The MBT and the new war scenarios: Do they still serve?

(To Tiziano Ciocchetti)
10/12/18

In the recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria there has been a marginal use of armored vehicles, as the Islamic state had few resources, mainly used as a trailblazer for other vehicles filled with explosives.

In Ukraine, on the other hand, there was a large-scale example of modern anti-tank fighting, in fact, heavy Russian artillery, also using field rocket launchers such as URAGAN from 220 mm and SMERCH from 300 mm, whenever the situation of Russian wire forces became critical, intervened with anti-tank sub-munitions on Ukrainian government positions. A tactic that inflicted numerous losses on Kiev's troops, as its armor - not updated versions of T-72 and T-80 -, without specific protections for the upper part of the vehicle, proved to be particularly vulnerable, having overwhelmingly disadvantage of maneuvering in large plains without natural obstacles.

The only solution would have been to position the wagons in tree-lined areas, however outside the scope of the Russian artillery, and operate by exploiting the capabilities of the UCAV to identify the field rocket launchers, eliminating them later with a counter-battery shot.

The latest conflicts, more or less asymmetric, have raised questions about possible future uses of MBTs. In this regard, once again, the experiences of the Israeli armored body (Shiryon) seem to trace the way for an effective use of wagons in today's conflicts, at least those of low / medium intensity.

After the non-negligible losses suffered by the Tel Aviv tanks (in the face of the total absence of an armored counterpart) in the operations in Lebanon in 2006 and in the Gaza Strip in 2009, in the summer of 2014, the Tsahal launches operation MARGIN OF PROTECTION - aimed at blocking the launch of rockets from Gaza and destroying the tunnel network built by Hamas - with the use of 400 armored / armored vehicles.

In this operation the MERKAVA were used to provide support to the infantry units, not to occupy key areas close to enemy lines, nor to destroy armored, non-existent formations of the opponent. The Shiryon it only contributed to the conquest and protection of a very limited scarcely urbanized strip of land, with the aim of facilitating the destruction of the tunnel network by the genius and infantry. In the battles, the MERKAVAs delivered support fire, supporting the troops that were stationed, firing thousands of shots against buildings, used by Hamas militia as launching posts.

During the operation, the Shiryon did not report any damage to wagons or losses or injuries among the crews.

This could be one of the possible uses of armored vehicles in future scenarios, as the widespread diffusion, even among militiamen, of modern anti-tank systems (remember that the invulnerable medium does not exist) strongly limits the use of modern MBTs with very high costs, especially in a densely populated urban environment.

(photo: MoD Ukraine / IDF)