If in '68 Luttwak had the opportunity to analyze Turkey, he would have succeeded in making his Manual even more interesting "Strategy of the coup"; in fact, starting from an analysis on the efficiency of Anatolian FA post July 2016, we find ourselves entangled in a particularly complex spider web.
If we were to tell a story, we should start with a "once upon a time the 2011 " when the conflicts between Erdoğan and the military leaders (already in progress) were interpreted as the genesis of one second Republic, blessed by a (presumed) democratization and sanctified by liberation from Kemalist protection, which already presaged the authoritarian Ottoman and Islamic trend. Not understanding the context led to short-sighted and hasty analyzes, such as those of the EU, lacking depth and strategic vision, so that every evolution, as long as it was free from military presence, could be considered satisfactory. Like it or not, the military institution has guaranteed internal and external stability; the operations carried out against the Caliphate starting from the 2014, have confirmed how capable the Turkish forces, accustomed since the 80 years to calcare both the operating theaters anti PKK Kurdish, and to face the Syrian hostility thanks to the Air Force and the departments of the 'Army, and despite the progressive infiltration of personnel politically reliable. Until you get to the 2016, the center of the spider's web, with an attempt coup d'etat very controversial enough to be defined by Erdoğan himself "a gift from God".
The path of the AKP (Party for Justice and Development, ed) from the 2002 has followed two paths, parallel but differently lit; on the one hand the long wave of economic measures, supported by expansive financial measures, on the other the slow but steady takeover of power with the ouster of the military, starting from the purges already started with the then ally Gulen , up to the 2017 constitutional referendum and the 2018 elections, which have effectively ratified institutional change.
The co-optation of General Hulusi Hakar as Minister of Defense has not compensated for the downsizing of the political role of the FAs, which tend, at the summit, to please an establishment that still fears both fronds and the refusal to execute orders deemed illegitimate, as in the case of some officers of the Army against the Kurds of Syria.
The hard core of nationalist and secular Kemalism that opposes AKP Islamism still wears uniform, but not in top grades, rewarded for having distinguished itself in the fight against the Kurdish separatists of the PKK and in the operations on the borders with Syria against the Kurds Syrians of the YPG.
The Military Supreme Council, now with a civilian majority, has no more stringent decision-making power in the summit appointments; Erdoğan, president with executive powers, decides directly on the posts of the high grades up to the colonels, with a direct control over the General Staff and with the demilitarization of the Gendarmerie, now subject, as the Coast Guard, to the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.
Nusret Güner (photo), an admiral resigned in protest against previous provisions of the 2013, tweeted a post in which he denounced the total interweaving of the military with politics, adding that Turkey should consider itself "over".
But can Turkey, on several fronts, do without official 3.000s? Do not forget both the size of the Turkish Forces, second only to the US with no less than 500.000 men and women in active service, and the relevance of Special Forces, involved in the attempted coup, starting with the paintings of the 1 ^ brigade of Special Operations Forces , of the 3 ° army corps, of the 2 ^ Army, plus the security services, now directly dependent on the Head of State. But here we come to the spider's web: how to reorganize the FAs?
The reis brings back a former general of special forces, Adnan Tanriverdi, who was dismissed because he was considered too Islamist and who, despite his over 70 years, is the biggest Turkish businessman in the field of security. Owner of the Sadat, a company of contractors close to the AKP, Tanriverdi has created an organization capable of offering advice in the field of unconventional war and useful to the Islamic world, so that this can "take your place among the superpowers".
There are articles in the Turkish language of June 2016, therefore prior to the failed coup, describing the Sadat as "the Erdoğan Invisible Army ", a force ready to do what officially can not be done. Beyond the journalistic hyperbole, it is certain that Erdoğan has consolidated his power through a multi-layered paramilitary structure, with youth political organizations, organized bands (eg. "Ottoman Germany"), private security companies: nothing more consequential in having entrusted the former general, expert in the procurement of equipment and in asymmetric warfare, the reorganization of the FA, with the opening of training camps thanks to the support offered from Gulf countries. The parliamentary questions already presented by 2012 are useless, even though they were beginning to highlight the network created by Sadat in the Middle Eastern region for pro-fighting groups in Syria and Palestine, thanks also to government decrees that have effectively strengthened paramilitary groups and allowed former members of the FA can influence the recruitment of military personnel up to 2020. To date, in Turkey, trained 990.000 operators operate, including regularly armed 620.000: a parallel Army, according to numbers.
While the Executive glances on the impact of purges, To the Monitor indicates a strong shortage of command panels and General Staff, as well as specialized personnel including Air Force combat pilots, Army helicopter pilots and Special Forces incursors. Although the training has continued to graduate from a personal level, the most specialized professionals are still missing.
The AM is the weapon that has suffered the most from the situation: the removal of more than 280 trained pilots has dramatically reduced the operativity of the air tool that, like the air force component of the Army, which has lost more than 50 pilots, can not ensure a correct number of crews, essential to the defense of the southern borders, porous and subject to jihadist activities.
Hypothesis of return to normal operation? 3 years. Maybe. To avoid the holidays we tried to make up for it with civilian resources, an aspect that, however, does not guarantee discipline and professionalism typical of the FA, and despite the inauguration of theUniversity of National Defense.
The Navy was the least affected weapon, as most of the purges were only identified at the highest central level and not in the suburbs, on board the naval units. What is missing, and long will miss, is the competence in the know-how precisely of the most specialized professionals, a deficiency that has also manifested itself on the field, fighting against Daesh able, at least initially, to slow down the action of the tanks. To remedy the situation, the Turks worked in synergy with local proxies thanks to small mechanized units, and using what remained of the AM, the T129 helicopters (development based on the Italian platform Mongoose), and the self-propelled artillery, only to allow the attacks to be conducted by Syrian proxies. In any case, due to its geopolitical characteristics, Turkey continues to be an important player for NATO.
On the occasion of the Operation Shield of the Euphrates, the hybrid threats that affected armored vehicles, which lacked active protection systems and adequate modernization, caused losses for anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM); portable air defense systems (MANPADS) have disturbed land-based communications, while improvised explosive devices have mowed many fighters; however, the Operation Olive branch showed a noticeable improvement in war activities, with an increase in the use of unmanned weapon systems, and with a Navy projected in the version Blue.
Turkey therefore vulnerable? Weakened, with an apparatus largely still lacking the necessary experience but with considerable reaction capacity; the problem, therefore, moves on two other fronts, political and economic.
Can the Kemalist front be defined as completely defeated? And above all: in the face of the power politics exercised, how will the economic crisis that is raging in the country affect? Both aspects concern a single fault, a rift that sees two opposing realities: secular secularism and conservative and Islamist politics of the AKP, a Turkish version of the Muslim Brotherhood and a megaphone of the country's rural areas. A bet, if we want, where, despite official statements, only money counts, and nothing else.
(photo: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri / web / Sadat)
