The 2019 promises to be a very special year for the People's Democratic Algerian Republic. During the first half of the year, presidential elections will be held which, now more than ever, will truly mark the beginning of a new historical moment for the North African Arab-Islamic giant. For twenty years, in fact, the fate of the country that belonged to Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumédiène has remained in the hands of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs between the 1963 and the 1979 and exponent of the "revolutionary first generation" who conquered the independence of the country from France during the Algerian War of Independence between the 1954 and the 1962. Although Bouteflika has affected as few others on the formation and development of modern Algeria, the time of its power can be said to be substantially concluded, being he for years seriously ill and confined to a wheelchair so as to be defined sarcastically by a part of opposition press as "the living dead". His public outings have been reduced to a minimum and the task of receiving the eminent foreign guests, once the exclusive prerogative of the President of the Republic, is now carried out by Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia and the senior leaders of the governing party since the year of independence, the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale).
However, probably in no other country in the world such as Algeria is the saying that "Things are never what they seem". Although the country has a complex institutional and constitutional architecture and is characterized by a division of powers essentially based on the French model, Algeria is often defined as a "controlled democracy" where the military and a small group of unelected civilians ( generally members of the high state bureaucracy) variously defined by the population as "Les Décideurs" (The Deciders) or "Le Pouvoir" (The Power), they make all the most important decisions in an atmosphere of secrecy and confidentiality.
On the opposite side of the pyramid is the base of the company, "Le Peuple" (Il Popolo). In between, there is the "transmission belt" that acts as a connector between the decisions taken by "Le Pouvoir" and the instances of "Le Peuple"; this transmission belt is given by the non-commissioned officers of the armed forces and security forces, veterans of the terrible 90 civil war that saw them triumph against the more obscurantist Islamist forces. In the Algerian popular jargon, this class of non-commissioned officers are known as "Les Centurions" (The Centurions) and they are the real backbone of the country, without whose support "Le Pouvoir" could not exercise control and "Le Peuple" does not could see its most indispensable demands recognized.
The Algerian War of Independence bequeathed to the young nation a formidable army and a highly sophisticated security apparatus that have often served as "nurses", especially during periods when the FLN ruling class was torn by clashes between opposing factions, as happened for example in the 1978 after the sudden death of Houari Boumédiène, when after a series of "conclave" behind closed doors, the country's political-military elite opted for Chadli Bendjedid as his successor, temporarily crushing the ambitions of Bouteflika, who should have waited 20 years before he could again "aspire to the crown".
Given the assumptions, it is not difficult to understand how the rumors regarding a feud between the various sectors holding the power have been circulating free for some time. The driving force behind such a flurry of speculation was the defenestration, in 2015, of Mohamed Mediène, said Toufik, and the subsequent dissolution of the powerful "Département du Renseignement de la Sécurité" (DRS), the secret services of Algeria, then promptly replaced by a new agency created ad hoc by Bouteflika and directly controlled by him. Following this event, the shock within the civilian population was considerable. Mohamed Mediène in fact, commanded the Algerian secret services for 25 years, from 1990 to 2015, and the same DRS has earned a well deserved reputation thanks to the results obtained during the Algerian Civil War when it managed to create a network of over 100.000 agents able to infiltrate not only Islamist terrorist organizations but also civil society as a whole. Long considered over the years' 90, along with the Chief of Staff of the Algerian Armed Forces, General Mohamed Lamari, and the Prime Minister, Redha Malek, as one of the leading exponents of the faction called "Les Éradicateurs" (The Uprooters) , that is contrary to any kind of agreement or truce with the Islamists, at first Mediène opposed the return to politics of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, considered then exponent of the faction called "Les Dialoguistes" (The Dialogists) which included, among others, also the predecessor by Bouteflika, general Liamine Zéroual. However, later the two reconciled and, for the following 15 years, Mohamed Mediène remained one of the pillars of Algerian power.
Indeed, every superstructure of power is irrevocably condemned to obsolescence. In Algeria, this coincided with the beginning of Bouteflika's fourth presidential term. Already after 10 years and two presidential terms, the old "bey" of Algiers showed signs of fatigue; however both the personal ambition and the disagreement within the gangsters of the "Decision makers" had made them opt for maintaining the status quo. What no one could have foreseen was instead the rise of the brothers of Bouteflika, Said and Abderrahim, who progressively made their way into the presidential entourage.
After being hit in the 2013 by a serious stroke, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was however re-elected for a fourth term, and it was then that the heads began to fall, both in the high apparatuses and in the ranks of the FLN. The first to fall was "the untouchable" Mohamed Mediène, then it was the turn of the military leaders, then the former Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and the police commander Abdelghani Hamel were fired. More recently, it was the General Secretary of the FLN, Djamel Ould Abbes, who had to withdraw from politics, officially for health reasons, in reality to open the way for a new generation of leaders far more malleable and deferential than the Presidential Office. After years of purges, and with an older brother reduced to a literally "larval" state, it seems that no one else has remained to bar the way for the young "Bouteflika brothers"; Said in particular seems to be the most ambitious and numerous press organs, both within the country and abroad, now portray him as the full-blown successor of Abdelaziz. If, during the presidential elections of the 2019, such forecasts were to be confirmed, we will thus have a Bouteflika succeeding another Bouteflika. But what kind of Algeria will have to lead Said Bouteflika (or whoever) to the future?
With a population estimated at around 42.200.000 inhabitants, Algeria is the demographic giant of the Maghreb and the second of the Arab world after Egypt; in the light of current demographic growth rates it could even become, in the second half of the 21st century, the first Francophone country in the world. It is also a great producer of both oil and natural gas (at the 16 ° and 9 ° place in the world rankings respectively), but also the pharmaceutical and electronics sectors have recently begun to contribute to the diversification of the economy. The years of the Algerian War of Independence and the Algerian Civil War, as well as the participation in counter-terrorism operations in the Sahara area, the continuing state of tension with neighboring Morocco and the existing relations that have existed for decades with Moscow have given Algeria of the most powerful, best equipped and financed armed forces in the whole African continent; position of pre-eminence that will be further strengthened in the coming years given the announcement of the recent signing between Algiers and Moscow of a maxi-contract from 7.5 billion dollars for the purchase of new weapons tested by Russia during the Syrian Civil War.
At the same time, economic problems should not be forgotten. The great wealth of hydrocarbons and the state monopoly existing in the sector have in fact relegated Algeria to the status of "state of income" with all the pros (few) and the cons (many) of this situation. Corruption and the lack of democracy have favored, since the mid-80 years until now, a growing alienation from the politics of the younger sections of the population. This discontent exploded once and had its own outlet in the Algerian Civil War. Although the bloody conflict ended at the end with the complete victory of the government, it is not certain that, in the absence of structural interventions capable of completely reforming politics, the economy and society, the events of the 90 years cannot be today again, given also the contrasting signals coming from the demographic and social analysis of the country, which seems to be stuck in a "pre-transition" phase without allowing this to show real "modernization".
It will be up to the new leader of the country to trace the route along which the Algeria of the future will set sail.
Photo: US Navy / MoD Algeria / web
