At this historical juncture, it does not seem that Defense is a priority in our country. It is true that there is an insistence on concepts such as "dual use" and "resilience", which could give greater effectiveness and efficiency to military spending, but it is equally true that there are further substantial reductions to an already modest defense budget. for himself.
What to do then? Trust in the salvific power of a further defense model, which risks as always to re-propose the existing on a smaller scale, or try to change the paradigm according to which up to now our Defense was conceived?
The experience of the many reformist resolutions that were then frustrated and the current geopolitical context, so profoundly changed compared to that of a few years ago, suggest a more courageous and attentive approach to the interests of our country, starting from the informative principle with which it has always been our Defense was organized and equipped, which can be summed up in "little but everything".
On the basis of this principle, over the years our country has had more or less significant operational capacities throughout the vast spectrum of the military universe. Only the exception is nuclear. For completeness it should be considered that in the years 50 and 60 has strongly pushed to have a national autonomous capacity also in this sector. However, the project had to be shelved following Italy's accession to the Treaty of Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The fact of having been able to keep one foot in the nuclear, although under the aegis of NATO, in some national environments it is still perceived in terms of compensation and compensation status for a capacity that we could have but to which we gave up voluntarily.
To a preliminary analysis the principle of an organized defense with a bit of everything' it may seem inspired by common sense and by proper caution regarding the unpredictability of the future. To this must be added the not secondary consideration that the availability of a complete military instrument in all its components, and therefore prestigious to external eyes, meets the ambitions of the national elite, not just the military ones.
On a somewhat more thoughtful examination, the principle of "little but everything"Instead shows all its limits, now more than ever. The main one is that of resources, given our chronically difficult defense budgets and the meager future prospects mentioned above. In fact, the "little but everything" almost always ended up translating into "too little"To be significant and credible as a real capacity.
Furthermore the "little but everything", And its prefiguring an improbable national military self-sufficiency, clashes with the political reality that sees our country firmly incardinated in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union. What is more is that in both international organizations, Italy has long been in the front row to demand an ever closer political integration and the pooling of military capabilities.
Finally, to evoke a hypothetical military self-sufficiency, not only for Italy but also for the countries of the political space of the Union, is anti-historical. In fact, it refers to an obsolete conception of inter-state relations made up of: defenses tous azimuth, of variable alliances according to convenience, of unrealistic affirmations of national sovereignty that belong to a past history and unfortunately still not completely metabolized. The recurring difficulties of the political project of European integration are testimony to this. To remain in the military field incrustations of this past can be found, for example, in the dislocation of the Departments reflecting historical contrasts. This applies a bit to all the countries of the Union, and to stay in our country, think of the Cameri air base remained operational until recently to defend us from who we do not know well: from France, from Switzerland ... ?
From what has been said, it is therefore clear that it is the primary interest of our country to rethink the historical strategic approach of Defense, progressively abandoning the paradigm of "little but everything"For that of"how much you actually need".
Someone could object to the risks that could derive from an unbalanced military instrument and therefore dependent on the abilities possessed by other Allied countries. These are just concerns that must however be assessed in an overall picture and also in a relative context. First of all, it must be considered that, even if minimal, a certain degree of self-sufficiency would still be maintained in order to cope with national needs, for which the alliances, for various reasons, would not take it upon themselves. Moreover, if it is true that one would be dependent on others for certain military capabilities, the opposite is also true. The mutual military dependence among the countries of the political space of Europe, besides avoiding redundancies, would therefore be a factor of further cohesion between them. Moreover, it would guarantee unilateral initiatives from improbable but not impossible, as history teaches. Ultimately the ever closer European political integration invoked above all by our country, and the pooling of defense capabilities, as well as responding to our national interests, goes in the direction of increased international security.
A reconsideration of the strategic approach of our defense can not, however, neglect the means. It is not about quantity, which is a variable dependent on political choices to allocate a few or so many resources to safety, but to quality.
Even in this rather delicate field, one should use thoughtfulness and shy away from only apparently obvious evaluations of the type: the means must be as advanced as possible ...
Yes, of course, but at what cost and above all to do with it?
So far, the paradigm of reference in terms of choice of means, with rare exceptions, has been to keep pace with the advances of technology, which in the last decades have been particularly accelerated. Fascinated by the new capabilities that day after day, technology was flashing, too little thought was given to costs and we wanted to believe in an idyllic context of increasing capacity at decreasing costs. What unfortunately is not and can not be. The reality is that technology costs, albeit relatively less in relation to the increase in performance it provides.
The paradigm: "technology regardless"Was therefore destined to collide fatally with the limited resources, which even in the most optimistic assumptions of economic growth in the country would always remain in default compared to what is necessary for the acquisition of future means and their maintenance in service. And it is what is happening not only from us but also in other neighboring countries, busy in laborious renovations that more than functionality aim at reducing costs.
It is clear that no anti-technological backtrack is invoked: technology is fundamental in all areas of today's life and above all in the absolutely crucial field of collective security. It is simply intended to underline the need for the future means of our Defense to have a degree of technological sophistication, and therefore of costs, compatible with the resources that are presumably available and, at the same time, strictly cut to the context in which these means will be called to operate.
In terms of technological progress and increasingly sophisticated military means, we have always had the USA as a reference. The US industry has been an inspiration for the national arms industry: our Armed Forces have borrowed from the US organizational schemes, employment concepts and operational visions for increasingly technologically sophisticated means.
The relationship with the US has been and is so close as to make one suspect that sometimes, consciously or not, they have accepted uncritically and made their own of the US operational visions that do not coincide with ours.
In other words, it seems that sometimes it has not been sufficiently reflected on the fact that certain military programs with very high technological sophistication had been launched by the US ally according to a logic that can not be superimposed on ours.
These logics were varied and could range from the historical vocation of that country to maintain and, if anything, increase the technological advantage on the rest of the world, which is the basis of its prosperity and its being Superpower, to more prosaic aspects such as appetites of the military-industrial complex, already stigmatized in the distant 1961 by President Eisenhower in leaving the presidency. The decisive fact, however, is that these military programs were and are designed by the Superpower for the possible comparison with other major powers (China, India, Russia ...) and certainly not with minor realities such as the countries of the southern side of the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the wider Middle East, which fall within our national horizon.
Excluding the case of self-defense contemplated by the Atlantic Treaty, it is difficult to imagine for Italy an actor's role in a possible future global comparison between primary powers. We weigh the constraints placed by our Constitution (photo *) and it is crucial to choose our country not to exceed the geopolitical scope of Mediterranean regional power.
The same industrial collaboration between US and national industry in certain programs with high technological sophistication, even if started with the best intentions, often clashed with insurmountable difficulties. The industrial comparison that should have been open and based exclusively on technical and economic parameters, often was not. We have weighed against us an objective differential in size between the US and the Italian industry that has often seen us as losers in terms of costs. Moreover, the secrecy constraints posed by the US Congress on many parts of the projects, which should remain of exclusive American knowledge, have excluded us a priori from the collaboration for the most interesting parts of the projects.
It is not a matter of upsetting the existing or even of questioning the transatlantic relationship that has brought great benefits in terms of innovation and collective security: it is simply a matter of adopting a pragmatic approach to Defense that will come that look at those who are the true interests of our country. The paradigm of "little but everything"With which our defense has been organized so far, it clearly no longer responds to our interests. As well as the paradigm of technology regardless it needs to be related to our economic prospects, to the geopolitical context of our interest and not least to the potential of our defense industry.
It is a dutiful exercise of realism and clarity that can no longer be postponed.
(photo: US Army / web / Armée de l'Air / US Marine Corps / US DoD / Lockheed Martin / Bundesarchiv)
* the images are chosen by the head editor
