More about recent episodes in southern Lebanon ...

23/11/15

Dear Director, I followed the exchange of messages relating to the recent incidents in Lebanon (the letter entitled 'If the soldiers of the army hide and flee, what will become of us?' and the subsequent response of the Head of Communications Office of SMD) and I can't help but notice that, even with the best intentions, who on the one hand who on the other continues to 'miss the target'.

In a nutshell we discuss 'rules of engagement' to say that our country does not support soldiers enough in the performance of their duties (which are carried out in the interests of the country itself), or of the value that the work of our military has (our work, being of the family too) and the appreciation we receive abroad and at home. What we should do instead is to ask ourselves if we are not doing something wrong in southern Lebanon.

I have been there, I spent almost a year and a half there (divided into two long mission periods), to carry out an assignment that deals with the 'understanding' of the situation on the ground, in contact with the population (including the militias present in that area). In short, what we have found, with operators and colleagues (in the 2008,2009 and 2011) is that we often create problems for ourselves.

Let me explain: South Lebanon is in fact a 'special statute' region both from a Lebanese internal political point of view and from that of foreign and international politics. The UNIFIL mission is there to ensure the demilitarization of the area, the non-presence of weapons and weapons systems and compliance with international agreements (eg the overflight prohibition). The man in the street of southern Lebanon on average knows very well the 1701 resolution (perhaps due to indoctrination rather than culture) and it happened to us more than once to receive questions about it, not requests for clarification but deliberately aimed at ascertaining that we we were aware of. Jointly, one of the most frequently presented observations was that on the 'invasive' behavior of the UNIFIL military. This observation was all the more frequent the closer the contingent in question was to NATO and NATO missions.

What I am trying to say is that we have found a tendency for the Lebanese to complain especially about the contingents of nations that simultaneously participated in other conflicts. The complaints concerned above all the 'neighborhood policeman' attitude that the military would have had in those contexts - for example going to 'ficcanasare' among the houses (perceived as an invasion of privacy) or performing patrols in urban areas during the night hours - a modus operandi tolerated in Afghanistan, intolerable in Lebanon. Of course, one could argue that the complaints were intended to hide some unlawful activity. The legitimacy of some of our operations, in line (or not) with the mandate assigned to UNIFIL by the UNSCR 1701 can be discussed, the opportunity (or inappropriateness) of certain (our) gestures is instead evident.

As rightly recalled by the SMD Head of PI Office, Lebanon is a difficult context in which complexity also derives from the evolved state and parastatal structure that characterizes society. We cannot think of applying Afghani techniques, procedures and mentality in Lebanon. Our professionalism must be explicit in the ability to understand the context in which we operate, identify the limits and operate by exploiting them rather than suffering them. The key is in cultural understanding rather than in the (also important) capacity in the handling of weapons.

A monkey can shoot with a Kalashnikov, but it takes a (culturally intelligent) man to negotiate solutions in the "difficult context".

RS