Probably the 2 September 1945 no one could have ever imagined what could have been the historical evolution following the conflict in the Pacific; on the Missouri bridge, Japan signed its unconditional surrender annihilated by the nuclear power of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alone. The new atomic deities had by now replaced the celestial Imperial. The "century short"Eric Hobsbawm, however, has unexpectedly changed Asian geopolitical balance, and the outcome of the recent Nato Election Consultation is the latest example.
The choice of Premier Abe to dissolve the Lower House, which was initially jeopardized by the unfavorable political climate due to allegations of clientelism and favoritism, has proved to be rewarding and has confirmed both certainties and heavy incognito, which weighs, on the other hand, the future (and historical) abdication of the 83enne Emperor Akihito.
Abe's success was not so great: its unpopularity and the ongoing scandals were at risk for the executive and its reformist politics; taking advantage of both the economic outcomes and the fears generated by North Korea, Abe has firmly promised missile provocations and has promoted significant constitutional changes that will allow Japan to face new external threats.
Was it a paying strategy? It would seem to be, though it should be kept in mind that at the Abe ball game table did not face competitors able to offer valid alternatives, but only media phenomena and pale remembrances of languid democratic magnitude. Economically, Japan is at a time of potential vulnerability due to strong debt internal (unlike Italy) for which there is still no problem spread, the commercial surplus for which the state is inefficient inside but very effective towards foreign countries, and to international changes capable of reducing Japanese exports.
At this moment, Japan is likely to lose its primacy in the Asian firmament to give up its place in Chinese nascent cloud, which is, however, only able to propose a re-issue of unacceptable neo-imperial servitudes. So it remains to be seen how he intends to re-propagate the Sol Levant, certainly more oriented towards Western positions than those of the Chinese face, which are only capable of generating "muscular" reactions.
On the economic front, the Prime Minister continues to push for the "abenomics"Or a mixture of Keynesian, Friedman's economic thinking and the Bernanke-led Fed line, which aims to push central banks to increase liquidity in order to later invest in public works. The fundamental points, the so-called three arrows, rely on one expansive fiscal policy thanks to public investment; in a monetary policy equally expansive similar to quantitative easing European 2015; in a long-term structural reform program able to relaunch private investment. As with the ECB in Driving, the effects have been the subject of controversy; the Japanese economy is considered drogata, also because domestic consumption did not replace exports, which the private did not replace large state industrial accentuations, and that the 80% of public debt was sold to the same Japanese. In any case, the new international policy continues to guarantee the internal economic holding,abenomics remains a certainty, even though suffered and uphill. The problems on the agenda are therefore of no small importance; in addition to supporting the trade balance, Abe must keep in mind the demographic issue, a real trigger that threatens the long-term prospects, and the not easy regional diplomatic relations with South Korea and China, made even more problematic by what is perceived as an excessive surrender to the US administration.
With a rapidly aging population the reflationary policy of 'abenomics could affect the economic holding. Japan's fears of security also flare up two types of potential threats, short-term North Korean nuclear weapons, yet capable of shaking Tokyo Stock Exchange and trades, and those of greater depth in time, linked to the possible primacy Chinese. Beyond possible nationalistic ideological drives, there remains the objective risk associated with the Drago's claims to operate control over the southern Chinese Sea, transit of the 50% of Japanese food and energy imports. A plethora Chinese meeting with Taiwan would help to further isolate Japan, in order to avoid a Liaison even American, is tightening ever tighter military agreements with Viet Nam, India and the US itself. Abe therefore points to a containment of China and a more affirmative foreign policy.
The tensions in the eastern area have led to increasingly increased conflicts, which have been exacerbated by the initiatives taken by Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe, decision makers and nationalists. A common factor can be noted how both have drawn political lines of rupture with respect to the past; Beijing intends to see the geopolitical equality with the USA recognized while Tokyo, the most important American ally of the area, aims to regain prestige and power by boosting the economy and strengthening its maritime projection capabilities. The two geopolitical realities are clearly incompatible: on the one hand the insurgent neo - centrism, on the other the Japanese aspiration to a "normality" supported by the support of the Trump administration, aware that it can no longer play a global hegemonic role. in a multi-center and multi-polar world, and at least trying to prevent the assertion of dangerous regional competitors. The latest considerations of a geopolitical nature can only make it easier to understand the political move that Abe is about to make, namely the revision of art. 9 of the Japanese Constitution. China and North Korea with their aggressive policy have done nothing but accelerate - with an initial domino effect - the process of constitutional rereading, prompting to consider congruous nationalist demands that press to allow the effective reconstruction of the FFAA, now configured as Self-Defense Forces.
Following the atomic holocaust, Japan has embarked on the road of occidentalism, a true dominant trend throughout the Cold War period; the end of bipolarism, however, has led to a new vision of the geocultural connotations, which are no longer understandable and no longer associated with the Japanese style of understanding politics. With the historical shift of power from west to east and with the pivot to Asia of Japan, Japan has felt the necessity to redefine its strategic line: either stay in the Western field by strengthening the ties with the US, or to return to the East in full knowledge of the need to remain under Chinese supremacy. According to the neoliberal school both solutions pose risks, and J. Mearsheimer is convinced that Chinese growth can not be in any peaceful way. The realistic (too pessimistic) and liberal (excessively optimistic) dichotomy leads to considering the general picture in key constructivist, or a purely objective and aseptic vision that rationally expects a containment of the Sino-centric instances and the attenuation of Japanese specialism. The Chancellor's reactions to Abe's statements, however, do not lead to particular optimism, which leads to wondering how much terror the Japanese Samurai still have. Tokyo is now setting its defense budget on significant volume memories of the Senkaku-Diaoyou Islands quarrels, the North Korean nuclear threat, and US-based decommissioning signals from the bases in the Pacific. Abe, moreover, also stated that the constant lack of Japanese participation in international missions "preclude vital business opportunities".
As China asks whether Japan, a possible arbiter of an unprecedented act from the end of World War II, will renounce its defense-oriented policy, Abe tries to stretch the tones, but without deflecting their own intentions. The continued Chinese claims of excuses for the invasion suffered by Japanese troops could be adequately compensated in the constitutional review: the recognition of past sins, well reminded in all the invasive countries, would be attenuated by a future perspective in which the Japanese national feeling would find satisfaction and no further humiliation. Moreover, given the global situation, it seems anachronistic to allow Japan to remain bound to pacifism: the demonstration of strength by both Chinese and North Korean, without counting the current impotence in the face of assaults on Islamic terrorism, they can only justify the legitimate use of all possible legal means for national defense.
The 313 seats guaranteeing the parliamentary majority allow us to concretely hypothesize the possibility of a constitutional amendment, favored by nuclear threats; the farewell to constitutional pacifism could become a reality, also bearing in mind the affiliation that the Japanese people have for their military, always in the forefront of all the tragic events that struck the Sol Levante.
Realpolitik once again shows its worth. While it is true that a possible constitutional amendment should still overcome the popular referendum judgment, it can not even be ruled out, given the majority on appeal, that the executive may resort to the rewriting of art. 96 of the Constitution, which regulates the procedures required to allow the Constitutional variations themselves.
The Self-Defense Forces, after a difficult rebirth from the ashes of a conflict with a tragic outcome, would find, with this Constitutional amendment in pectore, a full and corroborated legitimacy, moreover, by the international appreciation for the organization and technological preparation demonstrated during the participations in international missions that have seen the Japanese military engaged. Abe, in short, is the pivot on which Japanese politics will revolve for several years; economy, wages, regional and international conflicts must necessarily be examined, also taking into account the political inconsistency of the oppositions.
Will Abe also be the chief of government of the rebirth of the Japanese FFAAs? Extremely probable, given the will of affirmation of proven power on more than one occasion; it will be interesting to evaluate, however, the magnitude and value of the weapons that its executive will make available to the military instrument. A vision perhaps conditioned by tragic warfare might lead to the exclusion of the use of nuclear warheads, but the current North Korean threat, where it was still effective and projectable, would induce more, more than realistically, an option of this kind .
Never like now, Ruth Benedict returns; in 1946, though with many reservations, wrote a book of rare preciousness whose title condenses a perhaps unchanging reality of Japan: Chrysanthemum and sword. The "chrysanthemum"represents theIkebana, the Japanese artistic and cultural side; the "sword" embodies the honor and prestige of the Samurai, the militarist side. The symbolism of the title therefore encloses the paradox that Japan has always seemed to close in. Benedict, with the still-smoking nuclear ashes, predicted the rapid Japanese rebirth against any rationality as a result of the ideological elasticity and the great sense of duty of the Japanese citizen. Never before has been anticipated and "apt" of this.
(photo: Japanese MoD / US DoD)
