I have always believed that military magazines were nothing more than boring collections of tedious and monotonous items. The rare times I found myself leafing through one, after taking a brief look at the article index, I dismissed it with disinterest. One day, however, I put myself in the head to learn French, and wanting to read something military to learn some specific word, I bought a French magazine, one by chance, the first I found on the Internet after typing revue militaire françAise. He was called DSI (Défense and Sécurité Internationale). I was skeptical at first, but I started reading it anyway. Today I can say with confidence that the day I opened that magazine is one of the most important moments of my short military life. I was fascinated by that publication: in the editorial, the director of the periodical invited us to reflect on the effectiveness of the operation Sentinelle, (our Safe Roads), highlighting its positive and negative aspects; soon after, another article by the same author illustrated the current situation of the war in Yemen, analyzing the factions in the field and proposing some considerations on what could have happened in the next months of war; a few pages later, here is a very interesting article by a colonel of the French navy, who, for example, taking the American intervention in Afghanistan, underlined how difficult it was for today's modern armies to end a conflict once it started1.
Needless to say, that same evening I subscribed to that publication, as well as to another French magazine and a couple of Italians. There is no day today when I don't spend at least half an hour reading these newspapers.
From the day I read my first military magazine, my interest in defense and armed issues has only increased. Gradually, I began to understand how important these tools were for military institutions. These magazines are in fact a very useful means to promote the circulation of ideas and debate within the Armed Forces. This contributes decisively to the development of critical thinking and fosters change and innovation. All this is essential for the military instrument to keep up with the times and constantly adapt to the changing scenario in which it must operate. Moreover, these magazines represent an effective aid for the study and analysis of military history, which has always been a source of motivation and motivation for us soldiers.
CULTURAL VIVACITY AND INTELLECTUAL CURIOSITY
A deadly threat to the armed forces has always been inherent in their very structure. Being hierarchical organizations founded on the discipline, there is the risk that the military leaders fight up to stifle the proliferation of ideas and opinions in the lower ranks. Conformism, the mentality of the "It's always been like that", they are deadly enemies of military institutions. The fascist regime, which had begun to suppress freedom of debate since the mid-1990s, gave us the proof of this: "all the writings of the officers in a technical or political manner should be subjected to the prior censorship of army corps commanders "2, it drastically limited the exchange of ideas in the armed forces, with the results we all know. Italy presented itself at the dawn of the Second World War with an old and surpassed army.
Not least were the French cousins: the army of post-Napoleonic France assimilated the Prussian model, characterized at that time by a firm rigor against the exchange of ideas within the armed forces. As a result, statements like "Réfléchir c'est désobéir" (to reflect means to disobey) became recurrent in the major states. Many historians believe that this tendency to fight any attempt at debate and internal reflection by the French military summits was one of the decisive elements that led to the tragic defeat against the Prussian troops led by Helmuth von Moltke in the 18703.
On the contrary, it was the situation in the German army of the early 20th century 20: the chief of staff, Hans (Johannes Friedrich Leopold) von Seeckt, enthusiastically encouraged the exchange of ideas and confrontation and he always listened carefully the opinions of the officers at his command. His action positively influenced the very effective preparation of the Wermacht on the eve of the Second World War.
The cultural debate and the lively exchange of ideas and opinions within the armed forces is therefore essential because it stimulates critical sense, contributes to developing a strong creative capacity and prevents the prevalence of intellectual conformity. It is no coincidence that a characteristic that all the great military leaders of the past share is that of having been great readers and great reformers: reading invites reflection, promotes the ability to think and fosters the development of new ideas.
This discourse is especially valid for young commanders. By actively participating in the debate they can develop critical thinking that allows them to objectively assess situations, free from prejudices or personal impressions; to question the validity of the statements that are proposed to them, without accepting them a priori; to know how to question a topic and know how to propose a solution by applying a coherent reasoning.
INNOVATION AND CHANGE
The hierarchical structure typical of the military institution makes it the victim of a paradox: if on the one hand it is an institution that needs a continuous renewal, necessary to keep up with an ever-changing environment, it is also true that it is always a conservative institution, refractory to change. The hierarchical structure of the armed forces, however, can not be waived: it is vital for an army to function. However, it is necessary to avoid that conservatism inherent in the armed forces turns into a total closure and a blind adversity towards everything that leads to change and innovation. Once again, history gives us reason, since there are many cases that show how serious the consequences were every time the tendency to immobility prevailed over change.
One example above all is that of the French defeat of the 1940: it was due to mistakes made by the military leaders during the campaign, but above all to the ineffective adaptation of the military strategy of the army. It had in fact been prepared to fight another First World War, and when put to the test by modern German armored formations it was overwhelmed in less than two months.
Even the Italian Army, then led by Badoglio, a man of wit but excessively conservative mentality and still too tied to the paradigm of trench warfare, presented himself at the dawn of the Second World War with tactics and anachronistic doctrines for those times4.
And what about the English instead? At the dawn of the twentieth century, the English navy was in very poor condition, managed as it was by stubborn admirals, too tied to traditions and focused more on the state of cleanliness of the bridge than on the efficiency of the shot. It took a man of genius like Jacky Fisher, not wrongly considered the greatest English Admiral after Nelson, to turn the British navy into an infallible war tool. During his fifty years of career, as a cadet in charge of the Navy, Fisher fought for change, strenuously fighting the conformist and conservative mentality of the British admirals, finally managing to reach the top of the navy and impose the necessary reforms. The excellent state of preparation with which the British navy presented itself at the outbreak of the Great War was mainly due to Jacky Fisher5.
To win its conservative spirit, the Army must promote a cultural debate within it, stimulate the creative capacity of its members, encourage scientific research and promote critical thinking. If commanders do not feel this need, the younger ones must be active gregarious and call for change. The process of innovation can not be alone top-down, on the contrary, it must start from the bottom. Young leaders must feel the need for change and take an active part in the process of renewing the armed forces. Progress has always been the attribute of young people. No doubt the older generation who holds the highest offices has an experience that a young officer does not possess. However, the experience has advantages and disadvantages. If on the one hand it allows us to have a more elaborate and fair view of the military organization and therefore to be able to discern between what is achievable and what is not, on the other it risks creating a sort of fog that prevents us from see alternative roads to those we have foreshadowed. On the other hand, the ability of young people to think outside the box and be creative risks ending up proposing impractical ideas, as generated by people who do not have the necessary experience to judge what is actually translatable into reality and what is pure fantasy. The solution is therefore in a compromise. The older class must not close in on itself; on the contrary, it must promote creativity and the spirit of change in the younger generation and be ready to evaluate its proposals. The experience must essentially serve to implement the genius of the new generation6.
MILITARY HISTORY
A final consideration concerns military history. The articles dealing with military history are most often dismissed with indifference by the generic reader, as if they were a mere tampon, a bunch of sentences thrown there by some old historian to fill the final pages of the magazine. Well, in my opinion there is nothing more wrong. History is Magistra vitae, it is for real, especially for us military. From Napoleon to Clausewitz to Eisenhower in Montgomery, all the military leaders who have preceded us have exalted the importance and the advantages offered by the study of history, especially for those who practice the military profession. Napoleon, whose military genius is also the result of numerous readings and reflections favored by the life of the barracks that led to the 17957, he stated: "To be a great leader you need to become a student of success and the best way I know is to know the history and biography of successful men. So their experience becomes my experience "8. Even the most famous of military historians, Clausewitz, confirms what has been said, saying: "history is undoubtedly the basis of the art of war "9. What derives these enormous benefits that military history brings to those who study it? From the very nature of war: it does not depend on the methods by which it is fought, since it is linked to the nature of man, which does not change. Change the context, change parts, change weapons, but it is always the man who fights. In a sense, every war fought today resembles, in some way, those of the past. Not by chance the Peloponnesian War Thucydides, despite being written over two thousand years ago, is still studied at many military institutions10.
The study of history is also essential to promote innovation and change. An effective analysis of the "lessons learned" makes it possible to correct mistakes made in the past and to avoid repeating them. Be careful though. This tool must be used with caution. Eisenhower said "Neither a brave man nor a wise man would sit on the tracks of history waiting for the train of the future to invest them"11. What he wanted to say with this statement is that while the study of history can be effective in correcting errors that led to a heavy defeat, in the case of a success it can turn out to be a double edged sword, reinforcing in we theories and concepts to the point of obscuring our vision and preventing change. The example of the recent wars conducted by the United States must make us think: the US military leaders, convinced of the effectiveness of their doctrine and their dogmas, which had ensured their success during the Gulf War, proved unable to fight wars counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Finally we must point out another benefit that we can obtain from the study of our military history. The reading of the military vicissitudes of those who have preceded us is a source to draw upon in order to strengthen and reanimate in us the typical values of being military: honor, discipline, sense of duty, courage, loyalty. The reading of the heroic deeds of our predecessors must help us to understand the weight that we military bear on our shoulders: that of living up to those who have fallen to defend our country. An army without these values is destined to succumb.
I believe it is essential to encourage all the military, especially the younger ones, to actively contribute to the development of an internal armed debate. Collaborating through the creation of articles we encourage others to do so and we contribute to keep the circulation of ideas alive. Acting as a platform for debate for the leaders of the future, military magazines can make a decisive contribution to the development of our Armed Forces.
Matteo Mazziotti of Celso
1 Wars contre l'état islamique, les derniers coups de boutoirs ?, in DSI, N.130.
2 Rochat, The Italian wars, 1935-1943, Einaudi, Turin, 2008, pp. 171-172.
3 See Girardet R., The société militaire de 1815 à nos jours, Perrin, Paris 1998, and Serman W., Les officiers français dans la nation, 1848-1914, Aubier Montaigne, Paris, 1982.
4 Rochat, The Italian wars, 1935-1943, Einaudi, Turin, 2008, and Gooch J., The Italian army in the second world war, LEG Editions, Gorizia, 2016.
5 Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought. Britain, Germany and the coming of the great war, PIMLICO, London, 1993.
6 Nina Kollars, Genius and mastery in military innovation, in Survival, Vol. 59 n.2.
7 Tulard J., Napoléon chef de guerre, Tallandier, Paris, 2015.
8 Napoleon Bonaparte, Political, moral and war aphorisms, Newton & Compton Publishers, Rome, 2002.
9 Von Clauewitz C., Of the war, Mondadori, Rome, 1997.
11 Eisenhower D., "Time Magazine", Oct. 6, 1952.
(photo: US Army)
