The yellow-green foreign policy: why do we always look like the "usual Italians"?

The membership of the Atlantic Alliance, with the United States of America as a privileged ally, with an openness to Russia, to be perceived not as a threat but as an economic and commercial partner. In this regard, it is appropriate to immediately withdraw sanctions imposed on Russia, to be rehabilitated as a strategic interlocutor for the resolution of regional crises (Syria, Libya, Yemen). It is also necessary to refocus the attention on the Southern front. Not constituting Russia as a military threat, but a potential partner for NATO and the EU, it is in the Mediterranean that more factors of instability are gathered, such as: Islamic extremism, migratory flows uncontrolled, with consequent tensions between the regional powers. In the area Italy should intensify its cooperation with the countries committed against terrorism.

By now, even the children know the government program that Lega and Cinque Stelle intend to underwrite in the coming days. What we have placed at the head of the Present is a part of the article relating to foreign policy. The writer does not intend to go into the assessment of the genesis and legitimacy of international sanctions against the Russian Federation¹ and the related counter-sanctions: he has his opinions and keeps them to himself. For this reason, he will limit himself, as it were, to throwing four pebbles in the pigeon house of Italian politics, exposing evaluations on the concrete consequences of the implementation of the above mentioned by the yellow-green majority.

• The withdrawal of sanctions by the Italian is in the words of the document "immediate", but also one-sided, it seems to understand. These three words (withdrawal, immediate and one-sided) are, unfortunately, the stigmata of the foreign policy and strategic decisions of united Italy ... We want to remember, limiting ourselves only to the first half of the twentieth century, the abandonment of the Triple Alliance in 1914, the refusal to follow the western powers in the 1935, the abandonment of independent Austria in the 1938, the armistice with the Allies in the 1943 ... It seems almost to hear the words that echo in the western chancelleries: "They are the usual Italians". Yes, because on this point the new (possible) future Government does not ask to re-discuss the method of imposing sanctions (in the case of the nerve gas crisis, there were enough elements at least to take time and request a position of the European Union, also with procrastinatory purposes) or to want to take the lead of a skeptical country's alignment towards this instrument of pressure: it takes them away. Sic et simpliciter.

• The second stone comes from the first: it seems to understand that the removal of sanctions - and the appointment of first-level partners - is an act of liberality of Italy to the Russian Federation, in the sense that there is no talk of starting negotiations or to set conditions (for example, in relation to not "small" issues such as the Minsk agreements or the legitimacy of the annexation of Crimea, which involve other sovereign countries, who might be a bit ... take it²). Simply, they are canceled with a sponge four years of conflict and discussion. Now, as unjust or disproportionate sanctions can be considered, it is not clear why we do not speak, at least, about the removal of counter-sanctions: Salvini spoke with Putin during the visits to Moscow and knows for sure that they will be removed in selective way in our favor? Or grillini and leaguers suppose it, because in the end, Russia will end up making us the favor? Have they evaluated any "indecent" public proposals from Russia and how much could they annoy the allies, even the "privileged" ones? And what about the reactions of the other "lieutenants"?

• And with this we move on to the third stone: this act of liberality so immediate and spontaneous, how much will it cost us? Yes, because this break of the Western front against the Russian Federation will not be greeted by Paris, London, Washington and Berlin as a "Italianata" with a shrug. In the case of the United Kingdom, it will at least be perceived as a serious offense, given that His Majesty's Government complains that Russia has carried out an act of war or state terrorism against it. Serious stuff: someone explain it to our new rulers ... In Washington, how will President Donald Trump react, one who is not famous for reasonableness and moderation? It will still allow us to sit at the NATO table and contribute to our decisions³? You will say: they have Turkey do what they want. Yes, but Ankara has the second armed forces of Europe and exercises a strategic weight that we have dreamed of for eighty years ... We are sure that Americans will remember the friendly visits and consider reassurance that they are considered "privileged allies"? How much strategic space will France gain to our detriment from our immediate and one-sided "retreat"? How will Germany react? I ask this above all because these four countries account for almost half of our exports. If we remove the sanctions in Moscow in this way and with the justification that damage the Italian trade, are we really sure that, in a world shaken by tariff wars, Italian companies will not be the victims? I say it frankly: Russia could not, even if you would, replace the US, UK, France and Germany as a buyer of our consumer goods, armaments, vehicles and all the good and the good that we sell around the world.

• Finally, there is a warm invitation to Moscow to interfere in the issues of Yemen and Libya. Not even the Sisi Egypt, strategic partner of Moscow, had gone so far. On the contrary ... One wonders if the person who drafted this program has at least an idea of ​​the consequences of Moscow's intervention in the Saudi Arabian backyard, Yemen. The writer believes that Putin does not even want to know where Yemen is and if something is happening on the spot. Libya and the Russians: if he could read this program, Gaddafi would turn in his grave, wherever it is. But more than anything else, one wonders what they think, reading it, the leaders of China, Egypt and Algeria (three strategic partners at least at the level of Moscow, for Italy: think of their massive gas supplies ...) willingness to support a Russian intervention in Sirte. All this, net of the different opinions of the warring factions in our former colony ... But these are not questions that someone has asked: the Mediterranean for someone is just a highway for the new barbarians in which to make the Russian gendarme intervene.

What I recommend, to learn to manage relations with Moscow, is to move from Ankara and Budapest for an accelerated lesson. It's urgent…