The Beijing projects in the Arctic Region

The Chinese policy in the Arctic Region is particularly significant of the broader strategy pursued by Beijing on a global scale to establish itself as a first level player.

The Arctic is vast around 20 million square kilometers, twice the size of China, and holds 30% of the unexplored gas fields and the 13% of those of hydrocarbons.

The Arctic itinerary will allow Chinese goods, when the melting of the glaciers will be complete, to reach Europe in three weeks against the five needed if you pass through the Strait of Malacca, controlled by the US and therefore potential "chocke point" (trad . bottleneck).

A great advantage for a nation that has invested everything on the globalization of goods, for which great strategic importance will be the use for long periods of time of the two new "steps", of Northwest towards the Atlantic Ocean e in the north east in the direction of the North Sea.

Already in the 2017, in the document "Vision for maritime cooperatives and road initiative"Beijing referred to the" three main itineraries "that form the so-called" One Belt, One Road Inititiative "also known as the Silk Road, passing respectively to the Pacific Ocean, the Suez Canal and, precisely, the Sea Arctic.

In the 2018, with the publication of the "Arctic White Paper" the desire to participate not only in the exploitation of the immense natural resources was confirmed, but also, with the other Arctic countries¹, to the "governance" of this immense area through which the "polar silk road" will transit.

The intent of the document, easy to read as a whole, is essentially to enter a tense leg in the assembly of nations that sit on the Arctic Council² - even those that participate as observers (including Italy, China has become in the 2013) - with the aim of becoming, thanks to the extraordinary economic weight, an "Arctic power" within the 2050.

It is therefore not surprising that the recent statement by Deputy Foreign Minister, Kong Xuanyou, of strong encouragement to Chinese companies wishing to do business throughout the region, to build infrastructure or even for tourism purposes.

A political encouragement that follows a phenomenon already under way for some time, as shown, just to cite an example, from the number of arrivals of Chinese citizens to the Icelandic airport of Keflavik (photo), passed from 9500 in 2007 to over 86000 in 2017 .

It is from the 2004 that China has a permanent presence in Iceland with a research station. In 2008, Beijing intervened with numerous investments to save the island from financial collapse and in the 2016 it was a Chinese company, the SHENGHE RESOURCES, to buy the 12,5% of GREENLAND MINERAL AND ENERGY, an Australian company operating in the field of rare earths.

Beijing would also buy a port in Iceland and another in Norway (Kirkenes) to be included both along the Silk Road route.

Even in Greenland there are strong Chinese investments, not only in the field of the extraction of natural resources (iron and metals), but also in those of infrastructure, tourism (adventure and eco-tourism) and scientific research.

Chinese companies have been working on these three months to enlarge three airports and there are three scientific research bases opened by Beijing in the western part of the island.

It is no coincidence that in October of the 2017, the Greenland Premier, Kim Kielsen, went to Beijing with a large delegation, despite the vivid criticism of Copenhagen.

The policy of uranium mining and land emerged favored by the capital Nuuk continues to be strongly hampered by the Danish homeland, worried, like the other countries of the European Union, by the strong Chinese penetration throughout the area.

Also 'Alaska he could not escape the Chinese embrace. To understand its meaning, think that China is the 20 ° importer in the world of liquefied gas (LNG), for a total of 34 billion of investments and that the Arctic is estimated to own about 1 / 3 of the world gas reserves, half of them in Alaska.

As a demonstration of this special attention, after the meeting with Trump in Mar a Lago in 2017, Xi Jinping, along the way back, wanted to stop in Juneau (photo), to talk essentially about business, especially related to the exploitation of LNG.

A particular interest is also dictated by the fact that in the US state global warming is occurring twice faster than in the rest of the world, with the consequence that in these parts the conditions for opening new intercontinental routes will be created sooner than elsewhere.

But the penetration effort of China also concerns the Finland, which from 2000 to 2016 received from Beijing about 8,43 billion, and the Norway to which over 7 billion have been allocated.

Both nations contribute, with large Chinese subsidies, to the construction of the Arctic corridor.

The Chinese relations with all these countries show that, if it is true as Kong Xuanyou has repeatedly said, that China will not interfere with the policies of the other Arctic states, it is equally true that it will not be completely "absent". The variety and quantity of natural resources stored under the ice constitute a dish that is too delicious for the most energetic nation in the world.

The grand strategy of Beijing in the Arctic, on the other hand, develops in line with that adopted in the rest of the world, aimed at consolidating the nation's geopolitical rebirth and its energy supply.

China now reasons as a superpower, and it has very clear the implications that a good "Arctic policy" has on the consolidation of the respective geopolitical weight.

To this end he also promoted the approach with the Russia of Putin, particularly facilitated by the current sanctions regime.

The relationship with Moscow allows China to dialogue with a permanent member of the Arctic Council and, not secondary, to access Russian technology, for example that related to nuclear propulsion for icebreakers, of which Moscow holds the largest fleet in the world ( about 40 ships against the US 8).

A technology of great importance as potentially usable in the aircraft carrier construction program on which Beijing bases the achievement of extra-regional superpower status.

At present China has only one operating aircraft carrier, the Liaoning of Ukrainian construction, but has industrial plans for the construction, within 2030, of other 7 ships of this type.

The recent joint military maneuvers, JOINT SEA EXERCISE 2017, which saw for the first time the participation of 3000 Chinese military, are the confirmation of this new season of collaboration between the two nations.

Collaboration that also concerns the field of industrial investments, as demonstrated by the Chinese realization of a new city near St. Petersburg (Baltic Pearl), and by the investments that the powerful (and rich) China Development Bank has operated in the Russian giant NOVATEK's ARTIC, thanks to which Beijing will have direct access to the liquefied gas reserves of the area, gaining a major role in the exploration of the deposits present in the EEZ³ Russian.

Also Ottawa unresolved foreign to Beijing's attention, due to its strategic position and natural resources. There are numerous agreements in this sense, in all fields not least scientific and commercial.

The full availability of the passage to the northwest will represent the full consecration of Canada as an Arctic state, opening up new prospects for growth, which Ottawa is preparing to manage by increasing its population by 2100, from the current 36 to 100 million (and China can help him in this challenge)

However, there is a potential element of friction: while Ottawa and Moscow consider the Arctic passages to the north-west and north-east "inland waters", in the Beijing white paper they are contemplated as "international" itineraries. As if this were not enough, the document refers to a "Polar Silk road", suggesting, even in the choice of names, a little disguised desire to influence the new region according to its own intricacies, demonstrating once again the usual pragmatism of politics foreign of the Dragon.

The future will tell us how China will manage to shape the Arctic region and how far it will be allowed to realize its projects.

One thing seems certain: the future usability of this region will bring about a profound transformation also in the geographical field, to the extent that states that were geographically distant before - just think of China and Canada or Canada and Russia - will not only see volumes increase dramatically of the respective commercial traffics, but we will discover "neighboring" nations.

A perspective that China proves to have already understood, working to exploit it to the fullest.

¹_{The Beijing document defines a "near arctic state"}