The situation in Iraq a few days after the killing of Qassem Soleimani seems to be evolving in an unfavorable direction for the USA.
In Iraq, popular reaction to an act (perceived as a violation of national sovereignty) seems to have strengthened the bond of vast fringes of the Iraqi population (moreover two thirds of Shiite confession) with Tehran. Link that until a few days ago many contested as "interference", but which today no longer feel openly criticizing.
In Iran, it seems that the killing of an Iranian (moreover national hero) by a foreign power considered by many to be "imperialist" and "crusader" had as a first effect precisely the recompaction around government power (power that recently it had been undermined by the country's economic crisis and protests triggered by the rise in fuel prices and suppressed in the blood).
The Iraqi parliament unanimously asked for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the territory (meaning, of course, only those of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and NATO, a force that is also actually US-led in Iraq) . The fact that only slightly more than half of the parliamentarians participated in the vote, moreover only those of Shiite faith and that the parliament's decision is not in itself formally binding (requesting then that the government take the necessary diplomatic steps towards the USA and NATO) it is irrelevant. It is the political signal that counts!
From January 5 the soldiers of the anti-ISIS coalition and NATO are no longer welcome and are officially "occupation forces", with all that this entails for their security, for their international legitimacy (of which the USA can give a damn. but not many European allies, Germany and Italy in the first place) and for the same possibility of fulfilling their mandate.
On the other hand, it is clear that help to counter the resurgence of Sunni Islamist terrorism could easily be requested by the Government of Baghdad to Iran and Russia, allowing, even at the military level, a consolidation of control of Tehran (and Moscow) from Iran up to the Mediterranean along a "Shiite crescent" that embraces Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
As expected, Iran has said it will step out of the nuclear deal (JCPOA). It will therefore be able to proceed more freely and in the light of the sun also in this sector, which has always been identified by the USA as a global geo-political risk factor.
The threats against American interests (not only in the Middle East) do not come today only from Tehran, but from the whole Shiite world. Threats in relation to which the "time" factor should not be underestimated. In fact, Trump must hurry and must provide his public opinion (on the domestic front) and his allies (on the international front) signs of victory before the campaign for re-election. The Tehran regime is not bound by these immediate deadlines. On the other hand, the Ayatollahs have been in power for 40 years and can wait to hit when and where it hurts the most (maybe only a few days before the next US election). Furthermore, the US threat to hit 52 Iranian sites (among which there would appear to be Islamic historical and religious sites) could lead to an anti-American reaction by the whole Shiite world (for example in Afghanistan, where there is a substantial Shiite component) and perhaps a large part of the entire Islamic world, including non-Shiites.
So… is everything going wrong for the USA? Or, Trump acted on impulse (thinking he was a new Schwarzenegger or a Bruce Willis who eliminates the "bad guys" of the world) and did not calculate the consequences of what he intended to do? Or is this initiative part of a larger and more articulated plan and, if so, which one? Difficult to say.
The unpredictable way of the American president to take even shocking initiatives on an international level, his taste for risk and for the spectacular plot twist, the need to distract internal public opinion by offering him the "scalp of an enemy" in a moment politically difficult (for example, the request for impeachment, which in any case will have very little chance of passing to the Senate) or in view of the imminent presidential elections: all this could suggest an impromptu and insufficiently thought out decision. The fact that Trump does not use the conceptual support of his collaborators (or that he replaces them without hesitation if they are not 100% in line with him) supports the first hypothesis.
However, there may be more. The US may have acted to "please" some of their allies in the region who, for different reasons, neither wanted nor could expose themselves directly (Israel and Saudi Arabia). Or there may be an even broader design.
It is clear that, thanks also to the errors and discontinuity of US policy in the past twenty years, the whole range from Iran to the Mediterranean is nowadays not very stable and definitely in crisis. Across the region (apart from Israel) the US has lost much of the influence it previously enjoyed. Eliminated (right from the USA!) The main bulwark that contrasted Iranian expansionism towards the Mediterranean (Saddam), the pro-Iranian militias have assumed in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon a role that goes beyond the purely military one and a credibility (especially Lebanon and Syria) now hardly scratched.
US foreign policy has alternated, in an eternal yo-yo, acts of interventionism with declarations of withdrawal from the region, on the basis of timing dictated by domestic electoral deadlines rather than by a long-term geo-political vision. This left room for Russia to establish itself as a true reliable superpower to refer to and to two regional powers, historically competing but today both linked to Moscow (essentially Iran and to a lesser extent Turkey), to expand their role in the region.
It is conceivable that, for the sole purpose of avoiding a normalization process in which the US would no longer play a role, Trump decided to "blow the table" (further destabilizing the region) to avoid the consolidation of a Moscow - Tehran combination in control of the region?
In this context, even the foreseeable Iranian withdrawal from the JCPOA could be inserted as a piece of a puzzle expertly preordained in Washington (or Langley). In fact, despite efforts by the EU to artificially keep it alive, the deal was already de facto dead, given Trump's exit in 2018 and the imposition of economic sanctions on businesses that continued to do business with Tehran. It was obvious that at this point Iran would also denounce the agreement. On the other hand, this is probably what the US hawks have always wanted, so that they can justify actions, including military and not only commercial, against Tehran, which remains for many Americans the worst of the "rogue states".
It is true that Soleimani was a danger and was a well-known person, not only for his undoubted personal abilities, but also and above all for the absolute lack of scruples in conducting "his" war against the West. Surely there was him (as an arm) behind the attacks against the oil tankers in the Gulf and against the Saudi energy infrastructure. However, the political decision went higher. In fact, Soleimani, although he acted with great autonomy, was an Iranian general who implemented the directives that came from Tehran and in particular from President Hassan Rohuani. His successor Esmaail Ghaani will proceed along the same lines as Soleimani, but in an even more ruthless way because "justified" by what Iran all (even opponents of the Ayatollah regime) consider a "Yankee imperialist crime".
Soleimani could be eliminated if you wanted in so many ways. It was taken for granted that the killing of one of the most important men of the Iranian regime in such a striking way would in fact oblige Tehran to respond in an even more striking way.
So, one might wonder if provoking such an Iranian reaction was Trump's real goal. The more this reaction will be bloody, the more the American administration will be able to justify - a posteriori - the killing of Soleimani (whose legal legitimacy is disputed by more than one) by asserting: "given what type of offenders it was" and the more will justify future military actions against Iran or Iranian interests in the world.
Nor can it be excluded that Tehran will respond with new attacks on ships in the Gulf. However, this would offer a useful justification to the USA, Saudi Arabia and others for a large-scale attack, which Tehran would probably not be able to sustain.
Moreover, rather than resorting to classic military operations, Tehran is likely to resort to forms of hybrid warfare, with recourse to terrorist actions and also to cyber attacks. Attacks that it could lead to others (Shiite armed groups, hackers, etc.), then denying responsibility for such actions. Tehran will be able to hit interests not only of the US but also of its allies in the Middle East region and beyond. Possible targets besides Israel could be Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Which once again would provide legitimacy for a US reaction against Iran.
Trump's move obviously puts European countries in difficulty, who had not previously liked previous anti-Iranian White House initiatives. Not supporting Trump, however, will undoubtedly exacerbate the divergences between the US and the EU. Obviously this divergence of views and the inevitable US retaliation against "non-aligned allies", to which Trump has accustomed us, will make the "trans-atlantic link" on which the Atlantic Alliance should stand ("trans-atlantic link" on the whose solidity today only Jens Stoltenberg seems to bet). Furthermore, for the EU (and in particular for Italy, France and Greece) the evolution of the Libyan crisis is much more important than a possible Washington-Tehran crisis.
A "collateral victim" of this divergence of views will also be the credibility and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. But we are really sure that Trump does not intend to put pressure on the "old" NATO in order to have further motivation to get rid of an Alliance that, by virtue of his obligations to mutual consultation to decisions by unanimity, to him ( like George W. Bush before him)
Certainly, however, for Iraq, already battered by 16 years of civil war, a long period in which geo-political battles between the USA and Iran will be played on its territory (with the involvement of Russia, Saudi Arabia and Israel)
All that is happening in these hours was planned and wanted in Washington and it was felt that it was necessary to sacrifice Iraq in order to allow for a massive US anti-Iranian military response aimed at restoring US influence in a region where (due to of a long hiding of Uncle Sam) is a control of Tehran and Moscow (with Beijing in the distance) being imposed?
Or was the US move just the risky result of a decision dictated by domestic political needs rather than geopolitical goals, the effects of which got out of Trump's hand?
Difficult to say. Perhaps the answer, however disappointing, is the second.
Only history can tell us which of the two options is true.
But, personally, I would have more confidence in a superpower that put in place a dangerous, unscrupulous and Machiavellian maneuver, certainly regrettable from an ethical point of view, rather than in a super-power that moves on the international chessboard like the classic elephant in glassware, creating destabilization only for domestic electoral needs and without an accurate prediction of the consequences of one's actions.
Photo: US Army / IRNA
