The Egyptian energy crisis could have a deadline (January 2019), according to what reported by the sources that follow the extraction of gas from deposits discovered in territorial waters.
Egypt, thanks to its strategic position at the turn of Suez and as a bridge between Asia and Africa, like many others, is a country rich in labor but not (up to the present day) of natural resources; it has given rise to an economic liberalization without any political reforms to support, this aspect that has generated cronyism, the impossibility of strengthening the private sector, the creation of low-productive and low-income jobs, and the difficult absorption of more educated young people in the public sector, not to mention the fact that the IMF has to report on the investments and the repayment plan for the loans received. A situation that includes the recurrent explosions of popular anger, given the employment situation, the balance of payments and the policy of subsidies adopted.
Egypt lived the post Mubarak political experience until it reached the president Al Sisi passing through the Muslim Brotherhood of the deposed president Morsi. However, social political events have also led to the discovery of vast deposits of natural gas - Zohr, Atoll and, presumably, Young - in territorial waters. Given the importance of the deposits and their geographical location, it was inevitable for Egypt to wish to assume an area political economic posture that would justify its transformation into a hub regional gas, an energy sector that sees the emergence of interests at all levels, area and global. Noor, in particular, if confirmed, could prove to be a resource of such magnitude that Egypt could be able to meet its own internal energy needs - also creating economies of scale - at least in a medium-term timeframe, given the demographic expansion which, in the future, could make it difficult to meet needs. Resources off shore they therefore give Egypt strategic centrality and resilience, also in light of the competitive size of the deposits, geographically fragmented, too large for the domestic markets, and in need of transport infrastructures able to plow waters often subject to contention.
However, the enthusiasm for the discoveries was held back by the difficulties of a complex geoeconomic situation, where the Egyptian option changed the picture that had emerged following the worsening of the Turkish Israeli relations, and of the Israeli distrust nourished towards the authorities of Nicosia can not guarantee adequate safety for liquefaction plants; Zohr it does not present commercial or political problems, it satisfies at the moment the Egyptian internal demand, one of the fundamental points of Al Sisi's policy, it can open the doors of Egypt to the future, allowing to use the terminals of Idku and Damietta as useful points for export of gas throughout the region.
Egypt could therefore propose itself as a valid exporter contributing to varying the regional equilibrium, first of all the one with Israel that expected to supply gas to the Egyptian company Dolphinus Holdings for 15 billions of dollars in the next 10 years, and to collect the repayment of previous debts on Israeli Electric Corporation. In key "hub", It should also be considered that the gas extracted from the fields Leviathan (in front of Israel) and above all Calypso (in front of Cyprus), will have to transit to Egypt before reaching its potential buyers. Self Zohr, at 60% in ENI hands, managed to shake the eastern Mediterranean, Young would have the possibility to propitiate new agreements, but at the same time nourishing the tension in an area interested in the maneuvers of the great powers, as recalled by the Saipem 12000 affair of last February, where the Turkish diplomacy of the gunners he made President Erdogan's fears clear to an ever more likely exclusion from the political economy of the Levante basin and from integration into the energy markets. But if the revenue Turkey is in the strategic position, which makes the Anatolian country a natural point of intersection of the gas pipeline networks between the Middle East and Europe and therefore a hub in power, the decisions of its president further alienate Israel to push it to Egypt, and cut off Ankara from the wealth of the new routes to bind it to Russian supplies.
Conditioning the evolution of infrastructural developments to a solution of the Cyprus question, and offering the Russian Gazprom a way to the pipeline TurkStream (soon to open), the Turks have reduced the commercial interest of their Israeli gas route. The Egyptian role which gasiferous hub it therefore fits into the game of alliances matured after the Arab spring of the 2011 and, politically, thanks to the network of existing agreements, it facilitates the containment of the ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood, the key access to the area for the Turkish and Qatarine ambitions, the most frustrated by the energetic Aegean energy of the Mediterranean Levant.
The agreements with Israel have inevitably provoked criticism, fueled by the conviction of being able to reach, without any external support, energy self-sufficiency, but without further investigating which way to use to allow the export of the Egyptian product. The strategic aspect of the agreement lies in the fact that any damage by Hezbollah and Hamas will affect supplies destined to Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, while its preservation will make it a fundamental element in terms of cooperation and security for the balance of power. in the Middle East, with an eye to the Iranian presence. Egypt could therefore really propose itself as a Mediterranean actor indispensable for future energy needs; this also in the light of its possible next access to OPEC, and for the interest shown by the EU with the strategic partnership proposal, a last European attempt not to remain on the margins of the competition for gas.
The Egyptian development is also important for the roles that USA and Russia intend to assume. The American intent, strong of close and frequent relations, was to facilitate a sort of economic peace able to strengthen the agreements between the coastal States, without however evaluating the impact that the transport of the gas would have caused, favoring the bank Egyptian rather than the Turkish one; currently, Washington's political stance reinforces the conviction of its disengagement from the area.
Russia, with which the relations have been strengthened, instead presents itself in a proactive capacity; with Egypt has signed agreements for the construction of a nuclear power plant and Rosneft has acquired from XI the 30% of Zohr; the intentions are clear, and are directed both to generate doubts in Europe on US sanctions policy, and to make vain Western attempts to diversify the gas supply; Last but not least is the appearance on the Mediterranean of Russian companies (Rosatom and Novatek), otherwise limited in their homeland by Gazprom, and the approach to Arab leadership, according to the American posture, less predictable than the past and aimed at the Pacific.
For the moment, Al Sisi looks to the future, prepares a highly respected logistics with the construction of a refinery of more than 4 billion dollars near Cairo, equips the Suez Canal with additional refueling depots, and politically comes to the attention of the major geopolitical players in the area as a reliable and, above all, solvent referent, with a wider, less flattened foreign policy on the positions of the largest creditors (Saudi Arabia), and less influenced by the closest neighbors (Israel, Libya).
(photo: Presidency of the Council of Ministers / Energy Egypt / web / Kremlin)
