforcement of cooperation between the Member States in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy which, in this case too, involves an obvious strengthening of the intelligence apparatus. The main body dedicated to this type of activity is the EUIntCen (Intelligence Center) located within the European External Action Service (EEAS). Taking advantage of the collaboration of experts from the Information Services of the various countries, its task is to provide, on the basis of Open Source Informations, intelligence analysis and situation reports on terrorism and other threats to the High Representative and to all political leaders EU. Another relevant body is the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) which carries out activities of notice, assessment of situations and management of crises outside the Union.

An active contribution made to the sharing of relevant information is also given by private subjects who cooperate with the Institutions in matters concerning safety. In this regard, the role of FIUs (Financial Intelligence Unit) in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing must be mentioned. Risen from the original recommendations of the FATF (International Financial Action Group), these entities have as their main task to act as a connecting element between the financial system and all the other national and foreign authorities that deal with criminal phenomena through analysis and sharing of information related to reports of suspicious financial movements from industry operators.

Despite the efforts to define an effective enviroment intelligence sharing at various levels, from inter-agency to inter-Organizations, there are various barriers that still exist to create such an ambitious project. These limits can be summarized as follows:

Frequent lack of unitary political direction between and within International Organizations (especially EU) that should share intelligence. This implies the possibility that, if there is a fully shared system, a country uses data or information for purposes that do not coincide with those of the country that collected or processed it;

Presence of a hierarchical and strongly bureaucratic intelligence model that prevents the horizontal flow of information. Very often there is a lack of communication even between national agencies;

Reduced investment in the human factor and lack of a homogeneous training doctrine between the various States that allows forging operators and analysts with a wide-ranging mental culture and flexibility predisposed to the application of modern techniques and technologies for data collection and analysis;

Resistance in trusting the analytical process followed by the originator of information deriving from possible differences in the cultural, doctrinal and technological fields;

Presence of differences, sometimes very relevant, in the technical field in the various phases of the intelligence cycle. The actor with the greatest potential in HumInt, TechInt and SigInt (and related articulations) will have greater negotiating power with respect to information;

Presence of stringent constraints on secrecy classifications that can hardly be overcome except by a reorganization of the subject in the legislative or governmental area.

In order to overcome all these limitations and materialize the objective benefits of intelligent information sharing, it is necessary to rethink the entire security and defense system from the basics. Within an intelligence sharing enviroment the unity of political direction that guides the work of the major international players must be fully shared and mission oriented. It should also lead to the implementation of the HumInt tool and to the training of a group of senior managers, operators and analysts who, while maintaining their own mental and cultural patterns, are able to work in a complementary and integrated way in all phases of the intelligence cycle by eliminating the gaps currently found in some phases. This would lead to a reduction in technical time for the collection, processing and dissemination of information which would reflect on an increase in timeliness with which to address certain threats.

Among the deserving prospects for rapid implementation is that concerning classification and access to information. In this sense it would be desirable to homogenize the criteria for assigning the secrecy classifications as well as more functional declassification protocols and the creation of structured databases on three levels, strategic, operational and tactical, to which a parallel level of information processing corresponds. At strategic level, the data will be elaborated with strategic projection, ie the interpolation of the same with other correlables and with a broad spectrum whose assessments will determine the predictive development of a strategic development; at the operational level there will be the processing of the exhaustible data, in time and validity, within the current operational context. At a tactical level there will be a database containing raw data divided by categories, threats, geographical areas.

Since information represents a strategic asset of a country and, by extension, an international organization that shares certain goals, it is desirable to strengthen a system of information protection articulated on three levels: access based exclusively on the need to know principle various entry steps into databases based on biometric surveys; technical protection to limit as far as possible the use, manipulation and transfer of sensitive data through, for example, a system of alerts in case of violation of protocols for consultation and acquisition of the information that allows, at a control station remote, to intervene promptly to reject the unknown operation; Auditing and Monitoring procedures between the various operators in order to know any problems or gaps and intervene to remedy them.

The effects of such an architecture would fall on the sharing process, which would therefore be safer and more functional.

To gain the described advantages and to acquire a resolutive power in the new type of conflictuality it is therefore evident how a timely and adequate exchange of information is the way to go without further perplexity. The necessary action to follow is therefore that of implementing a political will that translates into a single and overlying device that determines the doctrines and imposes the cancellation of unnecessary duplications, the rationalization and pooling of resources, information, technologies , evaluations, while maintaining the sovereignty of each State intact.

All this while remaining constantly within a legal framework that protects fundamental human rights, privacy and the democratic principle.

Moreover, it is not enough to reach the sharing of information on the status quo before the operation but also serves and above all communicate the results thereof. Sharing action must not end with the planning of the mission but must also include the sharing of the elements of verification and control on the results obtained in order to share in a satisfactory way the lessons learned between the various international actors and identify, improving them, the various aspects considered critical.

There can not be intelligence sharing without a sharing of will.

Andrea Strippoli Lanternini