Libya: Can we expect something from Italy or is it better to seriously review French?

(To Giuseppe De Giorgi)
06/09/18

The 27 August 2018, one of the militias that are competing for power and internal and foreign financing in Libya, the 7 ^ brigade otherwise known under the name of "Kaniyat" based in Tarhouna, 65 km south east of Tripoli, it has carried out several attacks on targets and infrastructures protected by the militias so far in control of Tripoli. After 40 dead and 100 wounded, Misrata's intervention to help Al Sarraj and UN mediation, a fragile truce was reached. How long the truce will hold will be seen, but certainly the balance of powers in Tripoli has been altered, to be seen whether in favor of or against Al Sarraj. On the one hand, the aid from Misrata will require compensation in the redistribution of the economic resources that can be obtained from the control of Tripoli, on the other hand it eased the squeeze exerted by the militias that held the Al Sarraj government hostage.

Although the events of these days are serious, it is too early to say that we are heading towards a real civil war. Certainly, in view of the December elections decided by France, we remember against the Italian opinion, we must expect an increase in military initiatives of the various militias to position themselves at best in view of the elections, but I do not think that behind the initiative of the 7 ^ brigade there is a French hand, rather than a logic of indigenous power, even if it is certainly useful to the French cause to plasticize the inconsistency of the Italian support to Al Sarraj, in the moment of need.

In Libya much of the power revolves around who manages oil, or the National Oil Corporation and the central bank, which incidentally pays salaries both to allied militias with Al Sarraj that to those of Misurata, Haftar and the other countless companies of ventura blossomed after the 17 February 2011 revolution. The trafficking of human beings that mainly concerns the militias of the coast around Sabratha and those that dominate the accesses from the southern and southeastern border follows as a source of income. The attack of the 7 ^ brigade among other things, the guardians of some of the concentration camps of the migrants trapped in Libya have been put in flight. Desperate 400 have seized the opportunity to escape and wander aimlessly waiting to be recaptured or kidnapped.

In addition to Italy, which recently saw the renewal by the USA of the now ritual recognition of the leading nation on the Libyan dossier, a multiplicity of actors operate, first and foremost France, which is among the most active European partners in Africa, with long-term strategic objectives. It is not a mystery that Macron does not recognize the Italian primacy in Libya, constantly interfering with the weaving action that our diplomacy and AISE carry on without hype. Qatar also moves in support of Al Sarraj. France explicitly supports Haftar moving on the international scene with initiatives aimed at legitimizing it by equating it with Al Sarraj (the only leader recognized by the UN). To this end, France is increasingly presenting itself as a "super partes" arbitrator instead of Italy. Other important sponsors of Haftar are Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia.

Russia would like to oppose the return of Libya in the Western sphere of influence, therefore it resists any attempt to obtain incisive resolutions from the UN, making meanwhile impending any raids against human traffickers, foreseen for example by the 3 phase of the operation EU Sofia.

Al Sarraj has so far opposed the entry of the EU mission in territorial waters and on the ground. As it is contrary to NATO missions. The preferred solutions are the bilateral agreements, which are considered to be better manageable and according to the Middle Eastern tradition which can be opposed in case of need. This is how the Italian military presence in Libya took shape with Nave Tremiti, destined for the logistical support of the Libyan Coast Guard, while the EU operation Sofia it has literally remained on the "high seas", despite the fact that at least two years have passed since its launch, strongly desired by Italy, also as a tangible sign of European support. In Misurata there is also an Italian field hospital that has done an excellent and meritorious job.

Instructors and land vehicles were sent to the 2017 in the south of the country to train border guards. In all, the Italian military presence is however very small (just 350 / 400 men including the staff of the ship and the field hospital). Very useful for many reasons would be the expansion of the support to the Libyan maritime component with instructors of the 2 ° San Marco Regiment, the only military unit specialized in operations of MIO (Maritime Interdiction Operation) with ability to attack every time possibly located within the naval base of the Marina in Tripoli.

The Italian mission in Niger has not yet taken off, although it was approved by Parliament in the last parliamentary term. France, which commands Niger, had however placed two conditions on the Italian presence (where they also operated / operated by Germans and Americans, with their base): that the Italians were under French command and were willing to fight. In the absence of Italian availability to meet these requirements, our mission remains suspended, with the Italian soldiers already sent in their time hosted in the US base, awaiting developments.

According to open sources, they are present in Libyan territory, in many cases with different Libyan interlocutors, French, British and American military. For America, Libya remains, even with the Trump administration a secondary theater, in which however they move freely for the contrast of Daesh and terrorism in general. Trump probably would more willingly support the Italian action than the French one, less controllable and too autonomous, but it is likely that it would not oppose the French aims on Libya, if the Italian action proves to be inconclusive, provided the result is a containment of the Russian expansion to the west.

It's Italy? From the disastrous defeat of the Second World War, Italy has no independent national foreign policy. Italian choices have always been dictated by the winning powers and in particular from America and England. Some deviations were related to relations with the Middle East and the PLO of Arafat, to which Italy was moving towards trying to maintain non-hostile relations, essentially to avoid terrorist attacks. Subsequently, with the weakening of American protection and English influence we sought refuge in "multilateralism" which in fact provides for our aggregation of choices made from time to time by the strongest countries, even when they do not necessarily respond fully to our national interests (so it was for the 2011 war in Libya).

With the rapprochement with the United States wanted by Sarkozy and with the overcoming of the Cold War, the Italian utility as a privileged US ally in the Mediterranean has been reduced by much. With this the American embankment has been weakened to the French ambitions in the Mediterranean and in Italy, leaving us at the mercy of our powerful neighbor. Relations between Italy and France are progressively reassuming the historical conflict taking place from the pre-unification phase of Italy until the eve of the First World War. It's geopolitical beauty, and you can not do anything about it, one would say, citing Humphrey Bogart in Deadline. Suffice it to say that the war plans of the Royal Navy and the composition of the Italian fleet had been developed in an anti-French and not anti-Austro-Hungarian style. Moreover, our affiliation to the Triple Alliance was also dictated by the search for protection against French interference.

In addition, in the last decade Italian foreign policy, in the areas of autonomy that remained after having satisfied US requests (eg: Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) and compressed by the highest public debt of the EU after Greece, was essentially conditioned by its possible immediate repercussions on domestic politics, rather than on a comprehensive organic plan.

The case of Libya is emblematic. The Italian initiatives, implemented in alternating current and with different effectiveness, by successive governments over the years, have focused essentially on the immediate objective of stopping the embarking of migrants going to Italy. On the other hand, there was a lack of action aimed at strengthening the Italian relevance for the Libyan people, consolidating the foundations for a long-term privileged relationship. In this sense, in addition to a more incisive military / operational presence, to be obtained certainly in the most discreet ways possible, more "soft power" interventions would certainly be functional. Restore the efficiency of the production of Tripoli, help the reconstruction of the city, schools and universities etc. the Italian ascendant would greatly increase in the perception of the population.

In the south of Libya, in the strategic region governed by the Tuareg tribes, we could build wells, hospitals (starting with a field hospital like that of Misrata), schools, barracks for border guards, involving the Tribes directly in the economic returns of our investments , also to offer an economic alternative to tolls for the transit of human traffickers who cross the desert with impunity. It is clear that direct agreements would be needed with the Tribes and Militias that control security in Libya in areas of our greatest interest (which would keep the predictable Haftar outbursts in an anti-Italian key at bay) as well as the consent of Al Sarraj.

In Libya it works like this forever. Ignoring the tribes thinking of solving everything with the central government means not understanding Libya and failing to leave.

In reality, a long-term foreign policy exists, but it is not led by the foreign ministry. It is from the building that dominates the EUR lake, the ENI headquarters that the line is decided.

It's like this since Mattei's day.

If ENI has never stopped operating during and after the 17 February revolution, 2011 is precisely because the "dog with 6 legs" looks far and operates on a global scale. Italy's military and political weakness has made it a master of "real politik" and "soft power". In the present case: in December 2016 ENI, for example, accepted the transfer to the Russian company Rosneft of 30% of its Shorouk concession relating to the huge natural gas field called Young, obtained from the Egyptian government. Soon after, the Qatar sovereign wealth fund invested in Qatar investing the 19% of the capital of Roseneft, an operation also supported by Intesa San Paolo bank1. La Roseneft, the 21 February of the 2017, has signed a cooperation agreement with the NOC (National Oil Company Libyan authority that manages all activities related to hydrocarbons in Libya). In Libya, he commands those who have oil. Qatar supports Al Sarraj but gets along with the Russians of Rosneft under the good auspices of ENI. Egypt supports Haftar, but Eni has established strong cooperation relationships in the energy field with Egypt, obtaining concessions for the exploitation of huge hydrocarbon fields. ENI's excellent historical relations with the NOC, which has always been a privileged partner, are an important factor in favor of its credibility in the area, contributing to the stability of one of Libya's vital components, the usability of the wealth linked to hydrocarbons.

In this way the ENI is positioned to survive and prosper anyone who prevails in Libya, except for the French who would like to see Total instead of ENI.

In this sense, the failure of the Haftar initiative in favor of the creation of a parallel NOC in Cyrenaica for the autonomous sale from Tripoli of the proceeds of the large extraction plants of the so-called Oil Crescent, for which it was recently taken "manu militari". This attempt failed because of the limited success of the new Haftar NOC, which was not considered legitimized to sell Libyan oil from the international community. Haftar, however, remains a strong contender in the event of an election, while it does not seem to have the strength to subjugate the most powerful militias of Tripolitania if they joined him. Compared to Al Sarraj, he certainly has the advantage of having his own militia, in fact we should call it a member of the Libyan Army rather than a militia. Haftar exercises therefore a direct power and not reflected by an external support conditioned by relations with militias that in fact hold him hostage to their interests. Al Sarraj is currently the weakest horse. But if this is the case because Italy has focused on Al Sarraj?

The answer is in the previous considerations.

The first reason is the terminal of Mellitah (ENI) from which the great Greenstream pipeline that brings to Gela the natural gas that comes from Bahr Essalam and Wafa and which constitutes the most important supply channel for our country, immediately after the pipelines coming from Russia.

ENI owns the 50% of the Mellitah plant and the company that manages it. The other 50% is from the Libyan NOC. In the waters facing Tripoli there are also important deposits also entrusted to ENI.

Around the terminal and the waters facing Tripoli insist the interests and the greatest vulnerability in the energy field of Italy in Libya.

For the safety of Mellitah, Eni has relied on local militias, including the 48 brigade, formed immediately after the overthrow of Gaddafi, by elements of the Libyan Army before the revolution, subsequently supplemented by substantial entries by members of the Dabbashi clan that intervened (according to open sources never confirmed by the Italian Government) even in blocking the departures of the boats of migrants awaiting the resumption of operations by the Libyan Coast Guard.

The link between Italy and the revolutionary Militias of Tripoli who supported Al Sarraj it is therefore antecedent to its establishment by the UN.

It would have been difficult to protect relations with the Tripoline militias and the west coast of Tripolitania that control Mellitah, without supporting Al Sarraj at his settlement in Tripoli.

The second reason lies in the multilateralism of our foreign policy which leads us to renounce autonomous choices.

The point is: until the concession to ENI on our foreign policy in Libya can stand without damage to Italy, when the opponent is not only Total, but France?

What would happen if militia allies in Haftar conquered Mellitah? Would we change horse?

The fact is that we are perceived by the Libyan factions as the ideal friend of good weather, polite and affectionate, not invasive, but useless, even harmful when the weather turns to the worst, when you would like your friend at sea with you and not on quay waiting for the return of good weather. One fact is certain we must move wisely, but quickly, changing pace to play an active role in the national interest and Libya, otherwise it is better to seriously review the French.

  

1 Michela Mercuri - Incognita Libya - chronicles of a suspended country.

(photo: Italian government / Présidence de la République française / Defense / web)