What was the end of Afghanistan?

The Vichean theory of historical courses and recourses seems to have been written specifically for the Afghan scenario. The years pass, time passes and history repeats itself: the weapons, the adversaries change, but the Americans always remain the same, including the clumsiness in dealing with problems in that part of the world. As soon as he arrived at the White House, President Donald Trump faced various economic and social problems, fearing a decisive American withdrawal on all international issues. A few months later the music had already changed: Syria, Russia and North Korea forcibly rejected America at the center of the world arena, as if to remind her of her role as first actress. Among the most burning issues inherited from Trump is precisely Afghanistan where, despite an endless war, the deployment of men and means and the disbursement of large sums of money to the Kabul government, the balance of power does not they seem mutated.

In the 2014, the shock caused by the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar and the consequent struggle for succession toppled the Taliban's convictions without weakening its operations. The power vacuum - however brief - strengthened tribal ties, breaking up the Taliban front into more or less important groups that began acting independently against the national army and NATO forces. Internal divisions also facilitated the infiltration of the Islamic State (ISIS-Khorasan) and a renewed push by al-Qaeda to secure control of the militias and the territory. New emerging realities, such as AQIS, are now reinforcing their position in southern Afghanistan, while more veteran groups - Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehereek-e-Taliban Pakistan - operate undisturbed along the border of the entire state. In light of the facts, for Trump there are no other options than to reiterate the military commitment with a conspicuous strengthening of the troops already present on the spot. The risks of a Taliban recrudescence are many, while it is now established that Afghanistan and Pakistan have again become a "protected paradise" for several terrorists.

The alarm bell was sounded by General John William Nicholson jr. (Photo), commander of the mission Resolute Support. Of the 13.000 soldiers who today support the Afghan army, 8.400 come from the United States and if the requests of the American commander were accepted they could increase by other 3.000 / 5.000 units. The most serious problem certainly concerns the Taliban, however - as Javid Ahmad points out in an article published in Foreign Affairs - the greatest danger is found in the increasingly marked connivance between the Taliban and elements of theAfghan National Army¹. The progressive American disinterest has contributed to the worsening of relations between the US military and local forces. Cultural differences and differences misunderstanding arising from inappropriate translations or failure to comply with some local customs have, in fact, created a risky and unmanageable climate of tension. Not even a month ago three American soldiers fell victims of the ANA: although the motive remains obscure, there is no doubt about the strong psychological grip that the Taliban exert on the compatriots who have chosen to enlist. These episodes are certainly not new, and years ago they also involved our soldiers betrayed several times by the "friendly fire" of the local army or police.

According to Ahmad's investigation, the infiltration of the Taliban into the ranks of the ANA is favored above all by a sense of general frustration that affects Afghan youth in the presence of Western culture. The Americans - in particular - are accused of belittling their ally, committing a serious error of assessment. Within the walls of a base where local forces are educated, social dynamics coming from dissimilar cultures are intertwined which mistakenly take second place with respect to training. For example, a reproach made by an American officer to a compatriot is not the same as the humiliation that can accuse an Afghan recruit; likewise, problems have emerged even at intermediate command levels. The Pentagon thus had to take new security measures, dictating stricter restrictions on recruitment and more careful surveillance both by American intelligence and local informants.

All this is fertile ground for the Taliban who continue their territorial domination with a suffocating terror propaganda. THE Mujahideen they know who serves in the police or in the army, takes aim at their respective families, threatens and extorts information with violence, nevertheless for some time now a dangerous condescension on the part of the population appears more evident.

The agenda of Donald Trump does not have an "Afghan" political option in the lineup, since at the moment the greatest efforts are aimed at the annihilation of the Islamic State: on the other hand the Taliban - as Vice President Biden recalled in the 2011 - are not in itself the real enemy². Certainly the super bomb dropped by US planes has raised some concerns among the Kabul authorities, who have wondered why NATO is struggling to hit ISIS when the Taliban control the 57% of districts. There is no doubt that identifying who the real enemy is is not simple, but the White House cannot and must not continue to act with indifference and discontinuity. The government of Ashraf Ghani enjoys the allied blessing, but continues to be corrupt, prone to inequality of resources and totally absent on the actual needs of the Afghan people (about read also ...).

As in the 1980s, the war in Afghanistan risks becoming the arena for international issues related to the "Cold War". Scott Worden, director of theAfghanistan and Central Asia Programs argues that Iran and Russia are playing a sneaky game, offering the Taliban a good chance to win the confrontation with Westerners in the long term³. On paper, Moscow's support serves to prevent a strengthening of the Islamic State in Afghanistan, strengthened by the idea that most of the Mujahideen do not love the presence of terrorists. The Kremlin's attitude, whose sole objective is to contain the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, would prove to be short-sighted as arming the Taliban does not affect the groups jihadists, historically skilled exploiters of the confrontation between Moscow and Washington.

The 31 December 2016, the spokesman for the western governorate of the province of Farah officially declared that the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps trained and granted refuge to the Mujahideen, making them cross the border undisturbed⁴. The trespassing of the guerrillas and the arms trade, however, were only the tip of the iceberg: the collaboration between Iranians and the Taliban was realized mainly through the construction of real training camps in Birjand - south of the province of Khorasan and Razavi - and even within Iran. The news released by the governor did not raise particular wonder since, despite the declared enmity between the Taliban and Tehran, the two sides have always maintained a veiled exchange of information in an anti-American function. From the 2014 on, the wind has changed and the specter of the ayatollah no longer flies the stars and stripes flags, but the black one of the Islamic State: Tehran supports the Taliban to prevent the Jihadists of al Baghdadi reinforce the demands of the Sunni communities, particularly those of the province of Sistan and Baluchestan. An alliance therefore of mere convenience, useful only to arm the Taliban and to maintain chaos in all the western sector of Afghanistan.

The truth is that both Moscow and Tehran have no ambitions of control towards Kabul: the establishment of the two countries only aims to remove the specter of ISIS and if this further puts the United States in difficulty, so be it. Afghanistan needs the United States and is one of the few countries not to refuse help; the White House must first develop a credible economic policy that is not undermined by the corruption inherent in the Afghan government itself. The sending of a new contingent is necessary, as well as the elaboration of a common strategic plan to reject the Taliban offensives in the various provinces. However, this can only be done with appropriate measures involving both the military and socio-religious spheres, working towards the creation of an Afghan army whose cultural tradition is respected at 360 °. The Afghans are not Iraqis, they know how to fight, they are brave, they know the rules of war and they are proud of their past: respect for their character is a fundamental step to structure a reliable force. American diplomacy cannot afford to neglect diplomatic relations, striving to set up a negotiating table that also includes the Taliban. Russia, along with Iran and Pakistan, is trying and successfully trying; it would be advisable for Trump to read Peter Hopkirk's masterpiece "The Great Game" carefully, enough to notice that Afghanistan is a theater where, for centuries, actors have played the same part.