Dr. Stranaerdogan

(To Gino Lanzara)
16/09/19

From a western perspective it is not easy to understand the MO: different culture and political tradition require different and not easy interpretative keys.

Turkey is geographically a bridge, the passage between Europe, Asia and MO, the point where the Greek κυβέρνησις, the art of governing the cities that made the history of Western political thought, were compared with the absolutist forms of the East . The political change made by the AKP, the Islamist party in power, has long since changed the internal and external balances of a country induced both to the revision of the lay structure of the institutions and to the concretization of the concept of strategic depth by Ahmet Davutoglu, also jubilated by his own party, in a traditionally troubled area.

Although it is known in the West as Sultan, therefore with a more pertinent charge to the secular power, from the 2014 Erdoğan has not made mystery of the intention to recreate in fact a sort of Ottoman Caliphate, where the Caliph is a Prophet sent by God to guarantee the right Islamic government; a well-rounded leader therefore, and not only in a secular sense. It is therefore necessary to keep in mind the symbolic aspect of a statement that, in Turkey, has a value not only religious but also substantial, and that allows the President, strengthened by the institutional reform that actually centralizes in him the greater powers of the State, to govern by breaking balance and consolidated alliances to forge others, otherwise unthinkable, inspired by what appears to be a mission where mysticism and pragmatism merge to give life to an increasingly destabilizing realpolitik.

The Kemalist spirit, even after the post-coup 2016 purges, seems to be greatly weakened, and has left the stage both for aversion to the Western world and for the creation of a national industry based on foreign technology and based on principle of know who and not on that of know how. The Kemalist creation of a new society formed in religious schools was repeated in an Islamic form, and aimed at supporting a union of Islamic states, a less westernized society and more pia.

Theerdoganesimo he does not live by this alone; the strategic aspect of the Turkish economy, despite the tares that condition its medium and long-term development, aims, in its intentions, to occupy a position of weight among the first 10 economies in the world, increasing domestic demand with exports directed towards markets friends, and developing bilateral relations with payments in local currency according to the dictates of Islamic finance, characterized by low interest rates, devaluation, decreased ability to purchase Western products and easier credit lines with limited speculative possibilities.

The opening towards extreme right movements, aimed at consolidating consensus, is finally witnessing a marked transformist capacity that strengthens the departure from the West and pushes for a solid integration towards theE, a solicitation that has led to the promotion of policies that sometimes transcend national borders, as happened in Syria or during the last electoral campaigns.

Europe, which is so financially strong, so politically fragile, would perhaps do well to consider that Turkish citizens residing within its borders - even with dual citizenship - are about 3 million: a political force not to be overlooked.

State strikes and GDP

Turkey aspires to political independence in international relations; claims to be new, even if sometimes accused of revisionism by the other Middle Eastern countries; ill endures the constraints imposed by the Atlantic Alliance; continues to consider the Kurds as Mountain Turks and not an ethnic and political entity in its own right; suffers any historical reference to the matter Armenian, how uncomfortable and how much the Dalai Lama is for China.

Time scan politician Turkish is punctuated by Kemalist interventions of the FFAA, but without losing sight of the details, never small. In the 2003 the Operation Balyoz Harekâtı, with the alleged presence of the Kemalist organization Ergenekon can be regarded as a forerunner of the controversial 2016 subversive attempt, but with significant points of difference. In the 2015 most of the conspirators it is acquitted, and Erdoğan in the 2016, allows reintegration and reuse of the Eurasians prominent anti-Westerners: the presence of such elements in Libya cannot be excluded, and even less in actions aimed at conditioning the political and economic framework of Eastmed, an area that projects itself up to the Cypriot EEZ and that presents immense availability of gas natural. To this must be added the picture determined by the national economic situation, which is very magmatic and conditioned by political choices erdoğaniane; US customs retaliation cannot be separated from the acquisition of the Russian-produced S-400 missile weapon system and the consequent exclusion from the F35 program, a signal that led Moody's to launch an alarm on a possible downgrade with a negative outlook, given the difficult diplomatic relations.

Despite not having apparent sovereign debt problems, which in the relationship with national GDP stood at less than 30%, Turkey continues to have a strong foreign exposure, with an economy conditioned by cross-border financing, with a foreign and economic policy that intimidates investors and that tries to control capital on the run. Announcing the establishment of its own rating agency, in light of the imposed political control of the Central Bank, seems to follow the line water policy, for which the thirst quencher he sold, compared to that offered by others, can only be cooler of the snow.

Europe cannot ignore the situation: a possible Turkish collapse would be added to the US-American trade tensions and to the Brexit factor, a crisis potentially so disruptive since having already influenced the slowdown in German GDP.

The Turkish economic miracle, in summary, having never rested on solid foundations, is dissolving: Erdoğan, despite investments in infrastructure and faith in divine aid - which has not, however, prevented the electoral defeat in strategic Istanbul -, is not Keynes.

Equally paradoxical and politically intolerable, the assessment of the long-term debt prepared by Fitch, which equates Turkey with its rival Greece, given however a recovery.

Nuclear landscapes

The MENA / Persian Gulf areas, since the 2007, have witnessed the declarations of at least 13 States interested in nuclear energy, stimulated by the Iranian announcement of the restart of the uranium enrichment program. The ambiguity of the company lies in the nature of the technology used, which makes the development of military and civil programs very similar. UAE, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan (a country with large quantities of uranium), and Saudi Arabia, for some time already, though citing economic reasons, have therefore intended to give a signal both to Tehran, so that it would not consider itself the sole depository of nuclear power of area, whether to the US to solicit or a nuclear umbrella, or solely to reaffirm, like Riyadh, a sovereign political and negotiating freedom.

It is true that civil uses are economically convenient in terms of economic diversification, energy security and fresh water production, that enriched uranium goes well with the head of a ballistic missile, but it is just as good.

Egypt cannot and does not want to lag behind in this competition: nuclear development is a challenge that it does not intend to avoid, also to reverse the trend that could see it, in competitive terms, more backward than in traditionally less developed and above all committed countries in the protection of Muslim brotherhood.

To remember the Russian, French and South Korean activism in terms of assistance, planning and construction of the plants.

Two important actors are missing: Israel, which has never admitted the possession of atomic warheads, and precisely Turkey according to which "there is no developed nation that does not have nuclear weapons”, Statement erdoganamente inaccurate1, but aimed at goading the Jewish State.

The upcoming construction of the nuclear power plants at Sinope and Akkuyu, which is interested in the Russian Rosatom, is a clear sign of volatility and power projection in areas that are even more extensive than the regional one; it should be noted that, if Ankara is a force forced to buy Moscow uranium, it will replace the nuclear dependence on Russian gas, satisfying the national energy requirement according to a percentage that is however not fully suited to its needs civilians: the classic marriage of interest.

The possession of the atomic weapon is therefore not only an expression of power, but the certainty of being considered as valid interlocutors. If Shiite Iran is fearsome, because it can not be Sunni Turkey, especially when the Hebrew Jerusalem seems to be so for some time even though it has not adhered to anti-proliferation treaties, having remained firm to a policy of ambiguous nuclear opacity?

Nuclear nobility

Although the Mediterranean basin is small, the dynamics that follow it continue to have global relevance. Net of religious motivations, Turkey sgom to conquer his place in the sun, freed from the binding western protection of NATO, facing east as an independent political joker and seeking integration also in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Poor in resources, it is in fact the only country that, in the eastern Mediterranean basin, has not found its own energy resources; the Eastmed, for a state that aims to become the area's energy hub, has inevitably become like a glassware in which one cannot move if not awkwardly, continuing to trust in the inanity of a Europe under slap for the paid migration control from Syria, and with an island - Cyprus - harassed and subjected by the 1974 to a political status not recognized by the international community.

The presence of a nuclear arsenal in the availability of a power that grounds its motive of being on a religious and transcendent basis and with a variable geometry positioning on the global chessboard, could lead to more than one concern. What is certain is that the historical holders of nuclear weapons systems enjoy a position income and a leadership which, noblesse oblige, they will hardly share.

Turkey lacks preparation and means, and seems to be rich in rhetoric and risks for Europe, which would undoubtedly be weakened by a Turkish political transition to the east; net of the contingent political transformisms, the divine intervention could therefore be no longer so decisive for anyone.

1 Almost no developed nation has nuclear weapons except those authorized by international treaties (USA, Russia, UK, France and China). India, Pakistan, North Korea have nuclear weapons but they have not signed the non-proliferation treaty as Turkey did.

Photo: Presidency of the Republic of Turkey / Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri