In recent months, Jordan has experienced - and is experiencing - an internal political situation that, despite itself, has repercussions in the regional sphere and, more widely, in the international one. With a public debt of about 40 BILL of dollars, almost equal to its GDP, unemployment attested to 18% and more than 1 million Syrian refugees over a population that does not exceed 10 millions of inhabitants, the Hashemite Kingdom is experiencing the economic crisis deeper in its history, a contingency absolutely not marginal for a state that has made the stability of its business card.
Created as a buffer State capable of absorbing the tensions generated by the surrounding countries, Jordan is in the constant need to take decisions that will allow it to continue to be the "living" guarantee of an anomalous geopolitical stability in a magmatic context and in constant evolution. The recent popular protests that led to the dismissal of Prime Minister Mulki originated in an economic crisis caused by several factors, some other contingencies of a systemic nature, and to which the successor Razzaz, while rejecting previous liberal initiatives, does not seem to have found a solution.
Jordan, due to its geographical position and its historical past, can be defined as a rentier state, where the rent that has been so far ensured does not derive from natural resources that it does not have, but from the strategic importance that is inherent to it and whose importance, expertly, is from time to time brought back to memory by the street motions. Economic survival, therefore, came from and still comes from the support provided by those political subjects who, over time, have relied more on the ability of the Hashemite monarchy to propose itself for mediations otherwise inaccessible, and that have led Jordan to cover international relevance. The evolution of area dynamics, however, has made the squaring of budget problems far more complex.
That Jordan has a constant need for foreign resources is clear, that these resources can continue to flow as easily, is much less certain. The historical stability of Jordan is therefore confronted with dynamics that, already in 2011, have led to the Arab Spring and that, given the pathological difficulties of the North African and Middle Eastern governments in the management of budgets and in the fight against the endemic phenomenon of corruption and the "system tips ", still constitute an ideal broth of culture for the most radical movements.
King Abdallah, unlike the other rulers, was able to move politely in a prudent manner, applying the principle of divide et impera, parcelling the forces of opposition engaged in the attempt to weaken the relationship between the tribal entities and the Monarchy, adopting part of the institutional reforms invoked by the population in order to avoid dangerous radicalization and shifting the focus on the nature of the IS members, defined hawarig, outlawed, then detached from the context of Islam proper; what he could not oppose was the intervention of the IMF, which forced the government to make drastic but necessary decisions with a view to the repayment of the loan granted. Strategies for a painless exit do not seem to exist if we can not deeply change the foundations on which the Jordan State is based, which must however deal with the problems that the social composition of its people entails, and continuing to adopt a foreign policy is mediating but also objectively pro-active, under penalty of an exit of the harbinger of closures of lines of financial credit.
The Kingdom presents a significant fracture between Giordani and Giordano Palestinesi, a fault that the Government does not seem to want to remedy since 1970, and which is also reflected in economic activities, where public employment remains the prerogative of the former, leaving the private sector to the latter physiologically weak and subject to increasingly heavy systemic crises. The presence of refugees from Yemen, from Iraq and above all from Syria, altering the demographic situation, aggravates a very delicate picture; the lack of endogenous economic resources, associated with a decline in exports due to the Syrian and Iraqi war events, can not but make the situation even more problematic.
Economy, only apparently homogeneous society that sees the native population in demographic difficulty, internal security guaranteed with a control system that can not leave room for dissent, relations with the major regional and global political actors: these are the challenges that await Jordan, enterprises that strictly constrain the strategic needs to maintain relationships capable of continuing to ensure uninterrupted flows of funds justified by the expenses to be faced both for actions more strictly military, even if sometimes judged, for example by Saudi part, "insufficient" as in Yemen, both for the containment of migratory waves. The dependence on external aid, coming mainly from the IMF, from the USA, from the Saudis that effectively control the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Emirates and Kuwait, is therefore influential in terms of international politics, a "financial subjection" which, for the next few years has guaranteed revenue equal to 2,5 Mld. of dollars. The need to broaden the revenue spectrum requires therefore not only financial recalibrations but also in terms of international alignments, with the opening to new markets and new partners, such as India and China, which already uses the ports of the port of Aqaba.
Despite being the only Arab state, with Egypt, to have signed a peace treaty with Israel, Jordan could not refrain from taking a position contrary to the move of the US embassy to Jerusalem; it is important in this regard to recall that the stability of the Kingdom can not disregard fidelity to the Hashemite monarchy which, tracing its ancestry to the lineage of the Prophet, can not recede from the duty of custody of the sacred places of Jerusalem, prerogative decisions taken, however, placed Amman in opposition with the axis that sees aligned US, Saudi Arabia and Israel, in their attempt to contain the expansion of the Shia crescent.
The political balance for King Abdallah becomes a particularly difficult but essential exercise for the whole region, especially if placed in relation to the concern for Saudi politics, never so assertive and with which historically relations have never been easy; not wanting to participate in the sanctions regime against Qatar, which remains one of the strongest investors in Jordan; to the cautious rapprochement with the Iranian Republic, whose isolation has been defined as "counterproductive". However, it was the usual with the realpolitik that, finally, led the King to negotiate agreements with Israel for future energy supplies of natural gas in addition to how painfully provided by Egypt in difficulty in combating attacks on gas pipelines in Sinai , an area in which Amman hopes for a stronger militarization, and to opt for a privileged commercial relationship with Ryad rather than with Ankara, an index of the Jordanian refusal of the Turkish and Qatar regional polarization to support the Muslim Brotherhood, the inspirer of the main opposition political group, the Islamic Action Front.
The Syrian conflict also saw the work of the Jordanian foresight which, aimed at protecting its sovereignty, took steps to monitor the IS activities with a careful and active intelligence, avoided a direct confrontation in the south of Syria, rightly evaluated as a risky form of attrition and, resisting the Saudi pressures, carefully avoided asking for the deposition of Assad, hypothetical and renewed commercial partner of the future, as the keystone for the cessation of hostilities. This policy has allowed Amman to re-propose itself as an intermediary between the Saudi-US axis and the Russian Federation, which has well understood the Hashemite relevance. Not surprisingly, Abdallah, has considered it appropriate to highlight how the 3 dossiers that contrast the West with Russia, ie Syria, Crimea and Libya proceed in parallel, and that a compromise on the Crimean quarrel would facilitate the settlement of the conflict in Syria.
Pragmatism, rationality and political ability, have therefore made it clear that Jordan, despite internal difficulties, does not intend to abdicate its political role in the area, continuing to actively interpret the parts of the mediator without ever losing the Western alliance.
(photo: web)
