The holding of the 25 consultative referendum last September for the independence of the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan (KRG), with its participation data (72,6%) and consensus in favor of secession (92,7%), opened a new chapter in fragile balance of the area.
But what is the situation, just over two weeks from the vote?
The Iraqi parliament, as was to be expected, condemned the consultation defined by Prime Minister Al Abadi as "unconstitutional", stating that "no dialogue can take place with Erbil if the referendum is not canceled".
This week bank flows were blocked with the KRG and the telephone companies operating there were nationalized, the most important of which - the Korek - is owned by the Barzani family (on the president of the KRG, Masoud Barzani, now a old procedure for corruption, recovered in the days following the referendum).
In addition to this, the 11 last October, an Iraqi prosecutor's office issued an arrest warrant against the twelve members of the independent electoral commission who had the task of presiding over the proper conduct of the consultation, guilty of violating the law of the Supreme Court of the state.
Meanwhile, the fear of "possible significant attacks" by the militias south of Kirkuk and north of Mosul, which caused the temporary closure, the 12 October, of the only two roads connecting the KRG in Mosul, via Erbil and Dahuk.
Indicative in this regard is the statement to the Kurdistan-24 TV network of the head of one of the Shiite popular militias (PMF) who report to Hashd al Shaabi, of wanting to free the whole Kirkuk province, the Shingal area and the plain as soon as possible of Nineveh.
To throw some water on the fire, the 12 October, the statement of Prime Minister Al Abadi (photo) that "never arms against Iraqi Kurds will ever be taken up”, Followed a few hours later by the positioning of heavy vehicles and artillery of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) at the gates of the oil city of Kirkuk.
The firmness of the regional government of Erbil is counterbalanced by the fragmentation of the two main Kurdish opposition parties, Gorran and the Workers' Party (PUK), which previously opposed and "did not oppose" the referendum.
In fact, in recent times, internal divisions have increased within Kirkuk's PUK, probably on pressure from Iran, for not having thwarted the referendum in due time, granting freedom of conscience before the vote.
The fear of paying a heavy price in the upcoming local elections scheduled for mid-November and the recent death of Jalal Talabani (photo), the noble father of the party and old president of Iraq, have considerably increased the difference in positions within the political structure .
To this stalemate, we must add the grudges towards the president Masoud Barzani, whose mandate expired in the 2015 together with the grievances for the freezing of parliamentary works, to understand the fragility of the Kurdish political front, exacerbated by concerns about possible future moves that Shiite militias could take against the Peshmerga.
Finally, the Turkish declarations in support of the Turkmen minority in Kirkuk and the likely Iranian pressures on the premier Al Abadi are cause for concern, which could see its leadership strengthened in within the Arab component of the State.
By broadening the field, Iran immediately condemned the referendum, both with the threat of President Hassan Rouhani to close the borders - which, however, was not given any follow-up - and with more marked initiatives, such as the recent meeting in Tehran between Iranian and Turkish chiefs of staff.
Tehran's advantage over Ankara, which potentially amplifies its field of action, is given by being able to count on an important proxy such as the PMF, regularized (and paid) by the government of Baghdad last December.
In this regard, it should be noted that the presence of gen. Soleimani, head of the Iranian revolutionary guards and principal director of Persian military action abroad.
Turning to Turkey, Erdogan is one of the leaders who considers the initiative the most and his recent contacts with Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Habadi and Iranian President Rouhani prove this, from which the official declaration that no initiative will be taken, has emerged if it has not been first concerted by the three countries.
Its action is driven mainly by the fear of an independent Kurdish state on its borders, potentially capable of reawakening the ambitions of the "Turks of the mountains", an epithet given by Ankara to the Kurdish inhabitants living in the country, equal to approximately 20% .
It will be interesting to see how the Sublime Door intends to combine its strong posture with the Erbil referendum initiative, with the huge economic interests it holds in the KRG.
At the moment, however, net of the many declarations of threat, except for the closure of flights on the capital of the autonomous region, no measures have been taken against the Kurdish partner, with whom commercial relations normally continue.
What about the two main external actors, Russia and USA?
Putin, as already reported last week on this publication, immediately assumed an ambivalent attitude towards the referendum, dictated mainly by the desire to not want to upset Iran with which it cooperates in Syria, and Turkey for its growing importance in the chessboard.
It should be noted, however, that the massive economic interests with the KRG at this stage are significantly affecting the posture of Moscow.
In fact, after Putin's declaration of last October's non-interference in Iraqi internal affairs, 4 was followed, four days later, by that of his energy minister, Alexander Novak, on the project to channel part of the Kurdish pipeline system up to to the Black Sea.
Singular that Moscow's position this time appears to converge with that of the USA, interested in a possible interruption of the "Shiite arc" created by an independent Kurdish state, and worried by Iranian activism in Iraq.
It could be precisely this "unusual convergence" of Russian-American interests that inspired the action of the old Barzani, who does not appear particularly shaken by the recent adventurers, together with the conviction that Turkey will hardly pass from words to deeds, given its many economic interests. and financial that link it to the KRG.
The next few weeks will tell us if this vision will be a winner.
(photo: US. Army / US Air Force / US DoD / Presidency of the Turkish Republic / Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri)
