In May of 2003 the American troops ended their advance towards Baghdad, definitively bending every resistance of the Iraqi army. Saddam Hussein's army no longer existed, while the Bush administration was already at work for the Iraqi state to have a tomorrow. From the military point of view the operation "Cobra II" had been a success even if: "focused almost exclusively on conventional war fighting with SOF forces operating in the support of the main effort"1. Despite the superiority of the coalition, the control of the territory and the population was, in fact, an objective still far away. Immediately the American soldiers were seen as liberators, but in a short time the Iraqis changed their minds. For the winners, a period began that analysts define "the lost years": "a period of uncertainty in which US forces slowly recognized that, although major hostilities in Iraq had ended, the war was far from over"2.
From April 2003 to April 2004, the inability to properly handle the post-Saddam unleashed the violence of the population. In fact, the American troops did not fill that disparity between the population and the Iraqi ruling class, which, among other things, continued to be corrupt. The new situation created the ideal humus for the insurrection fomented by former army soldiers who joined the main terrorist organizations that had been operating in the area for some time. Obviously the Iraqis could not face coalition forces on equal terms, so they used the tactical principles of urban warfare, including widespread use of explosive traps and ambushes.
Birth of the IED problem
The term IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) should not be misleading "in the sense that some IED users and networks have quiet sophisticated production capabilities"3. The use of IEDs as the primary weapon of insurgents has evolved very rapidly, compromising safety in the country in a short time. The 28 June 2003 newspapers spread the name of the first American victim fallen due to an IED: it was the 25enne Jeremiah Smith. From 2003 onwards, attacks with explosives increased exponentially. For the Pentagon it was a real "tactical surprise", as defined by Andrew Smith: "a contemporary examples of conventional militaries being a tactical surprise with operational - if not strategic - implications"4. Thanks to their simplicity and readily available materials, IEDs became the "weapon of choice" of the insurgents, whose purpose was: "kill as many Americans as possible to erode domestic support for the war and provoke US forces into overreacting to attacks"5. The insurgents did not care if there were civilians among the victims: the death of innocents would further amplify their message of terror. Moreover, the population had to understand that the new government could not fight them, even if supported by a super power like the United States.
While the politicians were talking about what was the best solution to stabilize Iraq, the victims among the American soldiers increased and returned to their country with horrendous mutilations. The issue that beset the US government concerned several strategic tactical points, including how the Iraqis built their devices, but especially where they found the explosive material to make them. The question emerged in the 2004, just during the final stages of the presidential campaign that saw the Democrats John Kerry against Republican George Bush opposed. The Democratic senator presented a report to Congress stating the mysterious disappearance of 377 tons of explosives from the Al Qaqaa military depot south of Baghdad6. The total disarmament of the Iraqi forces had therefore been a failure. Furthermore, the same investigation concluded that the explosives that disappeared from the Al Qaqaa deposits were only a small part of the amount available to the insurgents. The explosive was the basic element that was used to make a IED, but the most important part concerned everything that revolved around a bomb, from who built it, who financed it and finally the individual who materially placed it .
Some IED were assembled by very experienced hands: "The insurgency's expert bombmakers - explains Montgomery McFate - are mostly former members of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS), the Mukhabarat"7. Before the end of the regime, the unit responsible for the construction of the explosive traps was the M-21 whose work was divided between several sections because "no one person constructed an entire explosive device alone"8. From the 2003 onwards the IEDs began to be increasingly lethal and widespread as a weapon of terror, even among less experienced groups. Furthermore, the use of vehicles driven by more or less aware suicide bombers (VBIED)9 increased both their power and range of action10. According to a study by Scott Swanson, IEDs could be divided into categories related to the complexity of their construction. For example, those designed by former M-21 members were classifiable as first level, then followed by mid-level ones: "Offshoots of these groups or aspiring individuals fall into about 100 plus mid-tier expertise IED cells and insurgent networks "11. Finally, there were the devices made by the so-called "low skill bomb makers and untrained willing participants in the form of gang structures or grieving locals"12.
After extensive use of ordinary ammunition (Unexploded Ordnance UXO), Iraqis specialized in the construction of different, even less sophisticated, devices. This was a need born to deceive - as we shall see - the increasingly technological countermeasures adopted by the EODs. HMEs (Home Made Explosives) exploited more commercial materials: "often composed of ubiquitous fertilizer, easily transportable and convertible to greater-than-TNT explosive power"13. The bombs were detonated by radio command (Remote Controlled RCIEDs) derived from commonly used objects such as a remote control of a car or a mobile phone. In this sense, paradoxically, the presence of American forces with all their equipment saturated the air with radio frequencies that were then exploited by the attackers themselves.
Another "more military" evolution of the IEDs, expressly indicated to hit armored vehicles, were hollow point EFPs (Explosively Formed Penetrators) driven by mobile sensors. However, these weapons were not built in Iraq, but came from smuggling on the border with Iran14.
The IED, besides being a highly destructive weapon, produced a paralyzing psychological effect. As Andy Oppenhemier explains, they could be "hidden along highways and disguised in meals, drinks, dead animal carcasses, or as rocks; encased in cement, placed in manholes, or in tunnel under the road "15. No corner of Iraqi territory could really be defined as "free" from the danger of FDI. Western forces could stem the problem on the ground, but a broader strategy was needed that would interrupt the flow of materials and skills to build them.
C-IED: rules, countermeasures, equipment and training
In the 2003 General John Abizaid sent a note to the commander of CENTCOM (Central Command) and to the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The commander of the US military in Iraq demanded that the Pentagon adopt extraordinary measures against the IEDs and in particular "Abizaid described a need for a Manhattan-like project to address the IED problem"16. The historical reference to the project of construction of the atomic bomb made understand the urgency and gravity of the problem which, to be solved, had to involve various civil and military authorities. The first response was the formation of the "Army IED Task Force" made up of 12 people and based in Washington DC. In June of 2005 the organization changed from "Joint Integrated Process Team" to "Joint IED Defeat Task Force" (JIEDD TF). In January of 2006 the "Joint IED Defeat Organization" was officially born (JIEDDO)17.
The American authorities had to give two different types of answers to the problem. The first concerned the military in the field, that is, supplying them with suitable equipment and means to face the IED emergency in the short term. The second, in the long run, was to include a program capable of neutralizing IEDs even before they were placed. Actually the Pentagon improved the equipment for the army units with systems of neutralization and identification of explosives, also in experimental form: "Microwave blasts, radio frequency jammers, and chemical sensor"18. The first jammers (called "Warlock Greens" and produced by EDO Corporation), for example, were not so effective: they created continuous interference with military radio systems and the insurgents could change the frequencies of the radio controls much more quickly than disturbing systems.19. Another instrument of great value were the "robots" or UGV (Unmanned Ground Vehicles) which from the 2003 to date have undergone continuous upgrades to improve their performance.
To protect the soldiers during patrols and displacements, the famous MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) arrived in Iraq, or Buffalo, with the V-hull which cost the American administration several million dollars: "for every four soldiers killed while riding in armored HMMWVs that were attacked by IEDs in [Iraq], only one was killed in MRAPs attacked by similar IEDs "20.
The EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) units were the tip of the counter attack allied to the IEDs demonstrating that the human factor was always the best method to fight the IED threat. Americans and British (the latter with a greater operational background from the conflict in Northern Ireland) deployed very well prepared EOD staff: their workload became heavier every day with serious consequences on the psychological health of the operators.
The Pentagon and NATO had to find a common Counter IED (C-IED) strategy to eliminate the root problem. IEDs were by definition an asymmetric weapon, a "weapon of strategic influence" and therefore were part of COIN's broader strategy. The most important thing was to break consensus against the terrorists by destroying the supply lines and the IED production process 21. Ultimately, the Coalition's military was to organize a training program for the Iraqi armed forces to fight terrorists autonomously and defuse the bombs.
From this desire the three fundamental points of the C-IED strategy were born. Here we will analyze the Iraq problem: Attack the Network (AtN), Defeat the Device (DtD) and Prepare the Force (PtF). In Iraq the term network referred to insurgents assumed fundamental characteristics and is still the crux around which the whole COIN strategy revolves. Attacking the network means "offensive operations against complex networks of financiers, IED makers, and their supporting infrastructure"22. The social fabric within which the insurgents were moving was closed, frightened and suspicious, and consequently being able to steal information about where the deposits were located rather than the explosives laboratories was almost impossible. Some operative cells acted within their own territory, while others - as Swanson observes - could be detached from one part of the country to another, making intelligence investigations more difficult.
The collection of information implemented on the IED object, in this case called WTI (Weapon Technical Intelligence), is the most important part to follow the traces of who supplies the IED manufacturers. At the beginning the people able to manufacture a bomb were not many and even today all the know-how on how to build them is in the hands of a few men. According to McFate this could be an advantage for coalition forces because: "if bombmakers are captured or killed, their expert knowledge dies with them"23. The collected WTI data interact with each other with the tactical procedures of the COIN doctrine and in particular with the data emerged from the special operations. Thanks to the biometric surveys carried out on the defused and removed explosives, we have created a database "to be associated with specific IED to discrete individual, link cluster of devices to a specific bombmakers or IED cell"24.
The second point - Defeat the Device - is more about the destruction of the IED. For the military engaged in Iraq the main objective was to clear away the few main roads from the explosive traps. Securing communication routes did not just mean destroying IEDs, but also cover the mitigation of the effects, the force protection and the use of electronic countermeasures (ECM).25.
The last point, the most difficult to achieve, focuses on training Iraqi specialists to independently face the danger of FDI. The United States and other NATO countries have spent many resources to provide equipment and equipment to Iraqi forces and also trainers included in the Military Assistance programs still in place in Baghdad.
The dilemma of insurgents
To face ever more precise C-IED technology, Iraqis have tried to simplify their devices, changing their devices, but above all by modifying their TTPs. "The insurgency" - explains Anthony Codesman - "has effectively found a form of low technology" swarm "tactics that is superior to what the high technology Coalition and Iraqi have been able to find as a counter"26. A good example of what Cordesman says is about the type of weapons employed by Iraqis from the 2005 onwards: the radio controlled IEDs found, in fact, a tough opponent in the Anglo American ECM technology. The radio wave trigger mechanisms were replaced by pressure IEDs: "For insurgents, the advantage to a pressure switch is that no one risk capture by staying nearby to trigger the explosion"27. In addition, the Iraqi bombmakers tried to insert less and less metal parts in order to escape the metal detectors.
The truth is that FDI can not be defeated only by technology, therefore, in light of the experience gained, projects such as those of JIEDDO - now more simply renamed JIDO (Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization) are to be considered satisfactory, but not decisive. " An honest assessment "- emphasizes Cordesman -" of the insurgent Iraq War, and particularly of its political an ideological dimension, also illustrates that technology is not a panacea, especially when the insurgency is far more "humancentric" than netcentric "28. In 2011, after five years of work and millions of dollars invested in projects with private companies, the danger of FDI was still far from being solved: "in fact, the rate at which soldiers are able to find IEDs before they explode has remained mostly steady, at roughly 50 percent, since JIEDDO was formed "29.
From the 2003 onwards, information was collected that was used for an even more accurate development of the C-IED strategy in both the military and civil sectors. Without going into details, today the threat of FDI has spread to all areas evolving into a continuous "cat and mouse" duel with the C-IED strategy. The improvised explosive device has therefore become a public threat, an economic weapon that absorbs large sums of money from the budgets of the states and reapes countless victims not only in the theaters of war. For terrorists, FDI is a weapon that maximizes the concept of "cost-benefit". Building an IED involves a negligible expense, while the technology to eliminate them can make the budget of any state in deficit. Not to mention the "on-line" dissemination of instructions to build a bomb, easily accessible by anyone who wants to immolate himself to the Islamist cause. There are forums and internet sites where so-called instructors provide all the necessary information on how to deal with explosives and which targets are most appropriate to cause greater damage.30.
In the 2003 the Iraqi IEDs paralyzed every Iraqi city activity for a long time, undermined the infrastructure and credibility of the new government set up by the Americans. Iraqis, whose concept of security has always been very labile, have seen their situation worsen further, mainly because the coalition has never really managed to protect them. From February 2003 to April 2006 the number of civilian deaths in Iraq has reached impressive peaks and with the advent of the Islamic State this trend seems to stand on ever higher values31.
1 TR Mocktatis, Iraq and the Challange of Counterinsurgency (Westport Connectict, London: Praeger, 2008), 87.
2 Ididem, 95.
3 Addressing Improvised ExplosiveDevices. UNIMIRED RESOURCES, UNIDIR Resoruces, 2015. URL: http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/-en-641.pdf
4 A. Smith, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response, The Let Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, April, 2011, vii.
5 Iraq and the Challenge, 109.
6 "The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is the United Nations' watchdog agency for nuclear issues, said that their inspectors had seen the Al Qaqaa explosives in January 2003 and had affixed IAEA seals on the bunkers. By the time US soldiers showed up on 10 April, the explosives had disappeared ". MD Klingelhofer, Captured enemy ammunitionin operation Iraqi Freedom and its strategic importance in post-conflict operations, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 2005. URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf
7 M. McFate, "Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs", in Military Review, May-June 2005, 37. URL: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/mcfate3.pdf
8 "An improvised explosive device started in the chemistry department. The electronic department prepared the timer and wiring of the IED ". Ibid.
9 "Car bombs, explosives hardwires to the ignition of a vehicle, and bombs attached to motorcycles are some of the weapons that are included in this category". G. Lafree, "Developing An Empirical Understanding of Improvised Explosive Devices: A Social and Behavioral Science Perspective", START, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism "August 28, 2009, 3. URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/developing-empirical-understanding-...
10 "Iraq - The Evolution of the IED", CBRN World, Autumn 2008, 72. URL:http://www.cbrneworld.com/_uploads/download_magazines/08_autumn_IRAQ_EVO...
11 S. Swanson, "Viral Targeting of the IED Social Network System", Small Wars Journal, Vol. 8, May 2007, 5. URL: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/viral-targeting-of-the-ied-social-netwo...
12 Ibidem, 6.
13 "Counter Improvised Explosive Device Strategic Plan - JESUS 2012-2016", 3, URL: https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20120116_C-IEDStrategicPlan_ExSum_Fi...
14 TB Smith-M. Tranchemontagne, Understanding the Enemy: The Enduring Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation, 75 Joint Force Quarterly, National Defense University Press, September 30, 2014, 2. URL: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577571/jfq-...
15 A. Oppenheimer, "IEDS: Meeting Future Threats" in NBC International, Summer 2008, 18. URL: http://www.iapscience.com/files/IED%20article.pdf
16 Improvised Explosive Devices, 13.
17 Ibidem, 14.
18 C. Wilson, Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures, CRS Report for Congress, November 23, 2005, 3. URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22330.pdf
19N. Shachtman, "The Secret History of Iraq's Invisible War, in Wired, 06.14.11, URL: https://www.wired.com/2011/06/iraqs-invisible-war/
20 D. Ax, "The Great MRAP Debate: Are Blast-Resistant Vehicles Worth it?", Breaking Defense, October 1, 2012. URL: http://breakingdefense.com/2012/10/the-great-mrap-debate-are-blast-resis...
21 TB Smith-M. Tranchemontagne, Understanding the Enemy: The Enduring Value of Technical and Forensic Exploitation, 75 Joint Force Quarterly, National Defense University Press, September 30, 2014, 2. URL: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577571/jfq-...
22 Counter Improvised Explosive, 8.
23 Iraq: The Social Context, 38.
24 Undertanding the Enemy, 2
25 "Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Doctrine Review", C-IED Center of Excellence, 5. URL: http://www.ciedcoe.org/Galerias/documents/C-IED_Doctrine_Review.pdf
26 AH Cordesman, Iraq's Evolving Insurgency, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 9, 2005, iii.
URL:https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/media/cs...
27 R. Jervis, "Pressure-Triggered Bombs Worry US Force", US Today, October 24, 2005. URL: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-10-24-roadside-bombs...
28 Iraq's Evolving, viii.
29 P. Clary-N. Youssef, "JIEDDO: The Manhattan Project That Bombed", in The Center for Public Integrity National Security, March 27, 2011. URL: https://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/03/27/3799/jieddo-manhattan-project...
30 A. Stenersen, Bomb-Making for Beginners': Inside at Al-Qaeda E-Learing Course, in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 7, Issue 1, February 2013, 30-37. URL: https://www.ffi.no/no/Forskningen/Avdeling-Analyse/Terra/Publikasjoner/D...
31 Only in Iraq since December 2012 to November 2013 there have been 7.347 incidents caused by IED with a number of 22.466 victims; from December 2013 to November 2014 there was a slight decline but since March 2015 in February 2016 Iraq has earned the sad record of first country in the world with the number of victims caused by IEDs with 12.045 accidents and 34.431 dead. "Iraq-Syria Daesh IED Report", CIED COE, June 2016. URL: http://www.ciedcoe.org/Galerias/documents/Jun_2016/20160609_IRAQ-SYRIA_D...
(photo: web)
