The entrance to the tank on the battlefields

(To Tiziano Ciocchetti)
28/12/17

The medium that was to become universally known as a tank was practically imposed, to the armies engaged on the western front of the First World War, just by the nature of the terrain on which the opposing sides had to fight.

With the opening of the second year of the war, the clash had practically assumed the appearance of a conflict of attrition. The German and French and British forces faced each other in northern France on a strip of land swept by the volume of fire delivered by machine guns and the power of artillery.

Opposing armies conducted mainly garrison activities in their trenches and from time to time made an effort to overcome the stalemate, organizing mass attacks, announced and supported by huge concentrations of artillery fire. However, all this did not bring significant results on a tactical level. Every time the attempt was made, from either side, to cross the strip of contended land and known as no man's land, the result was an immense carnage.

Independent of the intensity and precision of the artillery preparation shot, there was always a flank from which fire of machine-guns could have come, which survived the bombardment. It seemed to the Commandants that there was no way out of this desperate situation and that all they could devise was to make the fire of the artillery more and more intense and concentrated. However, the machine-gun nests continued to survive and the troop's blood toll increased.

The answer was a simple layer of steel sheets and some light weapons on board that motor vehicle which is now known as the tank.

The new vehicle had to be able to cross the devastated terrain of the French countryside between the opposing sides, to overcome the trench lines in which the infantry was positioned and then to go beyond the obstacles in the open field. Once the tanks had arrived there - the theoreticians argued - it could restart the war of movement and the destruction of the enemy.

The idea of ​​the armored earth vessel was already well established in the military literature before the 1914 and proposals for building such a vehicle had been developed in almost all the Major States of the European armies. However, none of these proposals was taken into consideration for the simple reason that there seemed to be no need for such a means, but after the 1914 the situation changed. Some forward-looking officials realized that the existing operating conditions on the western front could only be addressed by the use of mobile armored vehicles.

One such military was Colonel ED Swinton who used his command position in order to arouse the interest of government officials in the new weapon. Following this, a commission was set up at the British War Office with the aim of examining the proposals in place, however the work did not lead to any results. The intervention of the Royal Navy proved decisive, thanks to the experience of armored warfare made in 1914 by the armored car squadrons of the British air and naval service. The result was a number of vehicle development proposals big wheel, ie equipped with large diameter wheels capable of crossing the entrenched fields. Winston Churchill personally intervened and created what was called the Landship Committee (committee of the terrestrial ship) because it studied the way to operate on the French ground. The construction of the large-wheeled vehicle was then authorized, while the committee's attention was drawn to another named vehicle pedrail which was provided with a wide central track above which a motor was installed.

Also for this vehicle the construction of prototypes was ordered to be tested and, in the meantime, other vehicles equipped with tracks similar to the caterpillar type tractor were ordered for experimental activities.

Several vehicles were then built, including the Killen-Strait tractor, the tractor called Bullock Creep Grip and another vehicle, which fitted the wheels of the Daimler-Foster tractor and which had been built specifically for trench clearance, as indicated by its designation Tritton Trench-crossing Machine. None of these means was considered suitable for the task and the same applies to the Pedrail, which proved too cumbersome to be able to overcome the rough terrain.

Instead the tractor Bullock seemed to promise better results and two experimental copies were ordered from the United States. The Bullock, essentially an agricultural tractor, certainly could not be converted into a military vehicle, but its tracks offered the possibility to cross the muddy ground and the cross-linked. It was decided to instruct William Tritton of Lincoln's Foster to redesign the tractor. He had already designed the Tritton Trench-crossing Machine after the abandonment of the project big wheel.

Using tracks and suspensions of the Bullock, Tritton built the vehicle Lincoln No. 1. The project turned out to be much more promising than the previous ones, even though the track was too small and gave constant annoyance. A new track was then mounted and some other improvements were made, and in December the 1915 was born the vehicle named later small Willie (Little Willie). This was the first British tank, albeit at that time the name tank had not yet been adopted.

It seemed that Little Willie could satisfy the requests of the Landship Committee, but the vehicle was still too unstable and not yet able to overcome the obstacles, so that Lieutenant WG Wilson, who had already worked with Tritton on the order of the committee, conceived the idea of ​​considerably widening the tracks making them turn all around a hull that assumed the rhomboidal shape (lozenge shape), characteristic of the wagons of the First World War. The Little Willie's caisson hull had to be modified accordingly to adapt it to the new profile of the tracks, and so the mother (mother) wagon arrived.

When the Mother appeared, the British War Minister showed new interest in the problem and, after the demonstrations at Hatfield Park in January of the 1916, approved the project.

Il Landship Committee it was reorganized and became the Tank Supply Commitee (Tank Supply Committee) because, in an attempt to hide the role assigned to the new vehicle, the code name of Water Carrier ("water transport means") and following that of Tank ("tank"); the latter was the name that remained.

Il Mother it was the prototype of the vehicle that later became the Mk I wagon. In February of the 1916 the British War Ministry made an order of 100 specimens: the tank was born.

When the Mk I tanks entered the Somme area for the first time, in the fall of the 1916, they were not prepared either from the crews' point of view or from the mechanical efficiency point of view. Furthermore they were not used appropriately; deployed in random order, one or two at a time, should have been the decisive blow for the breakthrough of the German lines.

In order to do so, they would have had to cross a terrain that was bombarded with artillery bombardments and so soft that they would swallow entire artillery convoys without any trace of them. To complete the work, they would have to wade through rivers and streams of water. Unfortunately, the military doctrine of the time was mainly based on the concept of attrition and the tanks represented nothing but another weapon at hand for the application of it.

In the last days of the 1916, the Somme offensive stopped in a bloody way: the great opportunity to use the wagons was wasted in order to obtain a decisive result, and the Germans were already examining the few tanks captured in order to develop a special piercing bullet (called K and characterized by a tungsten ogive) for the Mauser-Gewehr 98 rifle of the caliber 7,92x57. In fact, when the Mk I wagons and the few new Mk IIs came back into action on the snowy ground at Bullecourt, the 11 April 1917, the new drilling bullets put some of them out of action. From then on, every German soldier received at least five shots of the new K-ammunition and the machine-gunners had many more.

The appearance of the new ammunition did not go unnoticed by the British General Staff, who already had some ideas about the future improvements to be made to the tanks after the experiences paid dearly in the 1916.

One of these improvements concerned the revision of the fixing of the armor to the hull. In fact, even the conventional projectiles, on impact with the armor, often penetrated inside the hull, spreading metal splinters and causing serious injuries to the crew.

The structure of the new Mk IV wagon, combined with a thicker armor impervious to K strokes, promised far better protection; combined with the improved internal ventilation, it rendered the life of the crew less disadvantaged. The experience of the first battle in which the Mk IV tanks participated seemed to confirm these improvements.

The Mk IV was employed at Messines on the 7 June 1917. Messines was one of those massive battles, planned by the British, according to the mass of semi-trained infantry of an army of citizens, who showed little flexibility in learning new military specializations.

The battle began with the canonical artillery preparation roll, which was followed by a relative novelty: the simultaneous detonation of a series of large mines under the German trenches. The wagons were to be used in their usual role: accompanying the infantry to destroy the nests of enemy machine-guns.

The use of 76 new Mk IV, 72 wagons of which were already on the front line, ready to go into action, was expected from the night before. It was normal procedure for the wagons to be taken to the starting line at night. The operation involved a tiring preparation and not a few difficulties as the crews, who already had a very limited view, in the dark obviously operated in worse conditions. The noise of the engines prevented voice communications, so that usually there was no other possibility than to arrange, very in advance, the indicators, such as ribbons or white poles, to signal the itineraries. The crews therefore had to rely on such indications or on guides that marched on foot in front of the wagons, but most of the time the guides did not show up at all or, if they were tapes, they had been destroyed by the artillery fire.

Under these conditions the crews had to navigate with the aid of large-scale maps, a special wagon compass and their intuition.

After some time, the crews of the wagons became very skilled in finding their own way, so that the infantry became accustomed to rely on them to follow their own, while the opposite should have happened.

At Messines it did not happen differently; Once the mines were detonated, the wagons moved heavily to attack, along with the waves of infantry. The first lines were torn from the German infantry, dazed by the explosion and the shock of the mines; the wagons went on awkwardly, as usual, towards the next goal. An Mk IV earned many honors for the destruction of machine gun posts in the village of Wytschaete, which made things easier for the infantry. Some wagons were later mired in the muddy ground that covered the whole area of ​​the battle, but could still play the role of protected stationary artillery posts, delivering accompanying fire.

The battle then gradually went off: the wagons had been assigned secondary objectives, in an operation that altogether had limited tactical objectives. In general they had proven effective and the new armor of the MK IV had resisted the perforating ammunition K.

After that, Mk IV tanks were used to provide support in two circumstances of little importance before their great opportunity presented itself.

For some time the superior carristi officers insisted on the General Staff to allow them to fight in favorable conditions to the wagons, on ground not overturned by repeated artillery bombardments and by means grouped in masses to crush any resistance. In the end the tankers had this opportunity and they fought the epic battle that history recalls as the battle of Cambrai (20 November 1917).

For a variety of reasons, the Cambrai sector had not attracted the attention of artillery to the same extent as other sectors. The nature of that terrain is generally flat and uncovered, but in the 1917 it was difficult to navigate because of the three lines of German trenches, the wagons would have to overcome them and therefore the crews had practiced to act in groups of three using bundles of timber to cross the trenches. Each wagon in turn threw his bundle into a trench and then passed the wagon behind it. In order to facilitate the action of the wagons, the artillery preparation roll had not been foreseen, which should have contributed to the realization of the surprise effect.

No less than 378 fighting tanks were to take part in the battle, plus other 98 support vehicles, like the Mk I equipped as radio carts to transmit the details of the clashes on the reverse as they unfolded. There were also many supply trucks for transporting ammunition and fuel.

Everything was ready in the morning of the November 20 and at the 6.00 the battle began. The wagons were driven into action by their commander, General Hugh Elles, and swiftly advanced into the fog, surpassing the frontline enemy trenches. The exercises and the practice made earlier gave their fruits: the means not only surpassed the first line of trenches, but also the second and third. The effect of the wagons that suddenly came out of the fog impressed many German infantrymen, who in many cases abandoned their trenches to flee to the rear; but in many isolated positions the machine-gunners remained in their seats until they were literally crushed by the tracks of the wagons.

Once the trenches were over, the wagons were found in open terrain and advanced in some stretches for about 8 km, much more than in all the battles of the Somme, which lasted five months, of the previous year. This does not mean that everything went smoothly for the wagons, because, for example, in one stroke a German cannon alone was able to knock off several Mk IVs. Others sank in deep holes and others were hit while trying to charge German batteries directly. But in general, from the English side, all the objectives were achieved and the cross-linked ones eliminated to allow the passage of the planned cavalry charges.

However, the cavalry was unable to enter the line and the subsequent German counterattacks regained all previously lost ground. The main cause of this failure was later ascended to the highest levels of the British General Staff, from which the success of the tankers had been watched with much skepticism: none among His Majesty's senior officers was convinced of the positive use of the tanks and therefore the available reserves had been left too far from the place of action to be of any use for the purpose of maintaining the land gained from the first wave of wagons. They could not keep the positions they had on their own and had to be retired to reorganize and refuel, and on the other hand the advanced infantry was too scarce in number to defend the vast ground conquered. Thus, the battle of Cambrai ended without tangible land gains, but the tanks had proved the validity of the thesis of mass employment. If they were able to fight in conditions appropriate to their characteristics and in adequate numbers, the wagons could have prevailed and won the battle.

But the lesson was not immediately assimilated. The next important action, in which the tanks played a significant part, took place once again on the Somme, in an operation planned even before that of Cambrai. The wagons were again used in limited numbers on a broad front, so that, while on one hand they were able to provide local support and to destroy some fire centers, they did not manage to decisively affect.

This time the battle had been well planned by the German High Command; it was the first of a series of breakthrough battles that began the 21 March 1918. The Germans broke through at various points and, as they advanced, the few available British tanks covered the infantry retreat. Many wagons were lost, more for lack of fuel than for enemy fire. Eventually the German advance stopped due to exhaustion, but it had completely disoriented the Entente Commands.

Although it was not obvious at the time, the March battles were the last effort the Germans could make. Worn out by years of economic blockade and lack of essential supplies, the German army was beginning to feel the lack of men and ammunition. The situation for the Entente forces was diametrically opposed. The Americans began to arrive in substantial numbers and were instrumental in stopping the German advance at Château-Thierry. In addition, as the prospects for the future increased, the first of the new Mk V landed in France ready to enter into action for the month of July. Even the number of wagons and trained crews progressed by leaps and bounds, and in the middle of the 1918 there were on the western front no less than 15 battalions wagons ready for use.

In the series of battles that culminated in the Armistice, a significant example of inter-agency cooperation emerged: Hamel's action of the 4 July 1918, where for the first time the Australian infantry cooperated with the wagons. In the action, from the limited tactical objective, the concentration of the wagons took place under an umbrella, while a short but effective bombardment of artillery preceded the beginning of the attack. The wagons advanced, supporting the Australian infantry to the intended target; Once occupied, the supply wagons proceeded with sufficient provisions to ensure that the troops maintained the conquered ground and that the wagons remained in the area long enough to destroy any source of fire escaped from previous raids. The result was an action in which, allied, there were very few losses and in which the five damaged tanks were also recovered.

The biggest battle of tanks was that of Amiens, which began the 8 1918 in August. The number of wagons used was not inferior to the 450, but some were kept in reserve; for the logistic support there were also 118 supply trucks. These vehicles were distributed on 12 battalions, eight of which were equipped with Mk V, two with Mk V * (version realized with a new section of 1,83 m of height of the hull, to improve the ability to overcome trenches and to reserve more space to interior for the crew or for the transport of materials) and two with medium tanks Mk A Whippet. There were no half measures in Amiens. While the wagons were gathering, their noise was masked by that of low-flying planes and artillery; at the first light of the morning the wagons advanced on the front of the IV British Army. The breakthrough was carried out immediately and the German lines crumbled. As the wagons advanced, they were joined by a battalion of armored cars that were helped by the wagons to cross the battlefield and, once in the open field, prepared themselves pushing deep into the back of the German units. An armored car even managed to attack a train, capturing the maneuvering staff.

The upheaval was total and the troops of the first ranks penetrated for well 12 km. Several tanks were hit, especially from the German countryside pieces that were proving to be the only suitable counter-truck weapon; many of the immobilized tanks were still recovered.

This time the cavalry pushed forward, but when it was beyond the lines it proved incapable of advancing even against individual machine-gun posts as well as moving at the same speed as the carts. Whippet; if it was necessary to prove that the cavalry was no longer suitable for modern warfare, this was provided by the battle of Amiens.

The advanced ones were stopped while the new offensive was being prepared. This was launched in a series of actions in Bapaume, Arras, Epéhy, again Cambrai, Catelet-Bony and Selle, where the advance of the wagons usually took place in close cooperation with the infantry, while the artillery provided support fire. and the aviation carried out the close survey. The degree of cooperation was perfect, to the point that to play it again you had to wait until after the 1940. The results of the action allowed the bypassing of enemy lines and pushed the Germans gradually back to Germany.

The 11 November 1918 was announced the Armistice and the First World War could be said to have ended.

(photo: web)