The tunnels of terror

23/05/15

The Gaza Strip is crossed by numerous roads that unravel along its entire extension; more or less viable routes traveled, every day, by hundreds of Palestinians. Many, however, do not know that there is another underground Gaza, more complicated and certainly less frequented.

An underground communication network of vital importance whose construction, in a few years, has absorbed a large part of the capital available to Hamas, the political faction that from the 2006 governs the thin band of Palestinian territory. Since the Islamic Resistance Movement (this means Hamas) has established itself as a political force opposed to al-Fatah, relations with Israel have undergone a dramatic decline. The strategy of tension towards Tel Aviv, implemented by the al-Qassam brigades, has involved a series of "lightning" terrorist actions against the kibbutz communities near the border. The infiltration of terrorists into Israeli territory takes place, in fact, thanks to a dense network of tunnels dug by Hamas men during periods of truce with Tel Aviv; and precisely thanks to the peace and humanitarian aid destined for Gaza, the Palestinians have gathered in a short time all the material necessary to make their galleries more efficient and sophisticated.

Economy and market in tunnels

Starting from June 2007, the embargo imposed by the Israelis and Egypt to the Gaza Strip created serious problems for the population, which saw progressively weakening the already poor food and energy resources. From the moment in which the blockade of goods was sanctioned, it was the Israelis who determined how many and which food could cross the border. The situation became particularly critical in the south of the Strip where the inhabitants of the town of Rafah, seized by despair, repeatedly tried to violate the borders with Egypt. The only possible and safe steps to get food, but not only, ran underground: a network of tunnels that, starting from Rafah crossed the "corridor of Philadelphia" and then emerge in the Sinai. The so-called "economic tunnels" were already covered, in the eighties, by many smugglers who exchanged food, but also gold, drugs and above all weapons. At the time the controls were undoubtedly more bland and the goods flowed without too many obstacles. After the Oslo agreements and the fabrication of the partition wall, the work of the smugglers became more difficult, obliging them to find alternative solutions and to widen the network of passages both to Egypt and to Israel.

The construction of a tunnel - let us dwell for the moment only on those for commercial purposes - was a golden affair. Each political faction contributed forcibly to the cause, assuming the construction of an underground way that for some represented a real economic investment. The excavation of a tunnel cost from 80.000 to 200.000 dollars, theoretically an unpopular expense for the coffers of Hamas who, in order to raise funds, relied on the persuasive power of the Imams. In every mosque the priests urged the faithful to commit their money in this new enterprise against the "infidels" and when someone died, buried by meters of land, was equated to a martyr of Islam.

Despite the risks involved, the clandestine routes made the Islamic Movement sufficient income to pay the salaries of 75.000 employees and, overall, on the eve of Cast Lead, the tunnels yielded a monthly income of about 36 million dollars. This is why the economic tunnels, unlike the military ones, were immediately subordinated to a strict control of the Ministry of the Interior which established the Tunnel Affair Commission (TAC) with the task of regularizing and establishing the volume of business generated underground. The tunnels used for food trafficking certainly did not pose a serious threat to Israel, although in addition to food and fuel, huge quantities of weapons were passing that armed the terrorists. After the "Cast Lead" operation, Hamas took advantage of the long truce to dig new underground routes; this time, however, it was not a matter of passing goods or weapons, but directly small armed groups ready to unleash the offensive beyond Israeli borders.

The underground offensive

The revenues from the commercial tunnels, added to the entry of humanitarian goods, guaranteed the Hamas party a considerable source of survival, even if the benefits were not shared equally among the population. For example, the influx of building materials, such as cement, useful for the reconstruction of vast areas of the country, was diverted to streets that were not really legitimate.

In the 2006 the abduction of the carter Gilad Shalid and the long and exhausting negotiations for his release, were only the beginning of a practice that, since July 2014, suffered a dangerous escalation. The 17 July 2014, 13 Hamas fighters infiltrated via the tunnel to Sufa's kibbutz, near the border. In a lucky case the IDF managed to intercept the group before it entered the village: two Israeli soldiers lost their lives in the clash. On July 21, 30 terrorists popped over the border disguised as Zahal soldiers trying to attack Erez and Nir-Am's kibbutz, four Israeli soldiers died repelling the attackers. Just seven days later, on July 28, some guerrillas appeared at the mouth of a tunnel near Nahal Oz's kibbutz, killing five soldiers. The succession of these attacks and the concomitant launch of Qassam rockets triggered the Israeli reaction and the "Protective Edge" operation. If the main work of intercepting and destroying rockets was entrusted to the Iron Dome device, the same tranquility did not apply to attacks conducted underground. The main problem of Israeli intelligence was to identify the location of the tunnels, their extension, but above all the access and exit points. According to IDF Lieutenant Colonel Peter Lerner, the Palestinians' intention was to launch a simultaneous attack within Israel by infiltrating at least 200 heavily armed terrorists by tunnel. Still according to Lerner it could have been a sort of Israeli September 11 although, it was an announced attack. Indeed, the Tel Aviv government had taken the problem of Palestinian cross-border raids under the sidelines, although the past was not without similar incidents.

In July of the 2014, Zahal's military advance focused mainly on the border areas where the Israelis deployed roughly 20.000 units: an armored brigade, three infantry brigades, but above all, teams of genius qualified for war in the tunnels. The General Staff estimated the existence of about 60 tunnels, at least three kilometers long and deep over 20 meters, but what the Israelis discovered on the field, far exceeded their expectations. In fact, the IDF unveiled real masterpieces of underground architecture, efficient and perfectly equipped.

In the time interval between "Cast Lead" and the new Israeli offensive, Hamas had done its best, using more than 800.000 tons of cement, a lot of manpower and a lot of money. According to analysts, the Palestinian leaders had invested over one million dollars to perfect the underground network, making extensive use of resources for the population. In this way the cities of the Gaza Strip continued to live on the edge of human conditions, while the Hamas government wasted labor and money in order to provoke war with Israel. A conflict that for the Israelis was inevitable, since the only way to prevent aggression from the tunnels was to scour every building in Gaza. The technology, however sophisticated, did not allow us to precisely identify the position and the route of a tunnel, also because the excavation criteria of the Palestinian engineers followed some primitive but effective logics. Hamas had been taught by the Lebanese Hezbollah party which, during the Second Lebanon War, expanded the effectiveness of underground fortifications with the help of North Korean engineers and Iranian Quds Force.

The main rule to build a tunnel without arousing suspicion was the prohibition of any electrical device or that produced anomalous subsoil vibrations; the earth was removed with rudimentary machinery, often fed by human power alone. It is useful to recall that among the workers there were not only guerrillas, but also children who, appropriately indoctrinated on the charm of martyrdom, spent their days digging like moles. The international community and the Institute for Palestine Studies denounced the death of around 160 children, who died as a result of collapses or fatigue, but above all innocent victims of Hamas. Many have compared the underground Palestinian network to the one excavated by the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War, but there are still some very important differences. In the first place the feature of the galleries: those built by Hamas are more sophisticated, have concrete walls, electric light and their width is such as to allow the transit of motorized vehicles. Secondly, the Palestinian galleries follow a complicated design, and what is more serious, they have the entrance disguised in unexpected buildings such as schools, hospitals, mosques or even UN headquarters. By itself the use of tunnels to fight, protect or move troops does not represent any violation of the Geneva Convention, however - as Jay Sekulow remembers in his Rise of ISIS - Hamas uses the population as a human shield for its installations, so it commits a serious war crime.

To weigh the conscience of Hamas with respect to its people, is the existence of a third and final category of tunnels, that is to say those set up solely to protect the party personalities and their families. The shelters, usually located in the city center, are not offensive, but they are often protected by buildings that are harmless at first sight. It is clear that the Palestinian leaders manifest a poor predisposition to martyrdom and to share the misfortunes collectively; According to some Israeli sources, Ismail Haniyeh, number one of Hamas, would own large tracts of land and pay large sums of money to have his children study in Europe and treat his family in Israeli hospitals.

Technology against tunnels

The Golan brigade and the Givati ​​84a brigade were the first to enter the Gaza Strip with the aim of ascertaining where the tunnel entrances were. Once the existence of an underground passage had been ascertained, the soldiers had the order to reclaim it from the various explosive traps and then destroy it; an exhausting and risky job because the research was not supported by adequate intelligence work. On this point the terrorists exploited the surprise factor to their advantage, while for Zahal the cost of human lives estimated to trace a tunnel was really too high. How to anticipate the moves of Hamas and with which instruments?

At the end of "Protective Edge" the Israelis achieved all their goals, most of the tunnels had been demolished, but the future did not bode well. As had already happened, every ceasefire that Hamas conquered meant new time and money to start digging the subsoil and find new ways to hit the eternal adversary. It was therefore essential for the Israeli government to acquire all the necessary means to prevent the construction of new tunnels. According to the opinion of the Israeli geologist Jospeh Langotsky, the threat of the tunnels had long been underestimated by the Israeli command; the war in Lebanon of the 2006 and the tunnels in which Hezbollah operated were to serve as an alarm bell, yet no one ever did anything. On the contrary, the Hamas party learned the lesson well, improving the quality of its buildings.

When the soldiers of the Givati ​​entered the tunnels they were astonished by the accuracy with which they had been built: high quality concrete, electric cables, iron tracks, all first class materials. But how could they have found all that material? At the end of the "Pillar of Defense" operation, in November 2012, Obama's government, to please the international community, put pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu to agree to enter all the reconstruction useful construction equipment in Gaza. However, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Knesset knew that this concession would be expensive and, in light of the facts, they were not wrong.

To date, the IDF research and development unit is working hard to find a system that allows intercepting the construction of tunnels before they come out on Israeli territory: the estimated cost would be around 59 million dollars. Some of the best Israeli companies have presented several projects whose object is "listening" to the land. The Israeli company Magna has proposed to dig a tunnel of 70 km - along the border with the Strip - equipped with special sensors that detect the movements of the ground. According to the director of the company, Haim Siboni - interviewed by the Globe - this system would transmit in real time useful data to identify where the excavation area is and how many men are working there. On the question of the tunnels a well-known Canadian archaeologist, Paul Bauman, discoverer of the alleged site of Atlantis, even intervened. The Canadian has worked for some time with the IDF staff to which he pointed out that the only effective tool for finding Hamas tunnels is not in one type of technology, but in a combination of them - radar, terrain tomographs and seismic measurement. In particular, Bauman said, the use of an underground radar could be the best solution: "it all depends on what type of frequency you want to use, in fact, you can have an apparatus that sees 100 meters below the ground, but at low resolution or only 10 meters with very high resolution ”. In addition, the Canadian archaeologist reiterated "the radar is particularly suitable for signaling concrete constructions and metal bars, all materials used in new generation tunnels".

Paradoxically, the technical evolution of Hamas in the construction of tunnels has become a double-edged sword. The second problem that haunts the Israeli staff is the preservation of the life of its soldiers when they run into a tunnel. A few months after "Protective Edge", the Roboteam company in Tel-Aviv presented to the Ministry of Defense the new Micro Tactical Ground Robot, a small device less than a meter wide and weighing less than 10 kilos, which can creep into the tunnels by scanning them thanks to five cameras, an internal microphone and a laser pointer. This small and agile instrument, easily transportable by the infantry, provides Israeli operators with the opportunity to see and hear in advance what is happening in a tunnel, so as to enter it, aware of the dangers they will find.

The last knot to solve is how to destroy the tunnel in its entirety because, the collapse of a part of it, is not enough to eliminate the threat. In addition to a good amount of explosives, some experts have promoted the use of the FAE (Fuel Air Explosives) whose power recalls the napalm of the war in Vietnam. The military operations of the IDF have apparently achieved all the objectives set: most of the tunnels have been demolished, but the bet remains open because many are questioning how long it will take Hamas to rearm and dig up new ones. But the new Israeli strategy has changed and, finally, aims at prevention by investing large sums of money to arrest the terrorists before they begin to creep underground. The only certainty remains Hamas and its firm intention to hit Israel anyway: against this attitude there is no technology or special weapon capable of arresting them.

Paolo Palumbo

(photo: IDF)